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have me believe, but I am assigning the cause why I am not able to adopt your hypothesis. The purpose for which we reason is that we may un derstand the matter."

Surely Mr. Holyoake may have his own words retorted on him, from the same page :

"Now, the manner in which this matter appears to us is that we want satisfaction of the understanding. If it is not proposed to give me any satisfaction in that respect-if it seems repugnant to the intention or to the judgment of other persons to satisfy me upon this matter, pray, if my understanding is not at all to be interested, on what ground do you claim my attention, or anybody's attention, to your system, as being a reasonable system? It seems to me, if you once put it on the ground of discussion-if you once say you can get, or pride yourselves on possessing, a faith more rational than my own, it must be because you can give better reasons, explain it in a better manner, and do more to satisfy my understanding. Now, in urging this argument, I surely do no more than the gentleman on the other side proposes; and the fault may be mine in not seeing the weight of the reasons presented to us, but the fault cannot be because I require those reasons.'

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Our champion of Atheism has great faith in Nature, that she could do many things, if we would but wait, and give her time, as if she had not on his hypothesis, had eternity to work in:-thus he falls into conjecture on the powers of nature, whilst his constant professions are to confine his enquiries to the order of nature: he says,

"You heard distinct reference made to the argument of design. The great force of what our friend said, briefly amounted to the improbability of matter being equal to the production of the various things we observe

in nature.

"We are curious to account for those things, and when I cannot account for them by one process which the theologian may point out, then I have to look in some other direction to account for them. Why I suppose nature is equal to the performance of all things is, not because matter has a certain form, and does not do certain things now-if world could wait long enough, if time were given sufficient for the purpose, we should find that this matter would change without help on our part, and would become we know not what, because it has already become what it is from what we are not able to explain."

This is well answered by Mr. Townley in the following passage:-

"Now, had it been only in the infancy of mankind that common sense had reported to reason that there were organisms and contrivance in nature, to produce which there appeared no sufficient amount of intelligence in nature, but that, as time rolled on, as miscroscopic aid began to be afforded, as matter began to be examined with greater care and attention, common sense had discovered and reported to reason, that at length intelligence was found in matter adequate to the production of all the contri

vances that nature exhibits-had this been the case, I would have been as forward as our friend in preferring the later reports of common sense to those of an earlier time, and in requiring reason to hearken to them, and to reverse the decision it had originally pronounced.

But such has not been the case. Microscopes (some of them magnifying half a million of times) have been invented, and employed in the frequent examination of particles of matter, by the most scientific men, with the greatest care and attention; but common sense is as far as ever from discovering any appearance of intelligence in them whatsoever.

"Will our friend declare that we have not waited long enough to ascertain what there is in nature-that, though the required intelligence is not now displayed to common sense by nature, it is expected that it will be at some future time; and that, till such time arrives, nature ought to have credit for being now in the possession of such intelligence; and thus, there being no need for the agency of a supernatural being, we should believe that no such supernatural being exists?"

His conclusion of this argument is a powerful and beautiful illustration of the necessity for some other power than exists in material things, to combine them into certain arrangements :

"Will he say, that as particles of matter are reported by common sense to be possessed of self-moving power, this power is enough to account for the formation of the eye and other human organs? Without stopping to debate whether common sense, after the innumerable observations it has made, will not, on the contrary, affirm that, in order to selfmotion, there must be life-without stopping to debate this, let it, for argument's sake, be granted, that a particle of matter can move itself. I then ask, can it guide itself also? An eye is to be formed; some millions of corpuscles, or particles of matter, are required, in order to its formation-if each of these millions of particles has power to move itself, is it able also to guide itself into its own proper position in the forthcoming organ? Has it intelligence enough to do this? And if it has, I yet further ask, would even such intelligence as this meet the exigency of the case? Intelligence is wanted sufficient to have contrived the eye. Unless such intelligence as this be possessed, the requirements of the case are not met; reason is not satisfied; reason requires an adequate contriver; if one cannot be found in nature, it must be sought for out of nature-have one, reason must, and reason will.

"If there were in a field a vast multitude of self-moving, self-guiding bricks, and beams, and stone, and, in order to form an intended edifice, each of these building materials had power and intelligence to move itself into its own proper place in the roof, or in the floor, or in the wall; still, the final appearance of a commodious and well-contrived habitation cannot be accounted for but upon the hypothesis that some architect, possessed of adequate intelligence, had made the plan. The self-moving, selfguiding materials would no more account for the edifice than the labourers, who with their hands moved and guided into their appropriate places the bricks, beams, and stones of which St. Paul's cathedral is composed, would account for the erection of that noble structure. A Sir Christopher o 3

VOL. II.

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Wren must be found. For the erection of the yet more noble temple of the human body, a greater than Sir Christopher Wren is wanted. accomplish this there must be a God."

We look in vain through this discussion for any advantages to be derived from Mr. Holyoake's views, though he frequently boasts of these, as he does of his understanding of nature, or requirement of explanations:

"I feel anxious to fully justify myself before so large a number of persons, against the supposition that I would for one moment occupy myself with anything less than a direct practical issue. I deal with this question-I trust we shall always have it so treated-I deal with it on strict practical grounds.

"I am anxious for something to come out of this issue which shall be of service to us, for we have somewhat endangered our controversy-the advantage of free speech-by not always taking care, when so many persons are inclined to protest against that privilege, not to employ it on that which is speculative, barren, beyond time, and, therefore obscure; but we should take care to employ it upon that which goes home to men's business and bosoms, and gives them something on which they can repose, and by which they shall better direct their lives."

In what respect men are benefitted, or their lives improved, Mr. Holyoake leaves us altogether in the mist; so that his mission is palpably useless, or at anyrate he cannot shew that his principles are good for anything; the confesssion, therefore, was not out of place, though not gracefully made, when by way of reproach to his opponent he observed,—

"I do think we occupy too much of public attention by mere discuss sions and reiterations of opinion upon those ABSTRACT POINTS WHICH HAVE NO RELATION TO HUMAN DESTINY OR PROGRESS."

We expect, however, that in another discussion now anticipated, Mr. Holyoake will redeem his pledge, of shewing some practical advantages of his system, and no more waste his own time or that of the public with "abstract points," and we shall look for a very clear and practical statement of those good things which his system has in store for the world.

Whilst on this point of utility, we may observe, the peculiarities of the theory of morals advocated by the Atheistic Seculars: they base morality on reason and utility; and find in this a sufficient guide and guarantee for human duty: yet in this discussion, that basis seems to be repudiated: in opposition to the argument of Mr. Townley on prudence, or taking the safer side, Mr. Holyoake observed:

"Now I think that the demoralization of reasoning. I know, on the part of my friend, this is said in the utmost purity-this is said in kindness, to warn us against what he supposes to be a precipice: but I submit, in human affairs we never so act; and a man never asks himself, whether it is safe and proper to be a patriot, or to take the side of truth he only asks, not whether it is prudent, but whether it is his duty

to do so whether it be right and proper. I confess, I believe in this matter we ought to disregard the question of prudence, and cleave closely to the reasons of our conduct, and to the righteousness of our actions.

"I will only add, I differ from my friend. I am not in search of happiness. I think, happiness ought to be a secondary thing. Our first thing is to make sure we are right; the next thing, is to make sure we do our duty. It is our business to walk in the right path, and leave our happiness to take care of itself."

Then utility is a very blind guide on moral questions, and our philosophers must look out for a better basis and guarantee; they must strike out some boasts on their moral theory as a point of secular superiority, and begin to build over again,

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IV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN NATURE.

The Nature of Man as Spiritual, Immortal, and Responsible, will be the most frequent topic of this department: though sometimes we shall introduce MISCELLANEOUs Subjects.

AN ADDRESS ON LAYING THE CORNER-STONE OF A PRIMITIVE METHODIST CHAPEL & SCHOOLS, GOOCH STREET, BROMSGROVE STREET, BIRMINGHAM, August 23rd, 1852.*

He observed, respecting the RISE OF PRIMITIVE METHODISM, that there are two points of a great work or important course of events, which excite most attention, the beginning and the end: the foundation-stone and the top-stone. Men have naturally a desire to explore the beginning of whatever becomes great; they trace a vast river to its source, and admire the source because of what it grows into; the end gives importance to the beginning: the few huts which commence a future city, become historical from the events to which they have led. So on the birth of an infant, as the beginning of an immortal being, we are led to serious consideration: the same is true of a place of worship, which is to influence the eternal destiny of many. With such feelings we may trace back the origin of the Primitives. Some forty years ago, in 1810, there was a little band, a society of ten members, no seceders from other denominations, but, by the grace of God, gathered together by a separate instrumentality. This little flock of ten was, about forty years ago, assembling in a room in Standley, Staffordshire,-a church in a house,-now, no house could hold them; the little one has become a hundred and ten thousand! This is something like building. Suppose they were to go on at the same rate of progress, the present numbers being as earnest as the first ten, and, therefore, increasing in proportion, they would soon overtake the ig norance and depravity of our outstanding population. Already, they may say with Jacob, "with my staff" (having no other riches than a walking stick,) "I crossed over this Jordan, and now I am become two bands."

Having noticed the origin of the Primitives, let us examine THEIR MISSION, and we shall find IT IS PECULIAR. All varieties of Christians answer different ends; and Primitive Methodism has two objects to serve:

By the Rev. Brewin Grant, B.A.

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