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Wonder not at this language from a soldier. I am a Christian: I am an old Spaniard, and I am persuaded that they are not earthly victories, but bolts from heaven which reach the wicked, such as the Corsican and his generals, whose principles are bad, and whose conduct is worse. I resign, therefore, my staff to this sovereign queen; she has been the general who has delivered the kingdom thus long: she it is who will deliver all that is placed under this staff, no longer mine but hers, and the Lord's who is the God of bat. tles."

It would be wronging the marquis to break off here, for in other parts of his address he spoke in the proper language of a patriot and a commander. "This is a holy war," said he, "in which we must fight like the Maccabees. Let him who feels for the public cause join us, and take arms, and offer himself as a sacrifice, and put forth his hand, and advance, and attack, and triumph. Eternal war against the tyrant, war against the coward, against the impious, the selfish, the peculator, and him who does not labour to his utmost in the good cause. Confide in the government and it will confide in you. If there is conduct in the chiefs, there will be conduct in the people moderation in the expendi. ture, and there will be plenty in the army; order in private families, and it will display itself in public actions; activity in individuals, and the army will be invincible; let there be obedience, union, fidelity, justice and truth, and God will fight with us."

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Unfortunately there were many in Valencia upon whom the first part of this address was likely to have more effect than the second. A friar, preaching in the Plaza Catalina, said to his auditors, "If the cortes think of abolishing our holy order, and that of our sisters the nuns, obey them not, ye armed Valencians, but oppose such

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mandates like lions. We are the servants of God, whom you must obey rather than man. The English themselves, though they have an excellent constitution, must eventually fall for want of the blessing of the Catholic faith. Ask not for cannon and gunpowder, but rather fly to your altars ; and instead of any vain attempt to resist the victorious French by force of arms, implore the aid of Heaven, which alone can avert the heavy calamities that threaten you." Zaragoza is as Catholic a city as Valencia, but it was not by such sermons as this that the heroism of the Zaragozans was excited and sustained.

Zaragoza had defended itself without any other hope than what the inhabitants placed in themselves. Valencia prepared for its defence under very different circumstances; it was true, indeed, that the French hitherto had succeeded in all their sieges; but, on the other hand, the Spanish general, who was now arrived to oppose them, came with full powers, civil as well as military, and the whole strength of the executive authority, to carry into effect whatever measures he might think needful The collected force under his command was equal in number to that of the invaders, and one division of 6000 men, taking its name from the fieid of Albuhera, had attained discipline upon which the officers could rely, and reputation which every effort would be made to support. Some of the generals also stood high in public opinion; Lardizabal had distinguished himself in Lapena's expedition; and Zayas was thought by the English, as well as by his own countrymen, one of the best officers in the Spanish service. Lines had been made to cover the city; no labour had been spared upon them; lines well constructed and adequately manned are upon all military principles impregnable; there could be no want of men here,

for, in addition to the regular force, the city and the kingdom contained a numerous and willing population.

Twelve miles east of Valencia is the town of Murviedro, which had been fortified. Colonel Andrioni was appointed to command there with a garrison of 3500 men, who volunteered for this service. Murviedro stands upon the site of Saguntum; and that recollection would have stimulated any honourable man to rival the fidelity which has rendered that name illustrious. The Roman theatre here, which is one of the most perfect remains of the ancients, and the other antiquities of this sacred spot, were held in such proper estimation by the Spanish government, that in 1785, under the ministry of the Conde d'Aranda, an officer was appointed to preserve them. When it was deemed necessary to fortify the place the engineers condemned the theatre; the conservator appealed to the cortes, and the cortes unanimously agreeing that it would be a reproach to the nation if this precious monument should be destroyed, addressed the regents, requiring them to give orders for its careful preservation.

On the 15th of September, Andrioni entered upon his charge, and a few days afterward the French from Tortosa and from Aragon began their march toward Valencia. Suchet had with him all the disposeable troops from Aragon and Catalonia; withdraw ing many of the less important garrigons, and smaller detachments, in full confidence that there was neither energy enough in the general government of Spain, nor union enough among the provincial authorities, to make a due advantage of the opportunity which was thus afforded them. He arrived before Murviedro on the 27th, and took possession of the town. Blake retreated from that place to the capital with 13,000 men, these were the flower of s army, the divisions of General

Obispo and Villacampa under D. Car los O'Donnel, brother to the Conde de Bisbal, remained in the field, 4000 men occupied Segorbe and Liria, and Bassecourt, with about 2000, was in Reguena and Utril; besides these forces the commander-in-chief had 1600 horse, part of them veteran troops.

Against such means of resistance, Suchet would never have ventured to advance if he had not despised the Valencian troops. Here, as in every part of Spain, the spirit of the people was excellent, but no where had it been more wretchedly misdirected. With an abundant population, brave and patriotic enough to offer themselves to any danger and submit to any sacrifices, and with resources greater than those of any other province from its redundant fertility, Valencia had scarcely made an effort in favour of its neighbours. At the earnest requisition of the British naval commander on that coast, a body of its troops had been detached into Catalonia, and they were actually embarked without a musket, because there was an established regulation, that before they left the province their arms must be deposited in the arsenal. When arms were provided for them, it was judged necessary to march them into Aragon, but they refused to enter that kingdom, and in consequence returned to Valencia without having faced the enemy. Whenever, indeed the Valencian army had faced them, some glaring misconduct had appeared, and some lamentable disaster been the necessary result. The spirit of provincialism ceased to paralyse them when the enemy was within their own territory, but Suchet still calculated upon the want of discipline in the men, and want of skill in the leaders: some reliance too he placed upon those infamous means of seduction by which France has triumphed as often as by her arms.

The day after he reached Murviedr●

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saulted it a second time on the 8th, and was again repulsed. The castle of Oropesa surrendered on the 11th, after a cannonade of a few hours. Cap. tain Eyre, in the Magnificent, had just arrived to assist it, but he came only in time to bring off the garrison of a tower about a mile distant. Artillery and tools could now be safely brought from Tortosa; and a week afterwards a practicable breach_was

he assaulted the fort at two in the
morning; in three places the escalade
was attempted, but the French were
repulsed at all points with the loss of
their ladders, and of more than 400
killed and wounded. They kept pos-
session of the town, broke through the
party walls of the houses, that they
might thus communicate without ex-
posing themselves to the fire of the gar-
rison, barricadoed the streets, and plant
in those houses which looked effected.
guns
toward the fort. This was not effect-
ed without some loss, and the besieg-
ers had not yet brought up their bat-
tering train; it was to come from Tor-
tosa, and the little fort of Oropesa in
their rear commanded the road. Such-
et gave directions for reducing this,
and acted in the meantime against the
troops in the field. Obispo was at
tacked on the 30th at Seneja, and
driven back upon Segorbe; there he
rallied, but reinforcements came to the
enemy, which again gave them the su-
periority; they entered Segorbe also
in pursuit of his broken troops, put
all who resisted to the sword, and
drove him towards Liria. The next
object of Suchet was to drive General
Carlos O'Donnell's division beyond
the Guadaliavar; on the night of Oc-
tober 1st he marched against it; the
advanced guard was attacked and rout-
ed at Betero; the main body at Bena-
guacil little loss was sustained by the
Spaniards in these actions, but they
did not contribute to raise the charac-
ter of the Valencian troops in the eyes
of their enemies, and Suchet, who knew
that the struggle would be with Blake's
forces, endeavoured to provoke that
general into the field, by reproaching
him for having remained idle in Valen-
cia while two divisions of his army
were defeated

He had made himself, however, already so far master of the field, as to continue his operations against Murviedro without interruption. He as

Twice in the course of the

day and the night the French attempted to storm it: the garrison behaved like men, and repulsed them with great slaughter. The fort, though, according to the inveterate habit of procrastination which has for centuries been the reproach of Spanish policy, its works were incomplete, yet was capable of making a very formidable resistance for it was so constructed as to form four parts, each of which might be defended after the others were taken. Blake calculated upon the impetuosity of the enemy, the steadiness of the garrison, and the patriotism of the governor; the two former did not deceive him: and, being unwilling to hazard a battle, because he felt an ominous apprehension of the result, he laid down for himself a wise plan of operations; which was to abstain from battle, in hope that the French would weaken themselves in the siege, and thatthey might be compelled to retreat by movements upon their flank and on the side of Aragon.

It was part of this plan to surprise the French in Cuenca, and thus cut off Suchet's communication with Madrid; this expedition was committed to General Mahy's care, that Mahy who was employed and trusted after his misconduct in Galicia. The Conde de Montijo was to co operate with him. The attempt proved ineffectual, and Mahy returned with his division to join the commander-in-chief. In Aragon the Spaniards were led by men of a differ

ent stamp, and their movements would have led to very different results, if the spirit of provincialism, and that insubordination which long habits of military independence can scarcely fail to produce, had not frustrated fair beginnings, and bright prospects of success. A decree of the cortes had attach ed the Guerilla parties to the armies of their respective districts, and given rank to their leaders, leaving them to pursue their own system of warfare at their own discretion, but subjecting them thus to a military superior when ever they should be called upon. Duran and the Empecinado, who commanded, the one in the province of Soria, the other in that of Guadalaxara, each with the rank of brigadier, had been ordered by Blake to unite and enter Aragon, which Suchet had drained of troops for the expedition against Valencia. Their collected force was computed at about 4000 men. With the greater part of this force they appeared before the city of Sept. 26. Calatayud, where the enemy had a garrison of be tween 8 and 900 men. Not expecting, as it appears, so bold a measure on the part of the Guerillas, the French upon sight of them sent out a detachment, who took post upon an eminence before the city, where there was a ruined castle; of this detachment about 50 were killed and as many made prisoners, not a man escaping; the garrison then, and all the persons connected with them, took shelter in the convent of the Mercenarios; this edifice had been fortified, and was one of those posts which gave them military posses. sion of the country. The Spaniards had no artillery, and having in vain at tempted to burn it, began to mine. This was a branch of warfare in which they had little skill and less experience; on the third day the mine was ready, it was exploded and produced

no effect, though two others were immediately commenced Meantime a re inforcement of 200 foot and 50 horse, the precursors of a much larger force from Zaragoza, came to relieve the be sieged-the Empecinado hastened to meet them, routed them, and chased them as far as Almunia, taking the colonel who commanded prisoner, and more than 200 of their muskets and knapsacks, which they threw away to disencumber themselves in flight. On the sixth day of Oct. 3. the siege, the match was laid to the second mine, which produced little more effect than the first; the third, however, was more successful; it brought down part of the wall of the church, and the French then capitulated, on condition that the officers should be sent to France on their parole. Five hundred men were made prisoners, and about 150 killed and wounded were found in the con vent. There were found here provi sions and money which had been collected by the intrusive government: the grain was sold at a fair price to the inhabitants of the district for seed. This Duran and the Empecinado thought necessary, that they might lessen as much as possible the evils arising from the state of waste to which that part of the country was abandoned. Soon afterwards more than 3000 French arrived,-they fol lowed the patriots, hoping to recover the plunder, but the Guerilla chiefs gave them no opportu: ity of effect. ing this, and the next day the enemy returned into Navarre, where they were recalled to resist Espoz y Mina. Lord Wellington, by a movement upon Ciudad Rodrigo, among other most essential services which he rendered to Spain, had compelled Marmont to draw troops from Navarre. and Mina, being thus relieved from the long-continued pressure of forces ten times out

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numbering his own, was availing himself of the opportunity with his wonted boldness.

These movements greatly disquieted Suchet: his communication with Tortosa was interrupted by the arm ed peasantry; scarcity began to be felt in his camp, and he was obliged to detach 4000 men to protect a convoy going from Zaragoza. It was Blake's hope that the three corps of Duran, the Empecinado, and Mina, might threaten that city, and perhaps succeed in delivering it from its oppressors. Zaragoza was probably too well fortified for their insufficient means of attack, but the plan was well-concerted, and if it had been executed, Suchet would hardly have ventured to maintain his ground in the kingdom of Valencia. The attempt, however, was not made; for some differences arose between Duran and the Empecinado, and instead of forming a junction with Mina, they separated from each other. By this time Murviedro was closely pressed, a battery of eight four-andtwenty pounders had been constructed, and the governormade signals of distress. The Spaniards were eager for battle, and Blake consented to gratify them: he had a just confidence in part of his army, and knowing that the Valencian and Aragonese levies were neither deficient in will nor in courage, expected that they would fight well, knowing themselves to be supported by good troops. Every thing tempted him to this resolution;-the necessity of relieving Murviedro, the ardour of the soldiers, the remembrance of Albuhera, and the hope that one victory, when victory certainly appeared attainable, and would be of such immense importance, would repay him for the many disasters which he had sustained. He advanced, therefore, on the 24th about noon, and took post for that night on the height of El Puig, his right rest

ing on the sea, and his left upon Liria.

The country between Valencia and Murviedro, is, like a closely-planted orchard, bounded by the sea on the right, and on the left terminating at some distance from the foot of the mountains which separate Valencia from La Mancha, Cuenca, and Aragon. Three great carriage roads cross this land of gardens; and by these three roads the attack was to be made; for though, from the nature of the ground, the left wing could not be united with the centre and the right, it was thought that this would be a less inconvenience than to leave open either of these three roads. It was of especial consequence to occupy the left road, that of Betera, for should Suchet, as might be expected, endeavour to anticipate the attack, he might otherwise send his main body in this direction, where the mountains would cover them, and the open country give free scope for his cavalry and for those manoeuvres, in which Blake knew but too well the superiority of the enemy.

On the next morning the army was put in motion for the attack. Zayas commanded the right wing, Lardiza bal the centre, Carlos O'Donnell the left, consisting of the Valencian division under Miranda, and the Aragonese under Villacampa: Mahy, with the Murcian division, was to support this wing; Blake, with another body of reserve, remained upon El Puig. The left wing was to begin the attack: relying upon the support which they would receive from the centre and the other wing, who were to accompany the movement and cover them on the right; this, it was thought, would be a resource in case of a want of firmness on their part, which would not have been the case, had a different disposition been preferred. If there was an error in Blake's disposition, it was

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