officer of the flotilla surveyed the coast of the island, to fix upon a place for embarking the garrison, if they should be compelled to evacuate both posts A precaution of this kind, if it had been publicly known, might have contributed, by disheartening the men, to produce the catastrophe which it seemed to anticipate; but it was the duty of the commanders to think of the worst result, while they hoped and acted for the best; and when they remembered what weak walls and insufficient works were opposed to a numerous enemy, experienced in all the arts of war, and more especially in the attack of fortified places, it was not without good reason that they thought it expedient to provide a place for embarkation. Hitherto, however, the defence had been well and fortunately conducted; and the fire of the gun-boats and from the island was so well directed, that great part of the enemy's stores and their heavy artillery had not yet been able to come through the pass of La Pena. By day-break on the 24th, the French had brought their approaches within 400 yards, immediately opposite the north-east tower. That morning an express arrived from Cadiz, with orders to Colonel Skerritt to embark his brigade: a council of war was held, but not for the purpose for which such councils under such circumstances are usually convened;-a right spirit prevailed among the British officers, and they determined that the place should not be abandoned. To go once in his life, as Colonel Skerritt had done, to the relief of a besieged town, and see its imminent distress, without bearing part in its defence, was sufficient grief for a brave and generous man; the French had insulted and vilified him for not having done at Tarragona what no want of will prevented him from doing; an opportu nity was now given him of showing

them his real character, and he did not fail to improve it.

On the night between Christmas eve and Christmas day, the French broke ground opposite the east tower at four hundred yards distance, and on the following night they strengthened their approaches at all points, and advanced 150 yards nearer to the east and northeast towers. At both points they opened a fire from a number of wallpieces, and fired musketry and wallpieces through pyramids of Sacsa Terre from the summit of one of the hills. Thence they poured their bullets over the whole town, but the men were so well covered that little hurt was done. The fire of the garrison was equally brisk and more successful;-it was not, however, possible to prevent the enemy from advancing in works, carried on upon the perfect rules of art; and in case it should be found impossible to maintain Tarifa, final arrangements were made for the order of retreat, and signals established with the island, to signify when the island was to fire on the breach, the suburbs, and on the town, so that our troops might be saved from any error in the possible confusion, and as much loss as possible inflicted on the assailants.

A heavy fire was opened on the 29th from two batteries; one bore upon the flotilla boats, which were then at anchor in the eastern bay, and they were obliged to cut their cables and put to sea. This battery then threw shot and shells to almost every part of the island. The men received little hurt, for they were at work at the traverses; but two of the female inhabitants of the town, who hadtaken refuge there, were wounded, one losing a leg, and several horses and mules were killed. The other was a breaching battery planted in the valley, nearly opposite the Retiro tower, at three hundred yards distance. By the evening a breach about five feet

wide was made to the right of this tower. The eastern tower was as yet untouched, but the enemy approached it by sap within fifty yards. Some of the inhabitants were killed and wounded in the course of the day retreating to the island. The men suffered little, for they were ordered to keep under cover. Their spirit was manifested upon an occasion which might have led to the worst consequences. One of our artillery officers spiked two guns; by whose order he acted has not been made known, but the troops were exceedingly indignant when it was whispered among them, and they expressed their discontent at the apprehension of being made to abandon the town, without having a fair set-to with the enemy. General Copons appeared highly enraged when he was informed of what had been done; and the temper which both Spaniards and English discovered at this circumstance, taught them how well each might rely upon the other in this their common

cause.

The next day, by ten in Dec. 30. the morning, the breach was enlarged to three and twenty yards, and about noon a flag of truce arrived; it was a service of danger to carry it, for the day was so foggy, that the flag could scarcely be seen. General Leval, who commanded the besieging troops, summoned the governor, saying, "that the defence made by the fortress under his command had sufficiently established that fair name which is the basis of military honour; that in a few hours the breach would be practicable, and that the same honour which had prompted him to resistance, imposed it now as a duty upon him to spare the lives of a whole population, whose fate was in his hands, rather than see them buried amid the ruins of their town." Copons answered in these words: "When you propose to the governor of this fortress to

admit a capitulation, because the breach will shortly be practicable, you certainly do not know that I am here. When the breach shall be absolutely practicable, you will find me upon it, at the head of my troops to defend it. There we will negociate." After receiving this reply, the French renewed their fire upon the breach, but most of the balls past through it into the houses which stood opposite.

Preparations were now made on both sides for the assault, and at eight on the following morning the enemy advanced from their trenches in every direction. 2000 of their picked men moved by the bed of the river in front of the breach; the 87th regiment flanked the breach to the north and south, leaving two companies in reserve to bayonet the assailants if they should leap the wall. This, however, was not much to be apprehended; for the town is built in a hole, and in that part the wall on the inside was four. teen feet lower than on the out. The breach opened into a narrow street, which had been barricaded on cach side, and was well flanked, and secured with chevaux de frize, for which the iron balconies, commonly used in Spanish towns, furnished ready and excellent materials. When Colonel Gough saw them advancing, he drew his sword, threw away the scabbard, and ordered his band to strike up the Irish air of Garry-one. The men immediately cheered, and opened their fire. The 47th, who lined a wall which descended from the south-east tower, and flanked the enemy's columns, did the same, and the carnage made among the enemy was such, that they halted for a moment, as if dismayed, then ran to the edge of the breach. This they saw was impracticable, and hurrying off under the wall, they made a dash at the portcullis. Here the barricade was impenetrable, and finding themselves in a situation where courage

could be of no avail, and where they were brought down by hundreds, they fled. Colonel Gough seeing them fly, bade his band strike up St Patrick's day, and the men were so inspirited, that it was scarcely possible to restrain them from pursuing the fugitives up to their very trenches. "Colonel," said one of the 87th, the regiment which took the eagle at Barrosa, "Colonel, I only want to tache 'em what it is to attack the Aiglers."

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The enemy suffered severely in their flight; hand-grenades from the houses were thrown upon those who fled by the wall, in hope of security, and a sixpounder on the north-east tower flanked them. The two leading officers of the columns remained under the wall, and were taken prisoners. A flag of truce was soon sent, to ask permission to bury the dead. About 500 had fallen; and it was a miserable sight to see the wounded crawling under the breach about 40, many of whom were officers, were brought into the town. On the part of the garrison 10 were killed and 17 wounded.

The old year was now terminated with triumph and rejoicing at Tarifa, but the new one came in with mourning. A dreadful storm of wind and rain came on from the eastward, and two Spanish gun-boats, full of fugitives from the town, were wrecked under the guns of the island. Two and forty persons perished. The inhabitants, who were hutted on the eastern side of the island, were overwhelmed by the surge, all lost their property, and many of them lost their lives. Many more perished by the storm than had fallen in repelling the assault. The weather, however, brought with it some compensation to the Spaniards for this destruction; the few shells which the enemy threw during the day fell dead, giving proof that their ammunition had suffered, and neither

that day nor the next did they make any farther attempt on the breach, nor move any of their guns to batter a more assailable point. During the night of the first, the wind blew up many of the tents on the island, and exposed the men to the storm. On the second, the rain increased, and the wind fell; in the course of the ensu ing night, a party sallied, and found the lower trenches of the enemy so flooded by the rains, that their picquets had abandoned them. Some deserters now came in, and declared that two regiments had refused to assault the breach a second time; that the sufferings which they endured from the weather had excited a mutinous expression of discontent among the foreigners in their army, and that Victor had in consequence of these things thought it necessary to send for Soult, who was arrived, and now at the convent of La Luz. Other deserters confirmed this account, and added, that there were about 1000 sick, and that the swelling of the rivers cut off their supplies, and was likely to cut off their retreat.

The besieged did not rely too confidently upon their good fortune, and these favourable tidings, which all appearances, as far as they could, seemed to corroborate. Ballasteros, with 2000 of his best troops, embarked at Algeziras, to assist in the defence of Tarifa, but the weather prevented him from sailing, and the commander seeing that the enemy were removing their guns higher up, and expecting that another breach would be made, applied to General Colin Campbell for a reinforcement. The light companies of the 9th regiment were immediately dispatched, and landed in the course of the day, and in the following night farther succours arrived. Towards evening, a column of the enemy was seen advancing from La Luz, and

a deserter brought intelligence that they proposed to attack at the same time, the town, the island, and St Catalina, a conical hill on the land side of the isthmus, which was occupied as an out-work to the island; if they failed in these simultaneous attacks, they meant to raise the siege. About an hour after night had closed, they approached close to the eastern wall, and poured a fire of musketry into the town; the whole of the garrison immediately repaired to their alarm posts, and the guards on the wall returned their fire with good effect. It was intended only for a feint, and the enemy presently withdrew. About midnight, the garrison were again called out by a firing on all sides of the town; the firing suddenly ceased, and a little before day-break, it was discovered that the enemy had retreated in the darkness. When the morning opened, nothing but their rear guard was in sight; the light troops of the allies pursued the flying enemy as far as the

river Salado, memorable as the place where the Moors made their last great effort for the conquest of Spain, and where they received from the allied armies of Castille and Portugal, one of the greatest and most important defeats which history has recorded.

The French left behind them great part of their artillery and stores, and what they attempted to remove the weather and the state of the roads compelled them to abandon upon the way. Their loss was computed at not less than 2500 men, a number exceeding that of the garrison. The siege had continued 17 days; the wall in front of the town was but a yard thick, and incapable of bearing heavy artillery ; a breach had been open in it for seven days. Here for the first time the French learnt in what manner Englishmen can defend stone walls, and Lord Wellington was about to teach them, at Ciudad Rodrigo, in what style. they can carry a fortress by storm.

hatred to Cromwell offered their services to Prince Charles in his exile, observed to him, that a desperate game of chess has been recovered after the loss of the nobility, by playing the pawns well. So it has proved in Spain; the Guerrillas supported the national cause in those parts of the country where the regular armies had been driven from the field.

None of the Guerrilla chiefs were placed in so dangerous a position as Espoz y Mina. Every fortress in Navarre was garrisoned by the French, and they were in possession of all the country which surrounds it. There was no point from which Mina could receive succour, or upon which he could retire. The mountains were his only fastnesses, and he had no resources but what were to be found in his own genius, and in the courage of his comrades, and in the love of his country. men. Suchet's destructive career had often been impeded by this enterprizing leader, the Scanderbeg of his age; by harassing his communications, and cutting off his convoys after the fall of Tortosa, he long prevented him from proceeding against Tarragona and Valencia. Mina was the terror of the French, and the bloody tyrant, in whom the love of revenge predominates even over ambition, ordered Reille, the

him down.

Towards the close of the preceding year, the French, with very superior numbers, succeeded in surprising and dispersing his troops. He and the commanders of his second and third battalions, D. Gregorio Cruchaga, and D. Lucas Gorriz, immediately began to collect their scattered forces, and perceiving that their dispersion would not have been so complete but for want of order, they abstained a while from offensive operations for the purpose of disciplining the men. Reille hoped again to surprise them while they were thus employed, and detached Colonel Gaudin from Pamplona with 1500 foot and 200 horse, who was to form a junction with an equal number, drawn from Tudela, Caparroso, and Tafalla, by Colonel Brescat, surround Mina, and occupy all the points by which he might seek to escape. Mina was informed of their movements; before the two detachments could join, he drew Gaudin into an ambuscade, in which forty of his cavalry were killed, and about 100 infantry made prisoners; he then attacked them in their position at Monreal, drove them from it, and was about to renew the attack upon a second position which they had taken, when the intelligence that Reille with a force from Pamplona was bas