matter of the greatest importance with refpect to the fuccefs of the attack, as these two veffels, in concert with the batteries newly erected in Province Iland, enfiladed the principal works which the enemy had erected on Mud lfland.

A heavy fire was fupported on both fides. At length, the vigorous attack made by the Ifis in front, and by the two armed veffels and the batteries in other quarters, fo overpowered the enemy in the fort and works on Mud Island, that towards evening their artillery was entirely filenced. And they perceiving that measures were taking for forcing their works on the following morning, and being alfo fenfible that, in the prefent ftate of things, they were not defenfible, they fet fire to every thing that was capable of receiving it, and abandoned the place in the night.

The lofs of the enemy in men was faid to be very confiderable; that of the fleet, was more trifling than could have been fuppofed. Their artillery and fome ftores were taken at Mud Ifland. In two days after, Lord Cornwallis paffed over with a detachment from Chefter to Billing's Fort, where he was joined by a body of forces juft arrived from New York. They proceeded all together to Red Bank, which the enemy abandoned at their approach, leaving their artillery with a confiderable quantity of cannon-ball and ftores behind them. The works were demolifhed.

The enemy's fhipping having now loft all protection on either fide of the river, feveral of their gallies and other armed veffels took the advantage of a favourable

night, to pass the batteries of Philadelphia, and efcape to places of fecurity farther up. The difcovery of this transaction occafioned the fending an officer with a party of feamen to man the Delaware. frigate lately taken, and lying at Philadelphia, and the taking of fuch other measures, as rendered the escaping of the remainder impracticable. Thus environed, the crews abandoned and fet fire to their veffels, which were all confumed to the amount of feventeen of different forts, including the two floating batteries, and firefhips. With all thefe advantages, the feafon of the year, and other impediments, rendered the clearing of the river, in any confiderable degree, impracticable; fo that the making or difcovering of fuch a channel, as might admit the paffage of tranfports and veffels of eafy burden with provifions and neceffaries for the use of the army at Philadelphia, was all that could be obtained at prefent.

General Wathington being reinforced by 4000 men from the northern army, advanced within 14 miles of Philadelphia, to a place called White Marth, where he encamped in a very strong pofition, with his right to the Wiffahichon Creek, and the front partly covered by Sandy Run. As this movement feemed to indicate a difpofition to adventure, General Howe was not without hopes, that the late reinforcement would encourage them to hazard a battle for the recovery of Philadelphia. If fuch was their intention, he was determined that they should not cool in it, for want of an opportunity of bringing it into action; or if they fill adhered to their usual system

of

of caution and defence, it was ftill reasonably to be hoped that upon a clofe inspection of their fituation, fome part of their camp would be found fo vulnerable as to admit of a fuccefsful impreffion.

Upon thefe grounds the General marched the army from Philadelphia on the 4th of December at night, and took poft on Cheffaut Hill, in the front of the enemy's right on the next morning. Finding that their right afforded no opening for an attack, he changed his ground before day on the 7th, and took a new pofition oppofite to their center and left. Some fkirmishes happened, in which the enemy were conftantly defeated, and their flying parties purfued home almost to their works. The General, at length, after continuing above three days conftantly in their fight, advancing within a mile of their lines, and examining their works with the clofeft attention, finding that nothing could provoke or entice them to action, and that their camp was in every part inacceffible, gave up the profecution of a defign which was evidently fruitlefs. The army alfo fuffered greatly from the feverity of the weather, both officers and foldiers being totally deftitute of tents and field equipage.

The General accordingly began his march to Philadelphia on the afternoon of the 8th, in full view of the enemy, without being purfued, or in the smallest degree in commoded on his return. As the season was now too far advanced, to admit of any other attention than what related to the accommodation of the army, a grand detachment was fent out to procure forage for the winter, which was

fuccefsfully performed. In the mean time, Washington removed his camp from White Marth to Valley Forge, upon the Schuylkill, about 15 or 16 miles from Philadelphia, in a very ftrong, and confequently fecure pofition. Nothing could afford a ftronger proof, to whoever confiders the nature and difpofition of thofe people, of the unbounded influence on the minds both of his officers and men which that General poffeffed, than his being able, not only to keep them together, but to fubmit to the incommmodities and diftreffes incident to living in a hutted camp, during the fevere winter of that climate, and where all his fupplies of provifion and ftores moft come from a great diftance, at much expence and no small hazard. It was alfo a proof with many others, of the general ftrong difpofition of America, to fuffer all things rather than fubmit to force.

Such was the iffue of the campaign upon the Delaware. A campaign which affords much room for the moft ferious reflection. The British arms were crowned with the most brilliant fuccefs. Two very confiderable victories were obtained. In all leffer actions, bating the affair at Red Bank, they were equally triumphant. Yet with all this tide of fuccefs, all the fruit derived from our victories at the close of the campaign, amounted to no more than fimply a good winter lodging for our army in the city of Philadelphia; whilst the troops poffeffed no more of the adjacent country than what they immediately commanded with their arms. It was ftill more difcouraging, that the enemy had given repeated proofs, that however he