The weight and execution of the naval equipment, fell of courfe upon the officers and men of that department, whofe ability, zeal, and perfeverance in the perfor. mance, can never be too much applauded. The talk was indeed arduous. A fleet of above thirty fighting veffels, of different kinds and fizes, all furnished with can-, non, was to be little lefs than created; for though a few of the largest were reconstructions, the advantage derived from thence depended more upon the ufe of materials which the country did not afford, than upon any faving as to time, or leffening of labour. When to this is added, the tranfporting over land, and afterwards dragging up the rapids of St. Therefe and St. John's, 30 long. boats, a number of flat boats of confiderable burthen, a gondola, weighing 30 tons, with above 400 battoes, the whole prefented a complexity of labour and difficulty, which feemed fufficient to appal even the fpirit of British feamen. However it must be allowed that the labour did not fall folely on them. The foldiers had their part; and what is to be lamented, the peafants and farmers of Canada were taken from their ploughs, and compelled by power to bear a fare in toils, from whence they could derive no honour or advantage.

Though the equipment was compleated in about three months, the nature of the service, as well as the eagerness of the commanders and army, required, if it had been poffible, a ftill greater dispatch. The winter was faft approaching, two inland feas to be paffed, the unknown force of the enemy on each to be fubdued,

and the strong pofts of Crown Point and Ticonderoga, defended and fupported by an army, to be encountered fword in hand. To add to thefe impediments, the communication between the Lakes Champlain and George, did not admit the paffage of thofe veffels of force, which, after being fuccefsful on the one, might be equally wanted on the other. And if all thofe difficulties were furmounted, and Lake George paffed, there ftill remained a long and dangerous march through intricate forefts, extenfive moraffes, and an uncleared country, ftill in a itate of nature, before they could reach Albany, which was the first poft to the fouthward that could afford them rett and accommodation.

The fpirit of the commanders rofe in proportion to the difficulties which were to be encountered. The objects in view were great, the glory to be acquired tempting, and the defire of their attainment feemed to leffen or remove obftacles, which to a cold or lukewarm fpeculation would have appeared infuperable. If the Lakes could be recovered, and Albany poffeffed, before the feverity of the winter fet in, the northern army would hold a principal fhare in the honour of bringing the war. to a fpeedy conclufion. It was conceived that they could then pour destruction at will, into the heart either of the middle or the northern colonies, each of which would be expofed to them in its moft tender and defencelefs part. Whilft the poffeffion of Hudfon's river would eftablish and fecure their communication with General Howe, it would equally fever and difconnect the fouthern and nor

thern

thern provinces, leaving thereby the latter to fink under the joint weight of both armies, or to accept of fuch terms as they could obtain, without the participation of the others. Nor could General Washington attempt to hold any poft in New York or the Jerfeys, with fuch a fuperiority of force as already oppreffed him in front, and General Carleton's army at his back. The fucceffes of their fellows on the fide of New York, increased the impatience, and excited the jealousy of this army, every one apprehending that the war would be brought to an end, before he could have an opportunity of fharing in the honour of that happy event."

With all this ardour, and the most unremitting induftry, it was not until the month of October, that the fleet was in a condition to feek the enemy on Lake Champlain. The force was very confifiderable with refpect to the place and fervice, extraordinary in regard to the little time spent in its formation, and fuch as, a very few ages ago, would have been deemed formidable even upon the European feas. The hip Inflexible, which may be confidered as Admiral, had been re-conftructed at St. John's, from whence, the failed in 28 days after laying her keel, and mounted 18 twelve pounders. One schooner mounted 14, and another 12, fix pounders. A flatbottomed radeau carried fix 24, and fix 12 pounders, befides howitzers; and a gondola, 7 nine pounders, Twenty fmaller veffels, under the denomination of gunboats, carried brafs field pieces from 9 to 24 pounders, or were armed with howitzers. Some

long-boats were furnished in the fame manner. About an equal number of large boats acted as tenders. Those we have taken notice of, were all intended for, or appertaining to battle; we omit the vaft number deftined for the transportation of the army, with its flores, artillery, baggage and provifions.

The armament was conducted by Captain Pringle, and the fleet navigated by above 7c0 prime feamen, of whom 200 were volunteers from the tranfports, who after having rivalled thofe belonging to the hips of war in all the toil of preparation, now boldly and freely partook with them in the danger of the expedition. The guns were ferved by detachments of men and officers belonging to the corps of artillery. In a word, no equipment of the fort was ever better appointed, or more amply fur nifhed with every kind of provifion neceflary for the intended fervice.

The enemy's force was in no degree equal, either with refpe& to the goodness of the veffels, the number of guns, furniture of war, or weight of metal. Senfible, though they were, of the neceffity of preferving the dominion of the Lakes, and aided in that defign by the original force in their hands, with a great advantage in point of time for its increase, their intentions in that refpect were counteracted by many effential, and fome irremediable deficiencies. They wanted timber, artillery, hip-builders, and all the materials neceffary for fuch an equipment. Carpenters, and all others concerned in the bufinefs of shipping, were fully engaged at the fea ports [4] 2

in

retired to their main body at Ticonderoga. Gen. Carleton took poffeffion of the ruins, where he was foon joined by the army. As he continued there till towards the end of the month, and, befides feveral reconnoitring parties, pushed on at one time frong de tachments on both fides of the Lake, who approached within a fmall diftance of Ticonderoga, at the fame time that veffels appeared within cannon fhot of the works, to examine the nature of the channel, and found its depth, little doubt can be entertained that he had it in contemplation to attempt that place. The ftrength of the works, the difficulty of ap.. proach, the countenance of the enemy, and the ignorance of their number, with other cogent reafons, prevented this defign from taking place.

It was evident that this poft could not be forced in its prefent ftate, without a very confiderable lofs of blood, whilt the benefit arifing from fuccefs would be comparatively nothing. The feafon was now too far advanced to think of paffing Lake George, and of expofing the army to the perils of a winter campaign, in the inhofpitable, and impracticabie wilds to the fouthward. As Ticonderoga could not be kept during the winter, the most that could be expected from fuccefs, would be the reduction of works, more indebted to nature than art for their ftrength, and perhaps the taking of fome cannon; whilst the former would be reftored, and the latter replaced by the enemy, before the army could interrupt their proceedings in the enfuing fum. But if the defence fhould

mer.

be obftinate, although the army were in the end fuccesful, it would probably thereby be fo much weakened, that all profpect of advantage in the future campaign would, in a great measure, be annihilated. The difficulty, perhaps impoffibility, of keeping open the communication with Canada, and fubfifting the army during the winter was obvious. General Carleton therefore reimbarked the army without making any attempt, and returning to Canada, cantoned them for the winter in the best manner the country afforded.

It is fit that we fhould now turn our attention to the important tranfactions in the South. We faw towards the conclufion of the last campaign, that Lord Cornwallis had not only overrun the Jerfeys, but that the Delaware was the only apparent obftacle, which feemed capable of retarding the progrefs of his army, in the reduction of Philadelphia and the adjoining provinces. The American army was indeed no more. It is faid that the greatest number which remained embodied did not exceed 2500 or 3000 men. This was all that remained of an army, which at the opening of the campaign amounted, as it is faid, to at least twenty-five thoufand. There are fome who reprefent it as having been at that time much ftronger. The term of their engagement being expired, which, along with the obligation of duty, difcharged all apprehension of dif grace, there was no keeping together, at the heel of a ruinous campaign, troops broken and difpirited, equally unnacuftomed to fubordination, and to a long abfence from their countries and families.