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milies. Thofe fmall bodies, who from perfonal attachment, local circumstances, or a fuperior perfeverance and bravery, ftill continued with the Generals Washington and Lee, were too inconfiderable in force, to demand much attention on the one fide, or to inspire confidence on the other; whilst the fupport to be derived from new levies, not yet formed, was too remote and precarious, to afford much prefent confolation to the Americans. Dec. 13th.

In this critical fituation of their affairs, the capture of Gen. Lee feemed to render them ftill more hopeless. That officer, at the head of all the men which he could collect or keep together, being on his march to join General Washington, who had affembled the Penfylvania militia to fecure the banks of the Delaware, was, from the diflance of the British cantonments, betrayed into a fatal fecurity, by which, in crofing the upper part of New Jersey from the North river, he fixed his quarters, and lay carelessly guarded, at fome diftance from the main body. The operation of zeal, or defire of reward in an inhabitant, having communicated this fituation to Col. Harcourt, who commanded the light horfe, and had then made a defultory excurfion at the head of a fall detachment to obferve the motions of that body, he conducted his measures with fuch addrefs and activity, and they were fo well feconded by the boldness and rapidity of motion which diftinguish that corps, that the guard was evaded, the centries feized without noife, the quarters forced, and Lee carried off, though all that

part of the country was in his favour, and that feveral guarded, polls, and armed patrols, lay in the way.

The making of a fingle officer prifoner, in other circumftances would have been a matter of little moment; but in the prefent ftate of the raw American forces, where a general deficiency of military fkill prevailed, and the inexperience of the officers was even a greater grievance than the lack of difcipline in the foldiers, the lofs of a commander, whofe fpirit of enterprize was directed by great knowledge in his profeffion acquired by actual fervice, was of the utmost importance, and the more diftreffing, as there was little room to hope it could be foon fupplied.

The rejoicing in Great Britain on this occafion was equal at least to the dejection of the Americans. It was conjectured, that fome perfonal animofities between this General and feveral officers in the army, as well as perfons of power at court, contributed not a little to the triumph and exultation of that time.

The capture of Gen. Lee was alfo attended with a circumftance, which has fince been productive of much inconvenience to both fides, and of much calamity to individuals. A cartel, or fomething of that nature, had fome time before been established for the exchange of prifoners between the Generals Howe and Washington, which had hitherto been carried into execution, fo far as time and other circumftances would admit. As Lee was particularly obnoxious to government, it was faid, and is fuppofed, that Gen. Howe was [4] +

tied

tied down by his inftructions from parting with him upon any terms, if the fortune of war fhould throw him into his power. Gen. Washington not having at this time any prifoner of equal rank with Lee, propofed to exchange fix field officers for him, the number being intended to balance that defparity; or if this was not accepted, he required that he fhould be treated and confidered fuitably to his ftation, according to the practice established among polished nations, and the precedent already fet by the Americans in regard to the British officers in their hands, until an opportunity offered for a direct and equal exchange.

To this it was answered, that as Mr. Lee was a deferter from his Majefty's fervice, he was not to be confidered as a prifoner of war, that he did not at all come within the conditions of the cartel, nor could he receive any of its benefits. This brought on a fruitlefs difcuffion, whether Gen. Lee, who had refigned his half pay at the beginning of the troubles, could be confidered as a deferter, or whether he could with juftice be excluded from the general benefits of a cartel, in which no particular exception of perfon had been made; the affirmative in both thefe pofitions being treated by Washingtion with the utmoft indignation.

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In the mean time Lee was confined in the clofeft manner, being watched and guarded with all that ftrictness and jealoufy, which a ftate criminal of the first magnitude could have experienced in the most dangerous political conjuncture. This conduct not only fufpended the operation of the

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cartel, but induced retaliation on the other fide, and Colonel Campbell, who had hitherto enjoyed every degree of liberty confiftent with his condition, and had been treated with great humanity by the people of Bofton, was now thrown into a dungeon, and treated with a rigour equal to the indulgence he had before experienced. Those officers who were prifoners in the fouthern colonies, though not treated with equal rigour, were, however, abridged of their parole liberty, and deprived of other comforts and fatisfactions, which had hitherto rendered their condition uncommonly easy. It was at the fame time declared, that their future treatment fhould in every degree be regulated by that which Gen. Lee experienced, and that their perfons fhould be anfwerable, in the utmost extent, for any violence that was offered to him.

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This was not the only inftance in which the Congress manifefted a firm and undaunted resolution. In the midst of the dangers with which they were environed, from giving way to any thing like unconditional fubmiffion, they made no overtures towards any kind of accommodation. On the other fide none were made to them. They prepared to renew the war, and to repair their fhattered forces with all diligence. They were now convinced of the inefficacy of temporary armies, engaged only for a fhort term, and calculated merely to repel a fudden invasion, when oppofed to the conftant war of a powerful enemy, and the in ceffant efforts of regular forces. It could never be hoped, with new men thus changed every year, to

make

make any effectual stand against veteran troops, and their present critical fituation afforded too alarming an experience, of the fatal confequences which might attend that period of utter imbecility, between the extinction of the old army, and the establishment of the new. To guard against this evil in future, which could not be remedied for the present, they iffued orders about the middle of September, for the levying of 88 battalions, the foldiers being bound by the terms of enlistment to serve during the continuance of the war.

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The number of battalions which each colony was by this ordinance appointed to raise and support, may be confidered as a pretty exact political scale of their comparative ftrength, framed by thofe who were interested in its correctnefs, and well acquainted with their respective circumftances. Maffachufett's Bay and Virginia were the highest on this fcale, being to furnith 15 battalions each; Penfylvania came next, and was rated at twelve; North Carolina 9. Connecticut and Maryland 8 each, New York, and the Jerfeys, the latter confidered as one government, were, in confequence of their prefent fituation, fet no higher than 4 battalions each.

The liberality of the Congrefs in its encouragement to the troops, was proportioned to the neceffity of fpeedily compleating the new army. Befides a bounty of twenty dollars to each foldier at the time of enlifting, lands were to be allotted at the end. of the war to the furvivors, and to the reprefentatives of all who were flain in action, in different fated proportions, from 500 acres, the allot

to 150, which

ment of a Colonel, was that of an Enfign; the private men, and non-commiffioned officers, were to have 100 acres each. As a bar to the thoughleffnefs and prodigality incident to foldiers, and to prevent the most worthlefs and undeferving from obtaining for trifles, thofe rewards due to the brave for their blood and services, all thefe lands were rendered unalienable during the war, no affignment or transfer being to be admitted at its conclufion.

The Congrefs had before, as an encouragement to their forces by fea and land, decreed that all officers, foldiers, and feamen, who were or might be disabled in action, should receive, during life, one half of the monthly pay to which they were entitled by their rank in the fervice, at the time of meeting with the misfortune. Notwithstanding thefe encouragements, it feems, as if the condition of ferving during the indefinite term of the continuance of the war, was not generally agreeable, to a people fo little accustomed to any kind of fubordination or restraint; fo that in the month of November, the Congrefs found it neceffary to admit of another mode of enliftment for the term of three years, the foldiers under this compact receiving the fame bounty in money with the others, but being cut out from any allotment of lands.

With all these encouragements given by the Congrefs, the bufinefs of recruiting went on, however, but heavily; and it must not be imagined, that the army actually railed, did at any time bear any proportion in effective men to that which was voted.

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