THE

MONTHLY REVIEW,

For DECEMBER, 1790.

ART. I. Eays on the Nature and Principles of Tafte. By the Rev. Archibald Alison, L. L. B. F. R. S. Edin. 4to. pp. 410. 16s. Boards. Robinfons. 1790.

THE

HE mode of inveftigation which, fince the time of LORD BACON, has been fo fuccefsfully employed in phyfical fcience, has of late been applied to inquiries into the human mind. The object of phyfical fcience, is the investigation of the caufes which produce the various phenomena of matter: the object of the fciences that relate to mind, is the investigation of our various fentiments and affections.

Of the phenomena of both, all our knowlege is derived by experience; and as it has been from the patient method of experiment and obfervation that the great difcoveries in phyfical fcience have been made, it is reasonable to fuppofe that the fame method of research will be equally fuccessful in the philofophy of the human mind. The great work of Dr. Reid, on the intellectual powers of man, while it has demonftrated the propriety of this mode of inquiry, has given, at the fame time, the best proof of its fuccefs; and will probably form as important an æra in the hiftory of this department of fcience, as the works of Lord Bacon have done in the other.

The feelings of Tafte form one of the most important claffes of the emotions of the mind. They are the fource of fome of the pureft and most permanent of our pleafures; they are the foundation of fome of the most valued, and most attractive arts; and they have alfo an acknowleged, though not a very obvious, influence on our character and difpofition. A work, therefore, which has for its object the inveftigation of this part of the human conftitution, cannot well be fuppofed to be without its use.

The plan of the publication now before us, and the method by which it is conducted, are explained in a fhort introduction; VOL. III. C c

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in which the author feems to have formed the fame opinions that we have now expreffed, with regard to the proper mode of philofophical inquiry.

Tafte,' fays Mr. Alifon, is that faculty of the human mind, by which we perceive and enjoy, whatever is BEAUTIFUL OF SUBLIME in the works of Nature or Art.

The perception of these qualities is attended with an emotion of pleasure, very diftinguishable from every other pleasure of our nature, and which is accordingly diftinguished by the name of the EMOTION OF TASTE. The diftinction of the objects of Taste into the fublime and the beautiful, has produced a fimilar divifion of this emotion, into the EMOTION of SUBLIMITY, and the EMOTION of BEAUTY.

The qualities that produce thefe emotions, are to be found in almost every class of the objects of human knowledge, and the emotions themselves afford one of the most extenfive fources of human delight. They occur to us, amid every variety of EXTERNAL fcenery, and among many diverfities of difpofition and affection in the MIND of man. The moft pleafing arts of human invention are altogether directed to their purfuit: and even the neceffary arts are exalted into dignity, by the genius that can unite beauty with use. From the earliest period of fociety, to its laft ftage of improvement, they afford an innocent and elegant amufement to private life, at the fame time that they increase the fplendor of national character; and in the progrefs of nations, as well as of individuals, while they attract attention from the pleafures they bestow, they serve to exalt the human mind, from corporeal to intellectual pursuits.

Thefe qualities, however, though fo important to human happinefs, are not the objects of immediate obfervation; and in the attempt to inveftigate them, various circumftances unite to perplex our research. They are often obfcured under the number of qualities with which they are accidentally combined: they refult often from peculiar combinations of the qualities of objects, or the relation of certain parts of objects to each other: they are ftill oftener, perhaps, dependent upon the ftate of our own minds, and vary in their effects with the difpofitions in which they happen to be obferved. In all cafes, while we feel the emotions they excite, we are ignorant of the causes by which they are produced; and when we feek to discover them, we have no other method of discovery, than that varied and patient EXPERIMENT, by which, amid thefe complicated circumftances, we may gradually ascertain the peculiar qualities which, by the CONSTITUTION of our NATURE, are permanently connected with the emotions we feel.

In the employment of this mode of investigation, there are two great objects of attention and inquiry, which feem to include all that is either neceffary, or perhaps poffible, for us to discover on the fubject of Taste.

These objects are,

I. To investigate the NATURE of thofe QUALITIES that produce the emotions of TASTE: and,

• II. To

II. To inveftigate the NATURE of that FACULTY, by which thefe emotions are received.'

After stating that these investigations are not to be confidered only as objects of philofophical curiofity, but that they have an immediate relation to all the arts of Tafte, Mr. A. obferves, that in the conduct of thefe inquiries there is a previous inveftigation neceffary, on the fuccefs of which all future research will depend, viz. into the nature of the effect which is produced on the mind, when thefe emotions are felt. With the proper emotion of tafte, he obferves, in every cafe, other accidental emotions are, or may be, united, and unless we are able accurately to diftinguifh this peculiar emotion from all others, we muft, of neceffity, include, in our account of the qualities which produce the emotions of Tafte, thofe qualities also that are the causes of the accidental emotions with which it is accompanied.

In this view of the fubject, a work intended as an INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF TASTE, may naturally be fuppofed to confift of the following PARTS, and to be conducted in the following MANNER:

I. THE FIRST PART would contain an ANALYSIS OF EXAMINATION of that EFFECT which is produced on the MIND, when thefe EMOTIONS are felt; and of their DISTINCTION from the SIMPLE EMOTIONS of PLEASURE.

II. THE SECOND PART would contain an INVESTIGATION OF the NATURE of the QUALITIES that are fitted by the conftitution of our nature to produce thefe EMOTIONS; and of their DISTINC TION from the QUALITIES that are productive only of the SIMPLE EMOTIONS OF PLEASURE.

In this part of the fubject, there are two fubordinate inquiries, that would naturally demand attention.

1. The qualities of fublimity and beauty are difcovered not only in pleafing or agreeable objects, but frequently alfo in objects that in themselves are productive of PAIN; and fome of the greatest compofitions of the fine arts are founded upon fubjects of TERROR or DISTRESS. It would form, therefore, an obvious and important inquiry, to ascertain by what means this fingular effect is produced in REAL NATURE, and by what means it may be produced in the compofitions of ART.

2. There is a DISTINCTION in the effects produced on our minds by objects of tafte; and this diftinction both in the EMOTIONS and in their CAUSES has been expreffed by the terms of SUBLIMITY and BEAUTY. It would form, therefore, a fecond object of INQUIRY, to afcertain THE NATURE OF THIS DISTINCTION, both with regard to these EMOTIONS, and the QUALITIES that produce them.

Ill. THE THIRD PART of fuch a work would contain an INVESTIGATION of the NATURE of that FACULTY by which these emotions are received: and the purfuit of it would naturally lead

to the important inquiry, Whether there is any STANDARD by which the perfection and imperfection of this faculty may be determined? and to the illuftration of the MEANS by which it may be either corrected or improved.

Such are the objects which it feems to me most important to afcertain in the PHILOSOPHY of TASTE; and fuch is the method in which thefe ESSAYS towards this inquiry have been conducted. But when I confider both the extent and the difficulty of fuch an investigation, and recollect the errors into which many great men have fallen upon thefe fubjects, I can only find refolution to prefent the FIRST PART of my inquiries to the public.'

In purfuance of the plan which he has laid down, Mr. A. proceeds, in the first effay, to investigate the nature of the emotions of tafte, by attempting to afcertain the effect which is produced on the mind when these emotions are felt:

The emotions of fublimity and beauty are uniformly ascribed, both in popular and in philofophical language, to the imagination. The fine arts are confidered as the arts which are addressed to the imagination, and the pleafures they afford, are defcribed, by way of diftinction, as the pleafures of the imagination. The nature of any perfon's tafte, is, in common life, generally determined from the nature or character of his imagination, and the expreffion of any deficiency in this power of mind, is confidered as fynonymous with the expreflion of a fimilar deficiency in point of tafle.

Although, however, this connection is fo generally acknowledged, it is not perhaps as generally understood in what it confifts, or what is the nature of that effect which is produced upon the imagination, by objects of fublimity and beauty. I shall endeavour, therefore, in the first place, to ftate, what feems to me the nature of this effect, or, in what that exercise of imagination confifts, which is fo generally fuppofed to take place, when thefe emotions are felt.

When any object, either of fublimity or beauty, is prefented to the mind, I believe every man is confcious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination, analogous to the character or expreffion of the original object. The fimple perception of the object, we frequently find, is infufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied with this operation of mind, unlefs, according to common expreffion, our imagination is feized, and our fancy bufied in the purfuit of all thofe trains of thought, which are allied to this character or expreffion.

Thus, when we feel either the beauty or fublimity of natural fcenery, the gay luftre of a morning in fpring, or the mild radiance of a fummer evening, the favage majefty of a wintry ftorm, or the wild magnificence of a tempeftuous ocean, we are confcious of a variety of images in our minds, very different from thofe which the objects themselves can prefent to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of folemn thought arife fpontaneously within our minds, our hearts fwell with emotions, of which the objects before us feem to afford no adequate caufe; and we are never fo much fatiated with delight, as when,

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when, in recalling our attention, we are unable to trace either the progrefs or the connection of thofe thoughts, which have paffed with fo much rapidity through our imagination.'

After fome further illuftration, Mr. A. lays down this first general propofition, That in the production of fuch trains of thought, feems to confift the effect which is produced on the imagination, by objects of fublimity and beauty.

For the truth of this obfervation itself, (continues he,) I must finally appeal to the confcioufnefs of the reader; but there are fome very familiar confiderations, which it may be useful to fuggelt, that feem very strongly to fhew the connection between this exercife of imagination, and the existence of the emotions of fublimity or beauty.'

He then proceeds to fhew, that unlefs this exercife of imagination is excited, the emotions of fublimity and beauty are not felt:

If the mind is in fuch a ftate, as to prevent this freedom of imagination, the emotion, whether of fublimity or beauty, is unperceived. In fo far as the beauties of art or nature affect the external fenfes, their effect is the fame upon every man who is in poffeffion of these fenfes. But to a man in pain or in grief, whofe mind, by thefe means, is attentive only to one object or confideration, the fame scene, or the fame form, will produce no feeling of admiration, which, at other times, when his imagination was at liberty, would have produced it, in its fulleft perfection. Whatever is great or beautiful in the scenery of external nature, is almoft conftantly before us; and not a day paffes, without prefenting us with appearances, fitted both to charm and to elevate our minds; yet it is in general with a heedlefs eye that we regard them, and only in particular moments that we are fenfible of their power. There is no man, for inftance, who has not felt the beauty of funfet; yet every one can remember many inftances, when this moft ftriking fcene had no effect at all upon his imagination; and when he has beheld all the magnificence with which nature generally diftinguishes the clofe of day, without one fentiment of admiration or delight. There are times, in the fame manner, when we can read the Georgics, or the Seasons, with perfect indifference, and with no more emotion, than what we feel from the most uninteresting compofition in profe; while in other moments, the first lines we meet with, take poffeffion of our imagination, and awaken in it fuch innumerable trains of imagery, as almoft leave behind the fancy of the poet. In the fe, and fimilar cafes of difference in our feelings, from the fame objects, it will always be found, that the difference arifes from the ftate of our imaginations; from our difpofition to follow out the train of thought, which fuch objects naturally produce, or our incapacity to do it, from fome other idea, which has at that time taken poffeffion of our minds, and renders us unable to attend to any thing else. That flate of mind, every man must have felt, is most favourable to the emotions of tafte, in which the imagination is free and unembarraffed, or in which the

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attention