matter, with all thefe adventitious powers, can never be fup. pofed capable of thought or confciou.nefs.

Imagine to yourfelf, (fays he,) fharp points, globular and triangular forms, endowed with magnetic virtues, &c. &c. Let them all be in commotion, fermentation, grow, rot, diffelve, &c. with all expedition, in every point of the compafs, exalting mechanifm and organization to the highest pitch. To what does this amount? The dead is not yet alive. Electricity cannot parkle into joy, nor into forrow. From the vibration of cords, you will never produce the perception of fweet or four.

The materialifts of the prefent day have forfaken the out works, and fhelter themselves in a fort which it will be neceffary to attack. They relinquish every other power in matter, and adhere to a diftinct power, that of thought: but whether it be eafier to conceive of an exiftent power of thinking, than of the foul, I fhall leave to the unprejudiced. The debate is now confined to the fubftratum, or vehicle, of this power. To poffeis a material foul, this extraordinary power must be diffufed over matter in general: but the union of matter is merely by accumulation or juxta pofition. Here let me again have recourfe to magnifying. The number of particles in the fmalleft portion of matter, is greater than that of buildings in the largest city. I will therefore fpread an individual thinking power over the town, and let each building poffefs its hare, in proportion to its fize. Allow the cathedral, for example, a thoufandth part, &c. The whole town must be occupied in perceiving, thinking, comparing, and muft poffefs a confciousnefs of what it is doing. The first difficulty that prefents itself, is to meafure this power, by the foot, as if it were wood or ftone; and it is the more difficult, as every idea occupies as much place in this power as living objects require in the wide world: but let us find room for them all. Each corporeal exiftence, fuppofed as minute as poffible, but not too minute to receive fome rays of light, each of thefe impregnated exiftences receives but a small share, not larger, we will fay, than the fingle globule of atmospheric vapour. Confequently, each, feparately, will not acquire enough to compofe an idea, together with judgment, and confcioufnefs. Our city, therefore, must be too crowded. Each piece of mortar muft convey its fmall feeling, by an active meffenger, to the particle in its neighbourhood. Omnis femita fervet. The univerfal enquiry must be for the general poft office, and thence to the town houfe, to be introduced to the invifibly fmall prefident. This perfon, confequently, thinks, I attract the whole kingdom to myself, I am mafter of all. He is an abfolute monarch: but he falls from his throne, on a clofer infpection. He is diffipated into fmall particles; and thefe again into fmaller; all of which may be re-affembled, and formed into a fmaller city, the edifices and figure of which perfectly refemble that over which he wished to play the tyrant.'

We need not purfue the idea any further. The intelligent reader will perceive that the force of the argument confifts in

our being obliged to have recourfe to fome exiftent principle, diftinct from matter, to maintain the unity, and act as Præfes. The materialifts must allow that their doctrine makes rather a ludicrous figure by being thus magnified, without caricature; and we fhall leave them to make their efcape out of this city, or fupport the reputation of its chief magiftrate as they

can.

This argument, which forms the very pith of the differtation, could not fuffer an abridgement; it has confequently detained us fo long, that we fhall only mention fome other particulars in a very curfory manner.

To the objection that the powers and faculties of the foul increase and decreafe with the body; and that its operations are prevented, and renewed, according as the corporeal frame is impaired by difeafes, or enjoys health, &c. the author anfwers, that the ftate of the brain depends on the fame caufes as thefe which have a falutary or pernicious influence on the body in general. Perceptions excited from without, depend on our fenfes, or on what is behind them in the brain. Injuries here impede the operations of the foul. The more abstract operations of the mind, in like manner, act on the brain: but thefe alfo have their limits, and a fenfe of wearinefs is excited in the mind itfelf, that it may not urge the material frame to pernicious exercife. This is the divine appointment, the law of the union of the two principles, &c. &c.

The fecond part of the question propofed by the fociety, referring to the intermediate ftate, has neceffitated each candidate to form his conjectures: but as they cannot be more than conjectures, we fhall merely announce them.

The first mentioned gentleman fuppofes it poffible that the foul fhould retain an incorruptible atom of matter; after the diffolution of the larger corporeal frame: that this, conformably to certain established laws, of which we are at prefent ignorant, may, after death, be planted into a newnefs of life; may receive a fecond birth, and a future growth: but he ftrenuously infifts on the neceffity of retaining a confciousness, in order to prove its identity; and that a moment's fufpention of thought, is equivalent to annihilation. For his mode of treating thefe fubjects, we must refer to the work.

The fecond candidate is M. 1. RocHUSSEN, fecretary in the liberties of Etten, &c. This gentleman's differtation was adjudged worthy of the first filver medal. He is alto a ftrenuous advocate for the immateriality of the foul. We will state his plan of argument as concifely as is confiftent with perfpicuity.

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The

The author commences with obferving that the utmost accuracy is requifite in enquiries of this nature; and to prevent any misconception, he examines what proofs may be deemed fatisfactory-what we are to underftand by foul-and what by matter. Under the first enquiry, he feemed fo high, and we had almoft faid, exorbitant, in his demands, that, for feveral pages confecutively, we fuppofed him a rigid materialist. He expects more certain proofs of the immateriality of the foul, than we have of any of the most common concerns in life. The proofs of thefe, he maintains, cannot advance beyond reasoning from analogy. Food itfelf is taken, fimply on the prefumption that it will prove beneficial; and in every step that we take, there is no certainty either of the ground on which we tread, or that our legs will be able to carry us farther but in philofophical fubjects, fatisfactory proofs, like a firm unfhaken edifice, are built on inconteftible principles, and carry their own conviction with them.

Refpecting the foul, he omits the various diftinctions concerning its properties, and confines himself to thofe which are generally acknowleged to conftitute its eflence. By foul, therefore, he understands that principle within us, which thinks, and judges, and wills, whether it conftitute a part of the body, or whether it be a diftinct principle united with it.

By matter, he understands whatever is the elementary principle of bodies; and without giving himself the trouble to enquire, with other philofophers, into its fpecific nature, he refts contented with the fimple property of extenfion; which com. prehends its infinite divifibility, and its vis inertia.

Having thus eftablished his preliminaries, he proceeds to confider the principal arguments that are adduced in favour of immateriality; and to examine whether they be fo complete as not to leave the least room for doubt.

The two principal arguments ufually adduced, are taken from the examination of ourfelves; by difcovering our own confcioufnefs; and by comparing the operations of the mind, with acknowleged properties of matter. Although the author admits that there is much force in thefe arguments, yet they do not afford abfolute demonftration. To the propofition, that confcioufnefs remains in every period of life, though the body is univerfally changed, he anfwers that it cannot be abfolutely proved that every particle is changed; and confcioufnefs may be feated in that which remains. To the fecond, he objects that although it be, in the highest degree, improbable that matter fhould be made to think, yet the abfolute impoffibility of this circumftance has not been demonftrated.

The

The argument which he thinks contains a full and complete demonftration, and for which he has thus been preparing the way, is the one advanced by that celebrated metaphysician, the late Mofes Mendelfzoon. This we fhall lay before our readers, in as faithful a tranflation as poffible, as it is stated in the differtation before us:

We learn from univerfal experience, and we affume it as an indubitable truth, that man forms ideas from objects which present themselves before him; that is, we acquire a knowlege of the relation which the parts of the object have to each other, and this takes place, because the objects operate on the foul through the medium of the fenfes.-Whoever denies this fact, denies the evidence of his fenfes, and is totally incapable of conviction from any evidence whatfoever. Let us then fuppofe a right line, A, D, which is compofed of a collection of innumerable points, A, B, C, &c.; that I obferve this, and my foul forms an idea of it; this operation must take place, either in one complete, infinitely minute, indivifible point, or in a certain extenfion. If you choofe the first, then I obferve, that all our ideas muft perfectly refemble each other: that they must all be feated in one and the fame point; and I conclude, that the power of forming ideas cannot be the property of that which is in fize, an indivifible point.

If we prefer the laft, (which every materialist muft prefer, in order to build his hypothefis,) then will each point, A, B, C, &c. of the object, make a feparate or diftinct impreffion, a, b, c, &c. on the foul, which must be fuppofed to be extended; and an image, not an idea, will be formed: for the difference between an image and an idea confifts in this; the first is a mere draught or reprefentation of the object: but the laft is a conception of the relation of the parts, which cannot be produced by a series of different and independent impreffions; it neceffarily requires a comparison, and confequently an union, in the different parts of the object. To this purpose, in the cafe before us, there must neceffarily be another fubftance; and this other being, or fubftance, muft again receive a feparate impreffion from the points, a, b, c, &c. and thus an extended reprefentation: but then we have now only an image, not an idea, of the object, and no conception can ever be formed, till we arrive at a fomething which receives one fimple impreffion; a fomething that, by uniting all the points of the line, for example, in the clofeft manner, can obferve that the line is conftituted by containing thefe various parts within itself. It is invariably requifite, in order to obtain an idea, that the object should act on the foul, in an infinitely indivifible point; and thus, as has been already proved, thought can alone be the property of a fomething which, relative to dimenfion, is fuch a point; a fomething that has no dimensions.

Let us now recal what has been demonftrated concerning matter; that not only matter in general, but the fmalleft particle of it, however divided and fubdivided, is yet divifible, and poffeffes di

menfion,

menfion, then is it inconteftibly evident, that the fomething which thinks within us, the foul of man, is immat.rial,'

Our metaphyfical readers will perceive a very clofe analogy between this argument, and that which is urged by the preceding writer, notwithstanding the different manner in which it is enforced. Should the materialift attempt to fhiel! himfelf from the fhatts of the former, by alleging that riicule is not the test of truth, how will he efcape this mailive club of demonftration?

In the fecond, or conjectural part of his differtation, M. ROCHUSSEN is much more diffufe than could have been expected, from one who required fuch strict demonftration in the argumentative part of his fubject. The leading ideas are, that the foul furvives the body; not being fubject, from its perfect fimplicity, to the laws of diffolution:-that as no particle of matter is loft, it is abfurd to fuppofe that the foul fhould be annihilated as bodies, whatever changes they may undergo, retain the properties common to bodies, fo muft the foul retain thofe properties eiiential to its nature-thought and confcioufnefs: but fince every idea communicated, has been through the medium of the fenfes, of which it is deprived in the ftate of separation, it is wholly occupied about the ideas already collected; which, with deductions from them, and the important confequences which are to follow, will conttitute its intermediate happiness or mifery. He inclines to the doctrine of an incorruptible germ, ferving as a kind of vehicle to the immortal fpirit.

The third differtation is tranflated from the English of an anonymous author. It does not affume the form of ftrict demonftration; it contains many fenfible obfervations, and is, inour opinion, fuperior to any of them in point of compofition. We lament that it is not practicable for us to do juftice to its merit, as the argument in favour of immateriality is more diffufed over the whole of the compofition; fo that it is fcarcely fufceptible either of abridgement, or of its being reprefented in a due degree of force by extracts. Let the following general view fuffice:

The objects of human knowlege, (the author obferves, in his introduction,) have always been diftinguished under three heads: material bodies, which are the objects of the fenfes; immaterial beings or fpirits which cannot be diftinguifhed by any of the fenfes; and living animals, confifting of vifible bodies and invifible fpirits united: man belongs to the third clais. He proceeds to give a very pleafing phyfiological defcription of the laws of this union; and adjudges the offices

performed