ARTICLE VII.

DIVINE AGENCY and Government, together with HUMAN AGEN

CY AND FREEDOM.

(Continued from p. 137, Jan. 1844.)

By the Rev. LEONARD WOODS, D. D., Prof. Theol. Sem., Andover, Mass.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF MAN.

THE chief difficulty on this subject appears to arise from the wrong methods in which men attempt to settle the question, whether they are accountable for their actions. If we rely upon any logical reasoning, or if we undertake to determine, a priori, what is necessary to constitute an accountable being, or a fit subject of moral government, we shall fail in our attempt, and shall fall into great perplexities. That we are accountable to God, is an ultimate fact, which, aside from revelation, is ascertained in one way only, that is, by a direct inward perception, or consciousness. We know that we are moral, accountable beings, just as we know that we are intelligent beings. Do we ever go about to convince ourselves by argument that we think, or that we love, and desire? And why do we not? Because there is nothing more obvious and certain, than that we do think, and love, and desire; in other words, there is nothing which has the nature of proof;-proof being something more clear and obvious, than the thing to be proved. Our accountableness (we may say) is self evident. The belief or feeling of it, in some way, is unavoidable. We perceive, and must perceive, an inherent difference among our mental acts. Some we see and feel to be right and praiseworthy, and some, wrong and blameworthy. This is as unquestionable as that one thing is agreeable to our taste, and another disagreeable. In a nind not totally perverted, one class of exercises is invariably accompanied with a feeling of self-approbation, and another with a feeling of self-disapprobation. Now to say I am conscious of right and wrong, is the same as to say I am conscious of being responsible. For right and wrong presuppose a law; and a law,

a lawgiver; and a lawgiver, a moral government. Under this moral government I know myself to be placed; inasmuch as I do, from the very constitution of my mind, approve or condemn myself, according as I obey or disobey the law. Thus the consciousness of an inherent difference among the acts of my own mind, as right or wrong, involves the sentiment that I am accountable for those acts. I do, and must, in some way, call myself to account for them, and pass judgment upon myself with reference to them. And in this judgment, there is always a felt or implied reference to a higher judge than myself, and a higher tribunal than my own conscience. Here is the sentiment of accountability to God.

My position is, that our accountableness to a Supreme Lawgiver and Judge depends, essentially, upon the constitution of our mind, just as it is, and is inseparable from it. We are never to turn aside from this point, and to take it upon us to determine, that we must have such or such powers of mind, or be placed in these or those circumstances, in order to our being accountable agents. Whatever may be found true in regard to our mental powers or our circumstances, we are accountable. It is proper for me to inquire, whether I do possess this power or that, and what are my circumstances as to dependence on divine control, and in other respects. But my inquiries ought not to be embarrassed by any prepossession; and whether the result of my inquiries be this or that, I know that I am accountable for my actions, and that I am rightly placed under a moral law. Whatever I may find to be true as to the existence and extent of the divine predetermination, or as to divine providence, or as to the actual subserviency of all my actions, under a divine control, to a good end; in short, whatever else may be true or not true; my just accountableness is evident. Of this I am certain. No other truth, no other fact respecting either God or man, can interfere with the certain fact, that I am an accountable agent.

Does God's UNIVERSAL AGENCY CONSIST WITH ANY OTHER AGENT OR AGENCY? AND DOES HIS BEING THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS ADMIT OF OTHER CAUSES ?

It is sometimes said, that if God is the cause of all things, as the Calvinists represent, if, as the supreme cause, he is through all and in all, there can be no other cause. If he is the uni

versal agent, and is always and every where active, and if all beings and events are absolutely dependent on him, then there is no room for any other agent or agency. All things must be absorbed in God; and pantheism must be acknowledged as the true system of theology.

Now God's being the supreme, independent, and universal cause, having a perfect efficiency in all beings and events, does indeed imply that nothing else can be a cause in the same sense in which God is the cause; that is, nothing else can be a supreme, independent, and universal cause. But because there is only one supreme cause, it does by no means follow that there are no subordinate causes. Because there is only one first cause, it cannot be inferred that there are no secondary causes. Subordinate, secondary causes may result from the supreme, first cause. Sir Isaac Newton, and all Christian philosophers before and since his day, and all Christian divines, have held, that there is only one supreme and universal cause, but that there are many subordinate causes, dependent on the supreme, and all having a measure of efficiency, from which result various and important consequences. The omnipotent energy of the first cause is so far from precluding secondary causes, that it gives them a real and permanent existence. The divine cause produces, not shadows, but substances; not illusions, but realities. Created things, things which result as effects from the Supreme cause, may have as real permanent existence, as that which exists independently of a cause. And those things, which exist as effects of the first cause, may, in the above sense, be the cause of other things, resulting from them as effects; and these effects of secondary causes, may become causes of other effects; and there may be an endless series of dependent causes and effects. The created universe, both material and spiritual, is manifestly such a system of dependent causes and effects, all proceeding from God, arranged by his wisdom, and leading on to glorious results in an endless progression.

The supposition, then, that the doctrine of Edwards, the senior, or the junior, or of the other Calvinists, precludes the existence of any cause, except the first cause, or of any agent or agency, except the Supreme Agent or Agency, would be wholly unfounded. Indeed, we can much more satisfactorily concieve of a universe of things having a real and permanent existence, as effects dependent on an infinitely wise, powerful and, all-pervading cause, than in any other way. For here we come

at once to that, which is a manifest and sufficient ground of the existence of dependent things. But the moment we start from this principle, and begin to contemplate created things in any other light than as effects of the first cause, we are met with the inquiry, how things which are not eternal come into existence; or how things which are at first dependent on the first cause can afterwards acquire independence; how things which owe their existence to the efficacious act of God's will can continue to exist without the continued act of that will; or, on the other hand, how an unchangeable God can efficiently will the permanent existence of dependent beings, and yet not continue thus to will it; or, if he does thus continue to will their continued existence, how that will, which was at first an efficacious cause, can cease to be a cause, or lose its causal influence, and the things which first owed their existence to the influence of that divine cause, can turn about and say they have no further need of the influence of that cause. When we enter on such inquiries, and admit suppositions which are contrary to the obvious sense of Scripture, what was plain before, at once becomes perplexed, and the mind wanders about, "in endless mazes lost."

But how can moral, spiritual agents, who are entirely dependent on a supreme, all-efficient cause, and constantly under its controlling influence, be capable of actions for which they are justly responsible?

To the question how this can be, my answer is, I know not. But, from my own consciousness and the word of God, I know the fact that moral agents exist, who are thus dependent on God, and who, at the same time, are justly responsible for their actions. I cannot but regard it as an illusion of a speculative imagination, that independence in any respect is necessary to accountability. And as I give no place to such an illusion, and as I hold, what every man of common sense must hold, that a state of dependence is consistent with a just accountableness to a moral government, and is the only state where such accountableness can be found, I escape at once all the difficulties which any man must experience, who denies the fact that dependent beings are accountable, because he cannot understand the mode of it. In regard to the fact, I make my appeal directly to conscience. And I call for some instance in which a man of plain, unbiassed conscience feels himself less accountable for his actions, because he lives, and moves, and has his being in God. Who that believes the Scriptures can doubt that God can cre

ate and sustain accountable agents, and exercise a sovereign control over their actions? Did he not by the measures of his righteous providence actually harden the heart of Pharaoh and Sihon, without interfering with their accountable agency? And cannot he do the same now? Does he not work faith and love in believers, without interfering with their moral agency? No one can say, that, because God influences and controls the acts of moral agents, he does it by a force or compulsion which supersedes their freedom and accountableness. For surely God has other ways of influencing and governing moral agents besides compulsion; and those other ways are such as correspond with the nature of moral agents. It is as certain as any thing can be, that God can adapt his efficacious influence to moral and accountable agents, as well as to material substances. His influence in both cases, however different in its nature or modes of action, is equally sure to accomplish its objects. When we contemplate this subject, we have constant reason to exclaim, How wonderful is the power and wisdom of God! His ways are past finding out!

If you inquire of me how I satisfy myself that I am a free, accountable agent, and that I am also in a state of entire dependence on God, and that I act under his sovereign control; my answer is, that I learn my own free, accountable agency from the uniform testimony of my own consciousness, and also from the manner in which God treats me in his word and providence. My accountableness is then certain. It cannot be doubted. The other point, that is, my dependence on God, is made out with equal clearness by the aid of reflection and divine revelation. By these I am taught that God sustains me; that all my actions are under the control of his sovereign providence; and particularly, that he governs my good actions by the influence of the truth, joined with the influence of his Spirit. These two points, then, are made known to me in different ways, but with equal certainty. I give them both full credence. I receive them into my heart, and leave them to work out their own consistency. If this cannot be done satisfactorily in the understanding, it can be done in the heart. Long labor has taught me, that the reconciliation of these two points, comes not within the province of speculative reason, and is not to be made out by any processes of intellect. But it is made out with perfect clearness by inward experience. Never, in any instance, have I felt the least incompatibility between the two