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some of the Eastern races to the Western nations, but this we have described to be the consequence of their hatred towards each other. Their hatred and contempt of the Giaour and Frengi is as burning as ever, perhaps even more so, because they are forced to implore his aid. Shylock was not despised and abhorred the less after he had supplied the wants of the Christian than he had been before. The Eastern seeks Christian aid in the same spirit and with the same disgust as he would eat swine's flesh were it the only means of saving him from starvation. This aversion to Europeans is like that towards the abovenamed dainty,—it is the growth of ages and is instilled into their minds from earliest youth; it is therefore more difficult to eradicate than if it were produced by reflection or personal experience. Need we have any further proof of this than the readiness with which, not only the refractory Albanians and Bosnians, but also the Egyptians and Arabs, nay, even the Druses and Metualis, forgetting their grievances, and their hatred of their Turkish rulers, flock under the standard of the Prophet in order to resist foreign encroachment ?
It is not by roughly transplanting Western institutions into the East, that the contrast existing between the two will be softened. Such a course will only produce greater opposition. Approximation must be gradual. It must be accomplished by breaking down the barriers which have hitherto kept the opposing elements separate, and by facilitating an intercourse beneficial to both parties
. The people, not the rulers only, of the East, must be brought into frequent contact with those of the West, and this contact must take place where the contrasts are not so strongly developed, namely, between adjoining races.
It is a singular but undeniable fact, that maritime intercourse, unless connected with colonisation, never leads to an assimilation or even a permanent exchange of ideas between nations; for which reason an insular position is the best for the undisturbed development of a people. Ideas are diffused by land. Contiguous races have therefore a similarity of ideas and habits which we do not find between remoter races, although belonging to the same degree of civilisation. Affinity of race — frequent contact in peace and war, past and present- physical circumstances, such as navigable rivers and open plains, — act as so many connecting links between the adjoining races. Such links may be found between the Eastern and Western races.
The course of these lines of union seems to follow the sun; at least, with very few exceptions, they tend from East to West. The most remote in distance and character from the East is certainly the Anglo-Saxon race, which, with its strongly developed individuality and national feeling, presents the most perfect contrast to the Oriental nature, and may be said to be the representative of the Occidental character. The Romance races - the Italian, Spanish, and French — follow next. They exhibit much less development of individuality ; still they possess a decided Western character and strongly marked national feelings. The Germans, placed in the heart of Europe, stand in the middle between the two antitheses. Their feebly developed
. national feeling, and their cosmopolitan nature, give to them a sort of neutral position between East and West. They are on one side connected with Western civilisation, and on the other touch the Magyar people, which is Oriental in its descent, traditions, and to a great extent in its habits and ideas. An European colony, of Eastern origin, and of a kindred race with the neighbouring Turks, the Magyar race has been drawn by historical events into the circle of Western civilisation, many of whose ideas it has adopted. It thus forms an intermediate link between the Eastern and the Western nations, and seems destined to bring them nearer to each other. Its geographical position indicates the same destiny. Enclosed on the North and South by high mountains, its river system forms a natural channel from the West to the East. The mighty Danube, proceeding from the very centre of Germany, and receiving the tribute of all the rivers of middle Europe, seems to be the natural high road for commerce and civilisation. It has already opened the long closed barriers between Magyar and Turk, and late events have not a little contributed to renew the contact between these two kindred people, which had been interrupted for ages, --- with this difference, however, that the arm which was formerly raised only to slay, has been now extended to receive and to defend as brothers, their long estranged kindred and ancient enemies.
It is a most' remarkable circumstance in this respect, that during the brief interval when the boundary between Hungary and Turkey was under the control of the independent Hungarian Government in the years 1848-49, that by a reasonable alteration of the almost prohibitory Austrian tariff previously existing between the two countries, and again restored since the termination of the war, an incredible amount of commercial intercourse immediately commenced, and Turkish merchants came in considerable numbers even to towns situated in the very heart of Hungary
Steam — the irresistible spirit of the nineteenth century-has already opened the iron gates of the Danube, and induced the
- to try
grave Osmanlis— those professed scorners of commerce to compete with the Austrian Lloyds for the traffic of the Bosphorus. The iron rails, which like veins and arteries seem to convey life over the earth's surface, already connect Hungary with the West, and are now branching towards the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. A few years yet, and Stamboul will be touched by the network of European railways.
The Danube and the railway can and will then be the mighty media for the exchange of material and mental produce between the East and the West. They are the most powerful agents for bringing the Oriental and Occidental populations nearer to each other. The gradual approach of the two great opposing and dissimilar elements through the two kindred races of Turk and Magyar will soothe the harshness in both; but whether a contrast, founded on such wide and natural dissimilarities of
will ever cease, or be even considerably mitigated, is a secret which is now buried in the unfathomable abysses of futurity.
ART. IV.--1. The Estimates of the Army, Ordnance, and
Naval Services, from 1st of April, 1853, to 31st March,
1854. 2. The Peril of Portsmouth. French Fleets and English Forts.
By James FERGUSSON, Esq. London : 1853. 3. A Flying Shot at Fergusson, and his Peril of Portsmouth.
By Lieutenant-Colonel JEBB, C. B. Royal Engineers,
London : 1853. 4. Copies of a Correspondence between the Board of Treasury
and the Board of Admiralty on the subject of Manning the Royal Navy ; together with Copies of a Report of a Committee of Naval Officers, and of Her Majesty's Order in Council relating thereto. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by
Command of Her Majesty. We confess that we have always been totally unable to com
prehend the principle on which certain persons have objected to any outlay for perfecting such a defensive system as should not only place this country in a posture of security against a possible attack by foreign Powers, but also remove the temptation offered by the state of weakness into which our defences have fallen during a long peace. No man would neglect to insure his warehouse or his ricks, because his neighbours declared that they were animated by the most friendly feelings towards him, and
had no intention of applying the torch to his property. National defence is national insurance; and we do not think any Government can maintain a character for prudence, that neglects to complete the insurance of this country against aggression, although we may not only continue to receive the most pacific assurances from foreign governments, but even give them the fullest credit for sincerity in their professions.
Neither do we understand the merit of making a mystery of what we are doing, or of hesitating to name the quarter from which we might most reasonably anticipate an attack. On the contrary, we are of opinion, that by showing to the world how completely we are prepared for a contingency so frightful to contemplate as an invasion of England: by showing how desperate an attempt would be, and how many chances there are against its success : we remove one of the strongest inducements to make it. France is the country whose geographical position affords the most favourable opportunities for attacking us; the invasion of England has been as common a topic of conversation there as among ourselves, and is looked upon by the educated class of Frenchmen with equal alarm; but they are wholly without influence to prevent it, should the army
and the masses determine on an attack. How much wiser, then, it will be to discuss freely and openly our situation, if by so doing we can convince the firebrands who would hail with acclamations an outrage that would once more set the world in flames, that such an attempt must almost as inevitably as deservedly be utterly and disgracefully defeated. Let it then be taken for granted that the blow, if it must come, will be struck by France: if sufficiently defended against her attacks, we need fear those of no other nation.
It is desirable that we should ascertain two points; that the premium we are called upon to pay is not too high : and that the insurance, when completed, will be valid. With regard to the first, we are confident, that if any reader will picture to himself the horrors which would attend the violation of our virgin shores by a hostile army,--and the utmost force of his imagination can not overcharge the picture, — he will confess that no price can be too high to pay for immunity. The remarks which we are about to offer on the different branches of the public service immediately connected with the defence of the country, and on some of the schemes for improving them, cannot fail to be interesting in themselves; and while they will show how much has been effected, and how much more is in progress towards the attainment of that great end, it will be highly satisfactory to find that a system of defence, calculated, as far as human foresight can make it so, to secure our country against aggression, can be completed without adding materially to our present expenditure, and with a confident hope of future diminution.
It was observed by the Secretary at War, in bringing forward the Army Estimates for the present year*, that we now maintain an army greater by 21,000 men than in the year 1835, — the model year of the economists, – while the gross estimate for 1853-4 is only 117,2341. in excess of that for the former year. But if the estimates be examined in detail, it will be found that considerable additional expenses
have been incurred in the interval on the recommendation of Commissioners, Parliamentary Committees, and other authorities; and that, on deducting these, it will appear that even with this powerful addition to its numbers, our army actually costs less than the smaller force of 1835.
This result is partly owing to the diminished cost of a soldier's maintenance, which averages now, officers and men inclusive, 401. 3s. per head, instead of 421. 16s. in 1835; partly to reductions in the non-effective branches, but in a very great degree to improved management. The condition of the soldier has been greatly improved in the mean time, by the reduction of stoppages for rations abroad: by the introduction of rewards for good conduct; of barrack libraries; of schools, both for children and adults; of improved barrack accommodation, which however is still susceptible of much amendment : and in other minor matters.
The discipline of the army is good, and the want of experience in field duties, to which most of our officers and men, excepting such as have served in India, are strangers, owing to the employment of our troops in small detachments, has been greatly corrected by the exercises at the camp on Chobham common, where the service of an army in the field has been carried on in all its branches.
A militia force of 65,000 active and zealous young men will, before long, be sufficiently trained to act with effect, in conjunction with the troops of the line and the artillery, if required; and we may look forward to the efficiency of this economical force, enabling the Government, at no very distant day, to dispense with a portion of the regular army, which it is now requisite to maintain at home. We hope that no future assemblies of troops for training and evolutions will be seen without a portion of Yeomanry and Militia brigaded with the line.
The enrolled pensioners form an available force of 15,837 old
* See . Times,' February 26. 1853.