nal life, he sought it for its own sake; and he regarded it according to its comparative importance. But this is a very different thing from loving himself, merely because he was himself, and seeking his own interest merely because it was his. He loved God supremely and his fellow-creatures as himself. The highest reward, therefore, to which he had respect, was the glory of God and the greatest good. Nothing but disinterested benevolence could have respect unto such reward as he sought. It was that which made him esteem the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt; and which led him to pray, "Yet now if thou wilt forgive their sin, and if not, blot me I pray thee out of thy book which thou hast written."

Objection 8. 'It is sometimes said, that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments addresses selfish motives to mankind, which is utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of disinterested benevolence.

Answer. This objection takes it for granted, that no man can desire to escape punishment, or to obtain a reward from any other than selfish motives. But this is not true. Disinterested benevolence always regards these things, but not as selfishness regards them. It regards them according to their nature and comparative importance.

The rewards and punishments, made known in the Word of God, do not justify selfishness, but condemn it. For nothing but selfishness will be punished, and nothing but disinterested benevolence rewarded in the life to come. Though saints desire the rewards of heaven, yet they desire them on account of their intrinsic and comparative importance. Besides; those rewards are of such a nature, that none but disinterested hearts can really appreciate, desire or enjoy them.

Let a person once deny the distinction between selfishness and disinterested benevolence; and he will find it impossible to point out any essential distinction between sin and holiness, or discover the least propriety in rewards and punish

ments. The doctrine of future rewards and punishments, therefore, and the doctrine of disinterested benevolence mutually illustrate and confirm each other.

Objection 9. It is written, "We love him, because he first loved us." It is thought that this passage settles the question, and fully proves, that christians are not disinterested in their love to God.

Answer. This passage is decisive proof, that God's love to us is disinterested. For it teaches us, that his love to his creatures precedes their love to him. Now if God exercises disinterested, benevolence toward his creatures, then they ought to exercise disinterested love to him; and they cannot be said to be born again, or have a heart after God's own heart, till they do.

The passage under consideration, however, has frequently been perverted and misunderstood. The passage means, that God's love to us is the efficient or producing cause of our love to him. It was his love of benevolence which gave his Son to die for sinners, and the Holy Spirit to renew their hearts. It is in this sense, that saints love him, because he first loved them. This is doubtless the real meaning of the text.

But even if the passage meant, what it is sometimes supposed to mean, it would not disprove the doctrine of disinterested benevolence. Let us suppose the passage to run thus: We love him for his previous love to us. Still the passage

would not justify selfish love to God, nor prove, that all true love to him is not disinterested. It is freely admitted, that saints do in fact love God, not only because he first loved them, but for his previous love to them. But then they love his be nevolence to themselves, for the same reason, that they love his benevolence to others. They love him for his benevolence to themselves, not because that benevolence does them good, but because that benevolence, whether it terminates on themselves or others, is morally excellent in its own nature. Real Christians love God for all his moral excellence, whether that moral

excellence is manifested toward their fellow-beings in general, or toward themselves in particular.

Objection 10. It may be said, that this doctrine cannot be true, because it is opposed by many good men.

Answer. The doctrine of disinterested benevolence must be true, because it was supported by "holy men of old," who "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Objection 11. "If this doctrine is true, then I am no Christian."

Answer. Search and see.

NUMBER X.

[Continued.]

SUSPENSION OF THE SELFISH PRINCIPLE.”

Having shown in what selfishness and benevolence consist, the way is prepared,

III. To show, that selfishness and benevolence mutually exclude each other.

They cannot co-exist in the same heart. No man can exercise selfishness and benevolence at one and the same time. This is plain, both from reason and Scripture. Holy "love is the fulfilling of the law," and selfishness is the transgression of the law. To say, that a man can transgress the law and fulfil the law, at one and the same time, is a plain contradiction. In this respect, "No man can serve two masters." Either he will love the first and hate the second, or else he will hold to the second and despise the first. "Ye cannot serve God and mammon.' It is impossible in the nature of things to love God for what he is, and at the same time love him merely for his favors. It is impossible for a man to love his neighbor as himself, and at the same time, love him merely for himself.

No man can love his own person on account of his worth, and, at the same time, love himself merely because he is himself. Selfishness, therefore, cannot exist in the heart without excluding benevolence; nor can benevolence exist in the heart, without excluding selfishness.

Further. Selfishness and benevolence are not only excluded by each other, but excluded solely by each other. Nothing beside selfishness excludes benevolence; and nothing beside benevolence excludes selfishness.

For,

1. Selfishness and benevolence, in men, cannot be superseded by any intermediate kind of love, which is not of a moral nature. Dr. Taylor, in his "Review of Spring on the means of Regeneration," makes a distinction between self-love on the one hand, and both selfishness and benevolence on the other. This "self-love" he represents as an intermediate kind of love. which is neither selfish nor benevolent, but en. tirely destitute of every moral quality. He represents this "self-love as taking the place of selfishness, in certain cases, and this is what he means by the "suspension of the selfish principle." He says,

"Before the act of the will or heart in which the sinner first prefers God to ́every other object, the object of the preference must be viewed or estimated as the greatest good. Before the object can be viewed as the greatest good, it must be compared with other objects, as both are sources or means of good. Before this act of comparing, there must be an act dictated not by selfishness but by self-love, in which the mind determines to direct its thoughts to the objects for the sake of considering their relative value, of forming a judgment respecting it, and by choosing one or the other as the chief good."

But there is no such thing as "self-love" in distinction from both benevolence and selfishness, in the human mind, or in any moral being. Holy beings love themselves, and their love to themselves is benevolent. On the other hand, sinful beings love themselves, and their love to themselves is selfish. Holy beings love themselves on account of their worth, and therefore, their love to their own persons is true benevolence. But sinful beings love themselves, merely because they are

themselves, and therefore their love to themselves is real selfishness.

"The desire of happiness," in every moral being must necessarily be either selfish or benevolent. It is impossible in the nature of things, for a rational being to desire happiness without desiring it for one of the two following reasons: He must desire it either for its own sake, or for his own sake. If he desires happiness for its own sake or on account of its intrinsic worth, that desire is benevolent. But if he desires it not for its own sake, but merely for the sake of self, then that desire is selfish. But an "in

Dr. Taylor speaks of "involuntary desires." voluntary desire," is a solecism. Choice enters into the very idea of desire, and into the very idea of love.

Should it be said, that no man can avoid desiring happiness, and, therefore, this desire must be involuntary, an answer is easy. No man can avoid choosing happiness, any more than he can avoid desiring it. If the desire of happiness is involuntary, because it cannot be avoided, then the choice of happiness is no longer choice, for the same reason. The truth is, the impossibility is of a moral nature. It is impossible in the same sense for a man to avoid all voluntary exercises; but it does not hence follow, that voluntary exercises are not voluntary exercises.

Dr. Taylor intimates, that "self-love," is not of a moral nature, because it "is always with us be our moral character what it may." It is admitted, that the desire of happiness "is always with us, be our moral character what it may," and so is choice "always with us, be our moral character what it may." But it does not hence follow, that our choice is not of a moral nature, nor that choice is no longer choice. Just so in respect to the "desire of happiness." Holy beings desire it on account of its worth; and theirs is a benevolent desire. But sinful beings desire it merely for the sake of self, and therefore theirs is a selfish desire.