dinate affections. But though the blindness of sinners arises from their hearts, yet God can enlighten their understandings, in spite of their hearts. It is by no means necessary, that he should first suspend their selfish affections, in order to pour the light of truth into their minds.

But Dr. Taylor seems to be very confident, that the sinner cannot cease to esteem the world as the means of his highest happiness, till he ceases to prefer it as such. This, however, is reversing the order of nature. In the order of nature, the "estimate" precedes the "preference;" and in the order of nature, the "estimate may cease, before the "preference "

ceases.

I said in the order of nature, because I am willing to admit, that after the "estimate" ceases, the " preference" will immediately cease as a natural consequence. But this fact does not justify the representation, that the estimate depends upon the preference. I know, Dr. Taylor does not say, in so many words, that the "estimate" depends upon the " preference," but yet his reasoning proceeds upon this hypothesis.

The Dr. has not proved, therefore, that the suspension of the selfish principle is the necessary "means of regeneration." Indeed, if the "selfish principle" must be suspended, before a sinful being can become holy; then the benevolent principle" must be suspended, before a holy being can become sinful. Let us then turn the tables, and apply Dr. Taylor's reasoning to Adam and the angels that kept not their first estate.

According to Dr. Taylor's principles, Adam's love to God was first suspended. He then took into consideration the question whether he could derive the highest happiness from God or from the world, and came to the conclusion, that he could derive the highest happiness from the world. Under the influence of this mistake, he then made choice of the world, as the means of his highest happiness; and this misguided choice was his first sin; and it was his first sin too,

solely because it was a misguided act.

Should Dr. Taylor

carry Adam's blameworthiness any farther back than this misguided choice, he would, on his own principles, make Adam sin before he did sin.

Should Dr. Taylor say, that Adam knew better than to make such a choice as this, it would be the same as to say, that Adam chose the world as the means of his highest happi"without esteeming it as such," which the Dr. himself will acknowledge, must have been impossible.

ness

In the light of Dr. Taylor's theory, therefore, we learn the evil of sin. If his principles are correct, it is founded entirely in ignorance and mistake. Will the Dr. convince the Churches, that his theory makes "sin exceeding sinful"?

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But wherein consisted the first sin of Satan? According to Dr. Taylor's principles, Satan, while he continued holy, chose God as the means of his highest happiness. His love to God as the means of his highest happiness, however, became suspended, or ceased to be as the greatest apparent good." As soon as his will had ceased to be as the greatest apparent good;" then God ceased to appear to him in this light. He then took into consideration the question, whether the highest happiness could be derived from God or from the world. After comparing God with the world, he came to the conclusion that he could derive more happiness from the world than from God. Nor did he stop here. He doubtless made a "" desperate effort" to choose the world as his supreme good. Such a desperate effort" would perhaps be more necessary to Satan, than to Adam; as the former, at the time he fell, probably knew but little about "the world." After Satan had convinced himself, that he could derive more happiness from the world than from God; and had tried successfully to deepen this conviction; and had made several desperate efforts to sin, he at length accomplished his purpose.

This theory respecting the fall of Adam, and that of the non-elect angels, is quite as rational, as Dr. Taylor's theory

of regeneration. The two theories are inseparably connected; and if Dr. Taylor will fairly refute the one, he will thereby refute the other.

NUMBER XI.

[Continued.]

(" MEANS OF REGENERATION."

Dr. Taylor employs several direct arguments, to prove, that certain mental acts, dictated by self-love, constitute the sinners using the means of regeneration. He says, p. 210,

"Our first argument on this part of the subject will be derived from those principles, which control the use and interpretation of language on a topic of this nature. And here we shall endeavor to present the subject in such a light, as to remove one of the principal difficulties with which it has commonly been encumbered, as well as to support the proposition which we have stated above.

"That the word regeneration may be used sometimes in a comprehensive, and sometimes in a restricted sense, is obvious in the first place from the nature of language. Many words in common use are complex terms, which include a number of particulars, in connection with some one leading idea."

After adducing several examples to illustrate this distinction, Dr. Taylor proceeds to apply "these principles to the case" under consideration. He says,

"It can hardly be necessary to prove, that in the language of the Scriptures and of common life, the command "make you a new heart,"" repent of this thy wickedness,"-"thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,"-implies and includes those previous acts of the understanding, which from the nature of the human mind, are necessary to an act of choice. Thus too, in the ordinary concerns of life, when parental or civil authority requires any voluntary action, it uniformly adopts the same mode of command; comprising under a single complex term the subject matter of the requirement. In directing a child, for example, to walk, or sit, or to write, these single terms are regarded by every one as sufficiently intelligible, without specifying all those previous mental acts, which, in the nature of things, are indispensable to the one enjoined. Those being always understood and known as inseparable from the duty enjoined, are properly considered as implied and included in the single comprehensive term, which is employed to describe that duty."

This argument is more specious than solid. It implies, that every command which enjoins a duty, virtually requires all those mental acts which are pre-requisite to the performance of that duty. This is not true; and if it were true, it would not answer the Dr.'s purpose.

The assumption is hot true. No reasonable command ever requires any thing more than acts of choice. When God requires us to consider our ways, he only requires those acts of attention or choice, on which that consideration depends. When he requires us to remember our Creator, he only requires such voluntary affections or acts of choice, as will cherish and perpetuate that remembrance.

When he required Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, he required preliminary acts; but those preliminary acts were all virtually comprehended in acts of choice. Abraham's journey to Mount Moriah depended upon his choice. His taking the wood depended upon his choice. His building an altar depended upon his choice. His laying the wood in order upon the altar, depended upon his choice. His binding his son Isaac upon the altar, depended upon his choice; and his taking the knife and stretching forth his hand to slay his son, de'pended upon his choice. The command which required these preliminary steps, therefore, required nothing but what was virtually comprehended in acts of choice; and the like may ⚫be said of every other command in the Bible.

But, though in requiring certain duties, God requires preliminary acts of choice, yet he never requires such mental acts as do not depend upon choice, and are antecedent and pre-requisite to all choice. To require the antecedents and pre-requisites of choice is absurd. It is the same as to require passive and involuntary operations.

Every command, whether human or Divine, addresses nothing but the will or heart, and binds nothing but the will or heart. But the understanding and conscience are the only avenues to the heart. There is a certain degree of knowl

edge, therefore, which is absolutely necessary to moral agen cy; and to suppose that God requires this pre-requisite to moral action, is the same as to suppose, that he imposes obligations upon his creatures, before he makes them moral agents. There are, then, certain mental acts pre-requisite to choice, which God does not require, and which it is absurd to suppose, that he should require.

Whenever God requires preliminary acts to the performance of a particular duty, he only requires acts of choice. Of what nature, then, are all those acts of choice which God requires? Does he require selfish choices? Certainly not. Does he require such choices as are neither selfish nor benevolent? or such as have no moral quality? Moral agents have no such choices; and if they had choices of this description, to suppose, that God requires them, is the same as to suppose, that he converts such acts into obedience, as can neither become obedience nor disobedience. But if God never requires selfish choices, nor such choices as are neither right nor wrong ; then he always requires benevolent choices, and nothing but benevolent choices. Benevolent affections, intentions, desires, and volitions, comprehend all that God requires, in all the internal and external duties which he enjoins.

Although some duties require acts of choice as preliminary to the thing specified, yet this is not the case with every duty. Disinterested benevolence is the very first duty of every moral agent. There is a certain kind of knowledge which is prerequisite to the performance of this duty, and which lies at the very foundation of the duty itself. Pre-requisites to the first duty, are not included in the first duty, and are no part of it. To say they are, is the same as to say, that there is a duty before the first duty. Dr. Taylor cannot avoid this contradiction by making a distinction between the order of time and the order of nature. For it is a palpable contradiction to say, that there can be a duty, even in the order of nature, before the first duty. But Dr. Taylor involves himself in this