How then shall we account for the first sin of our first parents, and of the fallen angels, by the mere influence of motives? The motives arising from the authority and favor of God, and the sanctions of his law, were infinitely more important than any sinful motive that could possibly have occurred to their minds. And yet they sinned, notwithstanding their hearts were fully set in them in favor of holiness and against sin till the very instant they rebelled. To say, however, that moral agency requires the causation of motives, is to deny the efficiency of the Holy Spirit in producing those moral exercises which are holy. For on this ground, moral exercises can be produced in no other way than through the efficiency of motives.

The term motives is sometimes used to denote the intentions of an agent; and sometimes the objects of his choice. Το say that motives, in the former sense, cause our choices, is the same as to say that they cause one another, which has been shown to be absurd. To say that motives, in the last sense of that word, cause our acts of choice, is the same as to say, that our acts of choice are caused by the objects of them. That whenever we choose an object, that object itself puts forth a causing act, and causes itself to be chosen.

But perhaps it will be said, that motives are not properly efficient causes, but only occasions of our choice; that, though we cannot choose without motives, yet our choices are not produced by them as efficient causes; but flow from our nature as their true source. That motive is not the efficient cause of choice; but only the occasion on which choice depends, or without which it could not take place, is readily admitted. But what is meant, when it is said, that our choices flow from our nature, as their true source? Is it meant, only, that our acts of choice are our own? So are the hairs o our head our own. They belong to our persons, as really as our acts of choice; and yet, we do not cause them to grow. The phrase, "They are our own," no more explains the caus

ation of our choices, than it explains the causation of the hairs of our head; of the beating of our pulse; or of the circulation of our blood; or even of our own souls. Is it meant, then, that our choices flow from our nature, in the same sense in which streams flow from a fountain? It may be asked, Is this fountain infinite, or finite? If finite, why does it not become exhausted? If this fountain is supplied; what is it which supplies it? When it is said, then, that our choices flow from . our nature, is something else intended? Is it meant that our acts of choice arise from the necessity of our nature; just as God's acts choice arise from the necessity of his nature? This is an absurdity which has already been exposed. Does. the expression mean, then, that our nature is really and properly the efficient cause of our acts of choice? If so, then our nature must do this by previous causing acts. This sup→ position only increases the difficulty. For it is even harder to account for these causing acts, than for the choices said to be produced by them. But this supposition was previously shown to be absurd.

The only pretext for supposing that Divine efficiency is inconsistent with moral agency, is, that it is beyond our control. But this difficulty exists on every supposition which can be made. Do our choices arise by chance? Chance must be beyond our control. Do they arise from the necessity of our nature? That necessity must be beyond our control. Do they flow from our natures, as streams from the fountain? Then our natures must be beyond control. Do they arise from some involuntary cause within us? That involuntary cause must be beyond our control. Are they caused by motives? Those motives must be beyond our control. Do our choices successively cause one another? That is to say, is: every present choice caused by a preceding or past choice? Such a preceding or past choice cannot be subject to present control. On the contrary, our present choice, in this case, must have been controlled by the choice next preceding; and

that by another previous choice; and that by another; and so on till we come to the very first choice we ever had; and this first choice must have been controlled by a choice before the first. It is evident, therefore, to a demonstration, that the doctrine of Divine efficiency is as consistent with moral agency as any supposition whatever.

In my next number, I intend to show, that this doctrine is equally consistent with the Divine character.

NUMBER IV.

In my two last numbers, it was shown, that the doctrine of the universal agency of God is consistent with the moral agency of creatures. In this number, I shall attempt to show, that it is equally consistent with the Divine character. If the agency of God, in the production of the moral exercises of his creatures, be inconsistent with the Divine character, it must be so, on one of the following grounds: either; that God cannot cause the moral exercises of his creatures, without destroying their moral agency; or without doing what is in itself sinful; or without doing what he has no right to do; or without doing this from some improper motive, Let us examine each of these grounds, distinctly.

1. Will it be said, that God cannot cause the moral exer cises of his creatures, without destroying their moral agency? This supposition has already been refuted. It is sufficient to observe here, that this supposition is a contradiction in terms. Moral agency consists in moral exercises. To say that God cannot cause our moral exercises, without destroying our moral agency, is the same as to say, that he cannot cause the existence of moral exercises, without preventing their existence. That he cannot cause sin, without preventing the existence of sin; nor holiness without preventing the existence of holi

'ness. That his efficiency cannot render his creatures praiseworthy, without destroying their praise-worthiness; nor blameworthy, without destroying their blame-worthiness and ill-desert. Will it be said, then,

2. That God cannot cause all the moral exercises of his creatures, without doing what is in itself sinful? This objec tion has been alleged, on the supposed ground, that like causes always produce like effects; or that there is nothing in the effect, that is not in the cause. But this ground is untenable. God has created matter; but he is not material. He has created venomous reptiles; but is free from their poisonous qualities. He has created a hell; but there is nothing in him of a hellish nature. The maxim, therefore, that like causes produce like effects," is contrary to fact.

Perhaps, however, the objector will concede that this maxim is not universally true; and still contend that it is true in mor als. But to assert that the maxim is true in morals, is taking for granted the very thing to be proved.

Besides, if the maxim be true in morals, it will follow, that the cause of the very first sin was sinful; and consequently, that sin existed before the first sin. This is a necessary consequence; since the cause must always precede the effect.

Nor can the objector avoid this absurdity, by contending, that the cause does not precede the effect in the order of time; but only in the order of nature. For if every sinful effect must have a sinful cause; then sin, at least in the order of nature, must have existed before it did exist.

But to say this, is to

"There is only one way in which the objector can avoid this. absurdity on the principle assumed. And that is, by contending that the first sin was uncaused. avoid one absurdity, by running into another. If the first sin of Adam, and of the fallen angels was uncaused, it must have arisen either from chance, or from the necessity of their na tures. Chance is a mere phantom of the imagination; and it can no more account for the existence of sin, than it can ac

count for the existence of the universe. If sin could enter in to the world by chance; what security have we against the final apostacy of all holy beings? The very idea of chance excludes the idea of cause and effect; and, therefore, to admit the existence of chance, is to deny that we have any evidence of the existence of God, from the things that are made. To suppose, that Adam and the fallen angels sinned by a necessity of nature, is equally irrational. They were perfectly holy before they fell, and dependent for their very existence. It is absurd to ascribe an internal necessity of acting to dependent natures; and stifl more palpably absurd, to ascribe a necessity of sinning to holy natures.

The maxim, that like causes always produce like effects, loses all plausibility, the moment we make a distinction between effects and emanations. There is a wide distinction between emanations from the Divine nature, and the effects of Divine power. The effects of Divine power are not necessarily like the Divine nature; and they may be as different from it, as light from darkness. Effects do not emanate or flow from their causes, as streanis from a fountain. The stream existed in the fountain before it emanated; and constituted a part of it; and, therefore, it is necessarily of the same nature with the fountain. But it is not so with effects. They never existed in their causes before they were produced; and never constituted the least part of them. They are not, therefore, necessarily like their causes; and they may be entirely different from them.

That God cannot cause the moral exercises of sinners, without doing what is in itself sinful, has been also affirmed on the principle, that blame does not belong to an effect, but only to its cause. But this principle is also absurd. . It re-. moves all blame from creatures, let the cause of sin be what it may. If motives be the cause of sin, this principle will transfer the blame from sia to motives; and from motives to the cause of them; and so on, till we come back to the first