cause of all things. If it be said, that we cause our own. choices voluntarily, this principle will transfer the blame of every sinful choice, to the choice which caused it; and, from this causing choice, to the choice next preceding; and so on, step by step, till we come back to a choice before the first choice; which drives it out of the universe. Will it be said, that we cause our choices involuntarily? This principle will transfer all the blame to this involuntary cause; and from this involuntary cause, to the cause which produced it; and so on, till it reaches the first cause of all things. Should it be said, that we cause our choices ourselves, without telling how we cause them, it may be replied, that we are effects too. The principle which ascribes all blame to the cause, therefore, will transfer all blame from us, to our Creator. If it be said, that Satan is the cause of sin, the above principle will transfer all blame to Satan, and from Satan to his Creator. To avoid this difficulty, perhaps it will be said, that sin has no cause. if the blame belongs to the cause, and sin has no cause; then the blame belongs no where. Blame-worthiness and ill-desert enter into the very idea of sin, and constitute its essence. Το say that blame-worthiness and ill-desert do not belong to sin, but only to its cause, is the same as to say that sin does not consist in itself, but only in its cause; which is a contradiction in terms. The fallacy of the above objection seems to consist in supposing, that cause and effect mean the same as subject and predicate. Because every thing in the predicate belongs to the subject, it is taken for granted, that every thing in the effect belongs to the cause. But this implies, that the effect exists in the cause, and constitutes a part of it; which is far from the truth. Will it be said, then,

But

3. That God cannot cause all our moral exercises, without doing what he has no right to do? This has been affirmed. It has been said, that we have no right to cause men to sin; and therefore God has no right to do this. This objection assumes, that the rights of God are measured by the rights of

This is not the case.

We have no right to

But how does it We have no more than we have to

his creatures. create, to preserve the world, to pardon sin, or to condemn sinners to hell. But has God no right to do these things? The objector will reply, that the cases are not parallel; because we have no power to do these things. appear that the cases are not parallel? power to cause our fellow creatures to sin, create. Even Satan cannot cause men to sin. He can present motives and temptations, and that is all he can do. It is absurd to suppose that we can do more than this. We can no more work in men to will and to do that which is sinful, than we can work in them to will and to do that which is holy. Still it may be, that the objector is not satisfied. Perhaps he will say, that creatures would have no right to work in one another to will and to do that which is sinful, even if they could do it. But what does this prove. Creatures would have no right to create worlds, to raise the dead, to pardon sin, or to condemn their fellow creatures to hell, even if they could do these things. Will it be said, that the very supposition, that creatures could do these things, is absurd? It is easy to reply, that the very supposition, that creatures could work in one another to will and to do, is also absurd. For aught that appears, then, the cases are parallel. And we have no more reason to infer, that God has no right to cause men to sin, because we have no right to do so; than we have reason to infer that God has no right to create toads and serpents, because we have no right to create them.

It is impossible for God to do what he has no right to do,' without infringing upon the rights of some being or other. But God can cause the moral exercises of his creatures, without infringing upon the rights of any being in the universe. Creatures can claim no right to independence in any respect whatever. And, therefore, their entire dependence upon God for their existence, motions and exercises, can be no infringment upon their rights. According to Scripture and reason,

God has the same right that the potter has, to form one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor. For he can work in all his creatures to will and to do; without infringing upon their rights or his own. Will it be said, then, 4. That God cannot cause all the moral exercises of his creatures, without doing it from some improper motive? To this, it is sufficient to reply, that, according to Scripture and reason, God works all things after the counsel of his own will, from a supreme regard to his own glory and the good of the universe; and this is the highest and best of motives. Should. it be said, that it is wrong even for God to do evil that good may come; this will be readily admitted. But that it is doing evil for God to cause all the moral exercises of his creatures, remains to be proved.

Why should it be more inconsistent with the Divine char. acter to cause the existence of sin, than to decree, or even permit its existence. Were it wrong in God to cause the exist ence of sin, it would be wrong in him to decree its existence.. If there were any criminality in doing either, it would consist in the Divine choice; and that choice which constitutes the Divine decree, must be of the same moral nature, with the choice which constitutes the Divine agency. It would not have been right in God even to permit the existence of sin,. unless it was wisest and best, on the whole, that sin should exist. And if it was wisest and best, all things considered, that sin should exist, it must have been equally right in God,. both to decree and cause its existence.

I know it has been confidently denied, that the existence of sin is for the best, all things considered. It has been said, that the reason why God permitted the existence of sin, was not because it was for the best, but because he could not prevent it, without destroying the moral agency of his creatures. But in this explanation, the objector admits the very principle which he denies. He admits, for instance, that it was better, in God's view, that sin should exist, than that the moral agen

Should the objector

cy of his creatures should be destroyed. still contend that it was not for the best, all things considered, that sin should exist; then it was not best that sin should be permitted to exist, even considering the reason which the objector assigns himself. If the reason of this permission, as explained by the objector, did not make it best, all things considered, that sin should exist; then that reason does not vindicate the Divine character. It actually impeaches it. It implies that, all things considered, the reason why God permitted sin to exist, was not the best reason. That, for a particular reason, God determined to permit the existence of sin, though he knew it would be best, all things considered, that sin should be kept out of existence. That is to say, for a particular reason, God permitted the existence of sin, though he knew better than to do so. If the objector's theory, therefore, be intended to vindicate the Divine character, it really admits the very principle which it denies. It admits, that it was wisest and best, all things considered, that sin should exist. Consequently it admits, that it was best, all things considered, that God should choose its existence, both in his determinations and conduct respecting it. But, although the objector's theory virtually admits this argument in its full force, still it contains an assertion which is not true. It asserts that God could not prevent sin, without destroying the moral agency of his creatures. But God could have prevented angels from sinning, by not creating any that he foresaw would apostatise. And if God had not created Satan, our first parents would never have been tempted by him, to eat of the forbidden fruit. God could have prevented our first parents from sinning, by keeping them out of the way of temptation; or by taking them to heaven before they fell.. God could as easily preserve his creatures holy, without destroying their moral agency, as he could have created them holy at first, without destroying their moral agency. It is absurd to suppose, that it is more inconsistent with moral agency, to preserve a holy heart, than to

make one. Why should preservation in holiness be thought more inconsistent with moral agency, than regeneration; or sanctification; or the promises of eternal life, to those who believe?

It has now been shown, I hope satisfactorily, that neither the moral agency of creatures, nor the moral character of God, affords any solid objection against a literal interpretation. of those passages of Scripture, which were quoted in the first: number of this article. It becomes us, therefore, to let the Scripture speak for itself, and not be wise either above or be low what is written.

NUMBER V..

I have already attempted to show, that there is no sound objection against a literal interpretation of those passages of Scripture, which, in their most obvious sense, teach the doctrine of the universal agency of God. I shall now attempt to show, that there are positive reasons in favor of such a literal. interpretation. It is true, I have, in some measure, anticipated those reasons. But I think they deserve to be more distinctly and fully considered. Let us, then, consider,

1. The nature of creatures. To be creatures, is to be dependent for our existence; and, to be dependent for our existence, is to be dependent for our understandings, our hearts, and all that we are. It has been said, that it is no contradic tion to say, that a being may be self-moved. Be it so. It is. no contradiction to say, that a being may be self-existent. Yet it is a contradiction to ascribe either of the attributes to a created being; and a still more palpable contradiction to ascribe the first of these attributes to a being without the other. No being can be self-moved, without being self-existent; nor be self existent, and, at the same time, a creature. There is