an unjust punishment upon sinners; for, they richly deserve the punishment which they suffer. Nor does God ever inflict unnecessary punishment; for, all the punishment which he inflicts is necessary to display the glory of his justice towards sinners, and the riches of his grace towards the elect. The fact that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, could neither annihilate the justice of God in the punishment of sinners, nor render the display of his justice unnecessary. And therefore this objection falls entirely to the ground.

Obj. 6. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system and would not; then, to pray that God would prevent sin, is to pray against the Divine will.

Answer. It might be said, with equal plausibility, that if God would have prevented all sin in a moral system, and could not; then, to pray that he would prevent sin is to pray that he would do what is beyond the reach of Divine power.

But this objection takes for granted what is not true. It assumes, that it is our duty to pray, that God would prevent all sin in the moral system. For, praying that God would prevent sin so far as is consistent with the dictates of infinite wisdom and benevolence, is not praying against the Divine will, but in accordance with it. It is not our duty to pray, that God would prevent all sin in a moral system; nor, that he would prevent more sin, than he sees it wisest and best to prevent. This objection, therefore, is built upon a false and sandy foundation.

Obj. 7. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system and would not; then he is the author of sin.

Answer. If this objection means, that God authorizes the commission of sin, it is not true. If it means, that he is the approver of sin, it is not true. If it means, that he is the perpetrator of sin, it is not true. But if it means only, that "God

worketh all things after the counsel of his own will;" then it is true, and I am willing to admit it in all its force.

Obj. 8. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral

system and would not; then he ought to have come out, and avowed that he had marred the system himself, that he might have the honor of it.'

Answer. What does the objector mean by God's having "marred the system himself," on the supposition that he could have prevented all sin in a moral universe? If the objector means, that on this supposition, 'God forms the light and creates darkness; that he makes peace and creates evil;' that "he worketh all things after the counsel of his own will ;" and that" of him and through him and to him are all things;" God has come out and avowed" all this, and he challenges the honor of it. If the objector does not mean this, it concerns him to explain his meaning; and till he shall tell what he does mean, I shall hazard the presumption that he does not mean any thing.

Obj. 9. The theory that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, is very perplexing to sinners in general, and infidels in particular.

Answer. "The way of the wicked is as darkness; they know not at what they stumble."

Obj. 10. But this theory is very perplexing to ministers who wish to preach so as to satisfy their hearers.

Answer. It is doubtless a perplexing task to make Divine truth pleasing to the carnal heart. And it is not strange that ministers, who endeavor to do this, should feel perplexed and embarrassed. They are sincerely to be pitied. And if they cannot find any relief, it would be better for them to relinquish the ministry.

Obj. 11. The doctrine that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system and would not, is calculated to make infidels.

Answer. If this doctrine is calculated to make infidels, then there is no doctrine of the Gospel but what is calculated to make infidels, and in the same sense. The reason is obvious. Sinners naturally hate the truth. And because they

receive not the love of the truth that they might be saved, God sometimes sends them strong delusion that they might believe a lie.'

Obj. 12. If God could have prevented all sin in a moral system; then sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and is not "a groundless assumption."

Answer. This is freely admitted. That sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, however, will be more fully considered in the sequel.

NUMBER VI.

66 THAT SIN IS THE NECESSARY MEANS OF THE GREATEST

GOOD,

IS NOT A GROUNDLESS ASSUMPTION."

In his "Concio ad Clerum," p. 29, Dr. Taylor says,

"The difficulties on this subject; [the introduction of sin] result, in the view of the writer, [himself] from two very common, but groundless assumptions-assumptions which so long as they are admitted and reasoned upon, must leave the subject involved in insuperable difficulties.

The assumptions are these: First, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and as such, so far as it exists, is preferable on the whole to holiness in its stead. Secondly, that God could in a moral system, have prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin."

That God could have prevented all sin in a moral system, has been already considered in the foregoing numbers of this review; and till my arguments shall have been refuted, I shall take it for granted, that this point is fully established.

I shall now inquire, whether sin is not the necessary means of the greatest good.

That sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, follows directly from the leading position established in the foregoing numbers. For if God could have prevented all sin in a moral system; then he would have prevented its existence entirely, provided its partial existence were not necessary to the

greatest good of the universe. For God is infinitely good, and always disposed to do what is wisest and best. There is but one way in which it is possible to avoid this conclusion from the position, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system. And that is by contending, that the universal existence of holiness, on the one hand, and the partial existence of sin on the other, are equally necessary to the good of the universe; and that the good of the universe might have been raised to as high a degree as possible in either of these ways; so that it was a matter of indifference which of these ways was adopted. This theory, however, is not Dr. Taylor's. He does not pretend, that God was ever in a state of suspense. He, and the rest of the New Haven Divines, I believe, admit and contend, not only, that the present plan of Divine operation is as good as any other, but the best possible. Dr. Taylor, therefore, it is presumed, will not pretend to deny the justice of the inference, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, till he shall have refuted the arguments already adduced in favor of the position, that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system.

Dr. Taylor thinks it is possible and even probable, that sin is "incidental" to a moral universe, "just as friction is incidental to machinery." But if this were so, it is difficult to show why every moral agent is not a sinner. Friction is not only partially incidental to machinery, but universally incidental to it. The only sense in which friction is incidental to a system of machinery is, that it is inseparable from the nature of machines. To say that sin is incidental to a moral universe in this sense, is the same as to say, that it is inseparable from the nature of moral agents. Friction enters into the very idea of machinery, and if sin were, in any proper sense, incidental to a moral universe, it would enter into the very idea of moral agency.

But we have seen that God could have prevented all sin in a moral system. Of course sin is not an incidental evil. And

if it is not an incidental evil, then Dr. Taylor himself will admit, that it is the necessary means of the greatest good.

The proof of this position, however, does not depend solely on the preceding reasoning. It is susceptible of proof by distinct and independent arguments.

If it can be shown that sin is necessary to the scheme of Redemption; and that the scheme of Redemption is necessary to the greatest good; then it will follow inevitably, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good of the universe.

The first thing to be considered is, that sin is necessary to the scheme of Redemption. This is too plain to be denied. There can be no atonement for sin, where there is no sin to be atoned; and no redemption of sinners, where there are none to be redeemed. A scheme of Redemption for holy and innocent beings is a palpable and glaring absurdity. It is, therefore, a settled and conceded point, that sin is necessary to the scheme of Redemption.

It remains, then, in the second place, to prove, that the scheme of Redemption is necessary to the greatest good of the universe. Here I would observe,

1. That the scheme of Redemption is pre-eminently adapted to the mode of the Divine existence. There are Three persons in the Godhead, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.

There can be no reasonable doubt that this peculiar mode of existence is absolutely necessary to the perfection of the Divine purposes and operations, and the consummation of the / Divine blessedness and glory. This mode of existence, however, is absolutely necessary to the scheme of Redemption; and the scheme of Redemption is better suited than any other scheme of which we can conceive, to this mode of Divine existence. It is evidently far better adapted to the mode in which God exists, than any system embracing none but holy and innocent beings. The creation, preservation and government of holy and innocent beings, could not lay a foundation