of his kingdom. The very supposition, that sin exists, because it is the necessary means of the greatest good, implies, that God chooses and ought to choose its existence, solely because he loves holiness and happiness, and means to secure the greatest conceivable amount.

If the benevolence of God requires him to seek the greatest amount of holiness and happiness; then it certainly requires him to love holiness and happiness, and hate sin and misery, on their own account; and if his benevolence obliges him to love holiness and hate sin; then it requires him to express his love to holiness and his hatred of sin in his holy law. But here another objection occurs:

Objection 2. "If it be said that it is on the whole for the best that he should require it, [holiness] but not on the whole for the best that they should perform it -what is this but to say that it is on the whole for the best that he should practise deception on his subjects? And what then becomes of his sincerity ?—Let us take an example or two. Who would regard the command of a parent as sincere, it being known that he prefers on the whole the disobedience of the child to his obedience? Who would regard the invitation of a friend as sincere, being fully apprised that he prefers on the whole its rejection to its acceptance ?—If it be said that no subjects of God have such knowledge of God's preference of sin to holiness in their own case, then the question is whether their ignorance alters the fuct; and whether he is truly sincere, when he would be justly pronounced insincere if the real fact were kuown?-Besides, after the commission of sin, the fact of such a preference, if there be one, is known. How then does the sincerity of God appear, when it is placed beyond a doubt by the event, that he did prefer on the whole, the sin committed by the subject to the holiness required in his law? Is it then possible that God should be sincere in his commands and invitations, unless holiness in man be on the whole preferable to sin in its stead ?" -Concio ad Clerum.

Answer. The word sincere has two meanings. It sometimes means the same as pure, and sometimes the same as unfeigned. The commands and invitations of God are sincere in both these senses. They are unfeigned expressions of pure benevolence. This the objector will acknowledge. But yet he contends, that God could not be sincere in his commands and invitations, if sin, so far as it exists, were the necessary means of the greatest good.

Is this a just inference? If so, it must be maintained on

one of the following grounds: either, 1st, That God cannot possibly exercise pure, disinterested benevolence toward his creatures, and at the same time choose the partial existence of sin, as the necessary means of the greatest good; or, 2d, That he cannot, on this supposition, express that benevolence in his commands and invitations.

Will it be said, 1. That it is impossible for God to exercise disinterested benevolence toward his creatures, if sin is the necessary means of the greatest good? If the Objector says it is impossible, let him prove that it is so. There is just as much ground for the exercise of disinterested, impartial and universal benevolence, on the supposition, that sin, so far as it exists, is the necessary means of the greatest good, as there is, on any other supposition whatever; and this, Dr. Taylor has virtually acknowledged, in the objection which has just been answered. For, he undertakes to tell, in what way God ought to express his benevolence, provided, that sin is the ne

sary means of the greatest good. Surely, the Dr. would not undertake to tell, in what way God ought to express his benevolence in a given case, if he believed it were impossible, in that case, for God to exercise any benevolence at all. Notwithstanding, therefore, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, it will be admitted, by Dr. Taylor himself, that God can exercise pure, impartial, universal benevolence toward his creatures. God is still able to love what is lovely, and hate what is hateful; and to regard every object exactly according to its nature and comparative importance.

Will it be said, then, 2. That, if sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, it is impossible for God to express, in his commands and invitations, the benevolence which he really feels?

If so, wherein does that impossibility consist? In the precepts of his law, God expresses his love to holiness; in its prohibitions and penalty, he expresses his hatred of sin; and in his invitations, he expresses a regard for the spiritual and eter

nal good of his creatures, according to its intrinsic and comparative importance. His love to holiness is benevolentlove; his hatred of sin is benevolent hatred; and his regard for the good of every one of his creatures, according to its intrinsic and comparative importance, is a benevolent regard. Such pure, disinterested benevolence, God can exercise, and such he does exercise, though sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. Such pure, disinterested benevolence, he can likewise express, and he does express it, in all his commands and invitations. Notwithstanding sin, so far as it exists, is the necessary means of the greatest good, the commands and invitations of God are unfeigned expressions of pure, disinterested benevolence. The position, therefore, that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, does not militate against the Divine sincerity.

The objector thinks, that if God, all things considered, chooses the disobedience of any of his creatures, instead of their obedience, then he is practising deception upon them, in his commands and invitations. But how so? In his commands and invitations, God professes to desire the obedience of every one of his creatures; and this he really does desire. So far, then, he is perfectly sincere. But, says the objector, 'The commands and invitations of God express what he desires, all things considered.' But what does the objector mean? If he means any thing to his purpose, he means, that God professes to desire, all things considered, the holiness and happiness of every person, whether the holiness and happiness of that person are consistent or inconsistent with the Divine glory, and the greatest good of the universe. This implies, that God professes to desire the holiness and happiness of every individual, more than his own glory, and the greatest good. The objector himself, therefore, virtually makes God insinFor God could not, profess to prefer the good of an individual, above his own glory, and the good of the universe, without professing more than he feels, and practising decep

cere.

tion and falsehood. But this he does not do. He regards and professes to regard the good of every individual according to its intrinsic and comparative importance. When he sacrifices the good of an individual, to the good of the whole, therefore, he acts in perfect consistency with his professions of pure, impartial benevolence.

The examples which Dr. Taylor has adduced, do not meet the point under discussion. The Dr. virtually takes it for granted, that the "parent,” on the whole, prefers the disobedi ence of his child, and the "friend," the rejection of his own invitation, WITHOUT ANY GOOD REASON WHATSOEVER. Let these examples be placed in a proper light, and they will no longer be in Dr. Taylor's favor. Every benevolent parent sincerely desires, in itself considered, the obedience of his child and expresses that sincere desire in his commands. But does a benevolent parent either desire, or profess to desire, on the whole, the obedience of his child, whether that obedience is consistent or inconsistent with the glory of God, and the greatest good of the universe? Certainly not. Every benevolent friend sincerely desires, in itself considered, the acceptance of his own invitation. But does a benevolent friend either desire, or profess to desire, on the whole, that his own invitation should be accepted, whether that acceptance be consistent or inconsistent with the glory of God, and the greatest good? Certainly not.

No earthly "parent" has a right to say, without qualifica tion, whether he prefers the obedience of his child to his disobedience, all things considered, or not; and the reason is plain. He cannot know, before-hand, whether that obedience is, all things considered, desirable or undesirable. The examples, which Dr. Taylor has adduced, therefore, are essentially defective. When Dr. Taylor shall have proved, that impartial benevolence, will make a parent prefer the obedience of his child, and a friend prefer the acceptance of his own invitation, above the glory of God, and the greatest good; then the

Dr. will have done something to his purpose. It will then follow, that commands and invitations necessarily express what is desired, all things considered. But if impartial benevolence always prefers the greatest good above every thing else, then benevolent commands and benevolent invitations do not, necessarily, express what is desired, all things considered; and, consequently, the commands and invitations of God may be unfeigned expressions of pure benevolence, notwithstanding the partial existence of sin is the necessary means of the greatest good.

NUMBER VIII.

[Continued.]

SIN IS NECESSARY ΤΟ THE GREATEST GOOD. OBJECTIONS

ANSWERED.

In my last number, I examined two objections against the sentiment, that sin, so far as it exists, is necessary to the greatest good. One of these objections was, that this sentiment militates against the benevolence of God; and the other, that it militates against his sincerity. But I have other objections

to answer.

Objection 3. "Further, it is extensively maintained, that virtue consists in utility, i. e. that such is the nature, relations and tendencies of things, that greater happiness will result from virtue or holiness, than from vice or sin. How then, can sin, in the nature of things, be the necessary means of the greatest good?" -Concio ad Clerum.

Answer. If it were true "that virtue is founded in utility," it is freely admitted, that sin could not, in the nature of things, be the necessary means of the greatest good. The very supposition would be contradictory and absurd. If holiness be founded in utility, sin must be founded in in-utility. If holiness be founded in usefulness, sin must be founded in entire