Brassard et al. vs. Langevin.

content with reading the pastoral-letter which the Bishops of the Province had published in the month of September, 1875, not on account of this election, but on account of the principles which should be propounded and defended. Thus, after reading this pastoral-letter, the pastors confined themselves to commenting upon it generally, without applying it to the political parties which divide this country and to the candidates who were before the people in Charlevoix. They explained the doctrine of the Catholic Church with respect to the several subjects touched upon in this pastoral-letter, without attacking or insulting any political party or any candidate.

There is, therefore, no parity between the Galway County election, and that of the County of Charlevoix.

The learned Counsel then referred to the Borough of Galway case decided by the same Judge, (1). also to Brickwood & Croft (2.)

As to the quantum of intimidation there can be no comparison as the evidence shows that they were only four cases. The case of Bonaventure is not in point. There threats were used and the sermons were delivered in the presence of the Respondent. Since the ballot, the free exercise of the franchise is full and complete and a person can no longer be influenced to vote for one in preference to another.

As to the question of agency-none has been proved. The Respondent positively denies that the members of the clergy were employed by him. If the priests were acting as agents it was as agents of the Bishop and not of Respondent.

The words imputed to Defendant cannot constitute the priests his agents. If he had said I will come

(1) p. 344, Prlt. Papers, Election Petitions, 1868-69. (2) pp. 120, 212, 216, 218.

Brassard et al, vs. Langevin.

forward provided the manufacturers are favorable to my candidature, would that constitute all the manufacturers his agents?

To establish an agency you must prove that the party has agreed to canvass and procure votes. See Brickwood & Croft, (1); O'Malley & Hardcastle, (2); Borough of Galway case, 1874, (3.) Priests doing nothing more than preaching doctrines of their church can not be declared agents of the Respondent Moreover, in this case it is proved that Mr. Tremblay tried to get the support of the clergy and not having been successful, he surely cannot charge Respondent because they preferred to be favorable to him. The clergy has the civil right as well as other persons of volunteering their united support to a candidate.

When the petitioners attempted to prove the acts with which they charge seven of the parish priests of Charlevoix we made the following objection, which has been repeated for every similar case, viz:

"Objected to this evidence by the Defendant :

"1. Because the Petitioners cannot prove before this tribunal any fact, any act performed by the Reverend Mr. Wilbrod Tremblay, in the pulpit, in the church of St. Fidèle, in his capacity of priest and parish priest of this parish, and in the exercise of the functions of his office;

"2. Because this tribunal is incompetent to judge an ecclesiastic's conduct in the exercise of the functions of his office, in as much as this ecclesiastic is answerable for his conduct only to his ecclesiastical superior and to the ecclesiastical tribunals;

"3. Because no ecclesiastic can be summoned before a civil tribunal either as plaintiff, either as defendant,

(1) p. 32, s. 2; (2) p. 197; (3) p. 37.

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or as a witness, without leave from his ecclesiastical superior, and that such leave is not fyled in this case; 4. Because in fact the Rev. Mr. Tremblay has already been summoned before his ecclesiastical superior, to answer the same charges that are made in this case, and explain the words he is accused of having uttered in the pulpit, all which is attempted to be proved before this tribunal."

This objection, which has been reserved on its merits, raises a question of the highest importance in a social and religious point of view; for it leads to the discussion of the relations which should exist between Church and State.

We affirm, as an incontestable and uncontested fact, that the Church is perfectly free in this country. This freedom is not denied by the petitioners, who are Roman Catholics, and who cannot complain should they be judged according to the rules of their church, inasmuch as these rules are recognised by the law of this country.

The Church being free, the civil law cannot fetter its action.

The reasons given to sustain our objections may be summed up as follows:

This Court has not the right nor the competence to appreciate the evidence produced in this case, with respect to the acts of certain parish priests, because the Catholic doctrine formally denies to civil tribunals the right of judging either the teachings of the Church or its ministers. Should we establish our proposition, viz that the doctrine of the Church does not admit in civil tribunals the competence to judge its teachings and its ministers; we shall have the right to conclude that the evidence produced before this tribunal is illegal,

Brassard et al. vs. Langevin.

and that consequently it must be rejected from the record and considered as null and void. The Catholic Church is a perfect society. In this case, we claim for the Church the right to exercise freely its functions. We want that its legislative, executive and udicial power be not overlooked by civil society. Thus we maintain that the petitioners deny to the Church the possession and exercise of these rights, when they attempt to submit to the State, represented by this Court, the judgment of its legislation, of its doctrine and of its ministers. The proof, under reserve of objection, has been made of certain sermons of the parish priests of Charlevoix, as well as of certain other words spoken by them out of the pulpit. Had the Court the right of examining this evidence, it would have the equal right of appreciating it, judging its meaning. Consequently the Court would have the right of judging the doctrines, the preaching, the teachings, the ministers of the Church; that is to say, it would declare itself superior; it would state positively that the Church is not a perfect society, is not independent, inasmuch as the Church would be liable to have its teachings, its doctrine, its ministers judged by officers of another society. Preaching (and upon this runs nearly the whole evidence on Petitioners' behalf) is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church, and the State is not a competent judge of its value nor of its teachings. In the case now under consideration, it is said:

'We do not wish to deprive the clergy of their political rights; but we ask this tribunal to repress and punish the abuse which the parish priests of Charlevoix have been guilty of during the last election. We admit the priest's rights as a citizen; but we require that, should he use them, he be placed on the same footing

Brassard et al. vs. Langevin.

as other citizens.' The liberty of preaching exists in election times as well as in any other time. The priest, in this circumstance, as ever, is responsible for his conduct only to his ecclesiastical superior. In elections, civil tribunals have not, more than in any other time, the right of judging the teachings of the priest, of the minister of the Catholic Church. The Church alone has the right of judging within what limits, in what circumstances, and under what forms, the right of preaching should be used; otherwise, civil society would encroach on religious society.

In support of our pretension, we quote to the Court Guyot, La somme des conciles." (1)

We refer the Court also to Phillipps, who is an authority in these matters.

The pastoral letter of the Bishops of Quebec, dated the 22nd September, 1875, is also very formal when it denies the competence of secular judges in reference to ecclesiastical acts and persons.

This freedom of preaching and of the priest's speech, which we claim in this case, has been several times admitted by our tribunals, and amongst others in a case of Poulin against the Reverend George Tremblay, parish priest of Beauport, unanimously confirmed by the Court of Appeal, Quebec. The learned counsel also cited Tarquini (2).

But should we suppose for a moment that the Court will maintain the legality of this evidence, the Defendant contends that it is insufficient in fact, and does not

(1) Edition of 1818, 2nd volume, page 146, 150; (2) Principes du droit public de l'Eglise, pages 12, 43; Audisio Droit public de l'Eglise, 1st volume, pages 72 and following, and page 218; Phillips, Du droit public de l'Eglise, 2nd volume; Instituts du droit naturel, privé et public, by A. B., page 401, 2nd volume, chapter 10; Le libéralisme, la franc maçonnerie et l'Eglise Catholique, by Canon Labis, 2nd edition, pages 230 and following.