Joyce vs. Hart.

an affidavit shewing that the Defendant's works, which the judgment orders the demolition of in the event of the Defendant not making the wall common are of the value at least of $1,900, which, with the damages ($100), would make up the sum of $2,000.

I feel bound by Lord Chelmsford's judgment in McFarlane v Leclaire, (1) to hold that to ascertain if this Court has jurisdiction in appeals from the Province of Quebec, under Sect. 17 of Supreme Court Act, we are, in cases of appeals by a Defendant. to take the amount awarded by the judgment as the amount in dispute.

If the judgment deals in any way with property of which the value is not ascertained by the judgment itself, I am of opinion that an affidavit should be filed shewing the value of the property. This was the practice followed in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of appeals from the Circuit or District Courts, which were limited to cases in which "the matter in dispute exclusive of costs", exceeded the sum or value of $2,000. The Supreme Court adopted precisely the same rule as that laid down in the Privy Council, and held that, if a judgment was recovered against a Defendant for a less sum than $2,000, there was, on the part of the Defendant nothing in controversy beyond the sum for which the judgment was given, and that consequently he was not entitled to appeal or bring a writ of error. (2). In an old case in the Supreme Court, the question arose where the judgment appears not to have been for the recovery of damages but in rem, and the Court there made an order that the Plaintiff in error should be at liberty to shew by affidavit that the matter in dispute

(1) Curtis Comment: Vol. 1, p. 220, Columbian Insurance Company v. Wheelwright, 7 Wheat, 534;

Joyce vs. Hart.

exceeded in value $2,000 (1) I refer to several authorities on this question (2).

The majority of the Court being, however, of opinion that the value of the matter in dispute is to be ascertained by reference to the amount of the damages for which the declaration concludes, my opinion is overruled.

I therefore proceed to state briefly my judgment on the merits:

I consider this case does not call for any adjudication upon the question whether the action of "dénonciation de nouvel œuvre" is or is not a possessory action distinct from the ordinary possessory action of "complainte "; or whether it lies for works erected on the Plaintiff's land or only on the Defendant's own land to the prejudice of the Plaintiff; or whether demolition may be ordered after the works are completed or only when they are in an unfinished state; all subjects of much controversy, though they seem now to be settled by the general consent of commentators and authors who have written on the subject.

The declaration contains no allegation of possession for a year and a day before the "trouble", which would be fatal to it as a possessory action.

It is, as far as I am able to give an opinion, a petitory action brought to recover property of the Plaintiff of which the Defendant has illegally possessed himself; it libels all the facts necessary to such an action and the conclusions are adapted to it. That demolition of works completed, as well as works unfinished, may properly be

(1) Course v. Stead's Executors, Curtis, Commentaries on U. S. Courts, in Append. 4, p. 577. (2) 1 Abbott's Practice, U. S. Courts, par. 336; 2 Abbott's Practice, U.S. Courts, par. 263; Winston v. U.S., 3 How., 711; Lee v. Watson, 1 Wallace, p. 337; Powell on Appeals, pp. 87, 88; Hayar v. Foison, 10 Pet., 160; Ex. p. Bradstreet, 7 Pet., 634, 647; Conkling's Practice, pp. 42, 54, 654, 655.

ᎡᎡ

Joyce vs. Hart.

made an incidental demand in a petitory action for the recovery of property is very clear on many authorities (1).

When the Plaintiff, by his conduct, has induced the Defendant to proceed with his works in error, or in the belief that the Plaintiff acquiesced in the prejudice caused to his rights, I take it for granted that an exception, analogous to an exception of fraud, might be opposed to the action. Take, for instance, the case of the Defendant making a large expenditure in building on his own lands to the prejudice of an insignificant servitude of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not, after passively awaiting the termination of the work, in either a possessory or petitory action, insist on the demolition of the buildings. Again, if the Defendant believed himself to be building on his own land, whilst the Plaintiff knew he was on the Plaintiff's land, it would be conduct amounting to fraud on the part of the Plaintiff silently to permit the Defendant to complete his erections and then turn round, assert his title, and ask to have the buildings destroyed.

In the present case nothing of this kind occurred, for the protest made by the ministry of a notary, in due form of law, gave early notice to the Defendant that he was infringing on the Plaintiff's rights, and put him in such a position that all he did subsequently was done with full knowledge, and at his own risk and peril.

Then the Court of Appeals, having it in their power to award immediate unconditional demolition, thought fit to interpose a delay and conditions in favor of the efendant, by giving the Defendant an opportunity of making the wall common. The Defendant's Counsel

(1) Belime Act: Poss: No. 369; Molitor, Vol. 3, La possession, pp. 219, 220, 221, No. 122 et seq.; Curasson, t. 2, No. 2; Troplong de la Prescription: No. 325; Bioche Act: Poss., p. 29.

RR

Joyce vs. Hart.

however, insists that this had already been done, for that under Art. 518, Civil Code of Lower Canada, which corresponds with Article 661 of Code Napoleon, the payment of half the value of the wall and of the soil on which it was built, was not a condition precedent to making it common, as it was expressly under Art. 194 of the Custom of Paris. This, however, cannot possibly be so; this right of a proprietor to make his neighbour's wall "mitoyen," is a species of expropriation for purposes of public utility, and prior indemnity is always a condition of such a mode of forced acquisition, which, indeed, the words of Article 518, though not so explicit as the article of the Custom, seem to contemplate.

If any authority were wanting to negative such a proposition, it is to be found in the case cited in the Journal du Palais (1), an arrêt of the Paris Court of Appeals, corresponding exactly with the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in the present case. This arrêt also shows that the demolition may be awarded in such an action as this, for the case of Odiot v. Rousseau could not have been a possessory action, since it appears to have been originally instituted in the civil tribunal.

I am, therefore, of opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

TASCHEREAU, J. :

La première question que nous devons décider en cette cause, est celle de savoir si l'appelant avait droit d'appel. Les intimés prétendent que le montant que l'appelant

(1) Odiot v. Rousseau, 26 Jour. du Palais, p. 76. Also Desrochers v. Blanchette 40 Jour. du Palais p. 638.

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a été condamné à leur payer n'étant que de $100, en sus d'une condamnation à défaire certains ouvrages par lui érigés sur la propriété des intimés et dont la valeur n'est ni alléguée ni prouvée être d'un montant suffisant pour couvrir les $2,000, montant requis par la section 17 du statut érigeant la Cour Suprême pour donner droit d'appel, ce droit d'appel n'appartient pas a l'appelant et que son appel devrait être renvoyé. En un mot les intimés prétendent que ce n'est pas le montant demandé par l'action originaire qui doit régler le droit d'appel, mais bien le montant accordé par le jugement.

Nous n'adoptons pas dans le même sens que les intimés, la section 17 de l'acte de la Cour Suprême qui règle le droit d'appel quant à ce qui concerne la province de Québec qui est en ces termes: "Pourvu que nul appel d'un jugement rendu dans la province de Québec, ne sera permis dans les causes où la somme " ou la valeur de la chose en litige ne s'élève pas à deux "mille piastres."

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De son côté l'appelant prétend que le droit d'appel n'est pas réglé par le montant ou la valeur de la matière en litige.

Cette question n'est pas nouvelle et elle a déjà été soulevée devant nos tribunaux civils en la province de Québec, à propos du droit d'appel de la Cour du Banc de la Reine au Conseil Privé de Sa Majesté. L'article 1178 du Code de Procédure Civile qui permet ces appels est, à peu de chose près, dans les mêmes termes que ceux de la section 17 de l'acte de la Cour Suprême savoir: "Il y a appel à Sa Majesté en son Conseil Privé de tout "jugement dans une cause où la matière en litige "excède la somme ou valeur de £500 sterling." On voit qu'il n'y a de différence que dans le montant.

Pendant quelque temps en la province de Québec, les