ページの画像
PDF
ePub

Nature; not in its specific Nature, for solid or fluid Bodies, as fuch, are not neceffarily, and therefore cou'd not be eternally exiftent. Not in its generical Nature; for, ift, This deify'd Matter being in one Part not conscious of the Thoughts that are in another, as we experience in our felves, wou'd not therefore be conscious of its own Thoughts, that is, wou'd not think at all; and then Man is not only without, but above, God in the World. adly, An eternal and neceffarily exiftent Subftance, is no more fubject to Alteration in its Properties, than it is in its Nature and Effence; the God of the Deist, as well as the Christian, must be the fame to day, yesterday and for ever; which does infer not only Thought, but a Parity of Thought and Reafon in all Beings, contrary to undoubted Experience; and on the other hand to fuppofe the Divine Nature thinking, but weakly in a Man, incoherently in an Ideot, and not at all in a Stone, is to fuppofe his vital and moral Perfections determin'd ab extra, which is to fuppofe in him an abfolute Imperfection.

The Second Principle is, that Motion was communicated to Matter; otherwise it either mov'd from Eternity, or first began to move of its felf. The first Suppofition is demonftrably falfe from the fucceffive and periodical Nature of all corporeal Motion; for

all

all the Parts of whatever is fucceffive, were once prefent; that is, there was a first, or there could have been none fucceeding; and therefore that first is limitted on both fides; but Eternity is an unlimitted Duration.

The second Suppofition, that Matter began to move it felf, is contrary to that known Law of Matter (which every one that has well confider'd the Nature of it must affent to) that it is indifferent to either state of Motion and Reft; and therefore being once in either, must persevere in it, till interrupted, or disturb'd by an external Caufe; fo that if Matter was ever once altogether quiefcent, it never cou'd have mov'd it felf.

And, from these two Absurdities hewn, it immediately follows that the Origin of Motion fprings, of neceffity, from fome thing immaterial.

Having prov'd that there must be one immaterial Subftance, eternal, and the first Cause of Motion, it is not incumbent upon me to prove, as a farther Confirmation of my Principle, that there are likewise finite created immaterial Substances; it is abundantly fufficient that there is no Contradiction in the thing and that immaterial, as well as material Subftance may be conceiv'd the Objec and Effect of Divine Power; which it certainly may be, fince it does not imply in its Idea any thing of absolute Perfection.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of Extension and Cogitation, as the Attributes of Body and Mind, and how far their different Ideas argues different Subftances.

HAV

Aving found that we come by the Knowledge of Substance by its Attributes, &c. we must follow the fame Guide in our Enquiry after that Subftance which we call immaterial; and here the two first Properties that offer themselves to our Confideration of human Nature, are Extenfion and Cogitation; that is, that our Nature is made up of a Body, and fomething endu'd with the Power and Faculty of Thought.

We need not therefore enter into the Dif pute about these Terms, whether Extenfion alone, without the fpecific Difference of impenetrable, conftitutes the Nature of Bo dy; or whether Cogitation, as an Operation, can be the Effence of any Subftance; for all that I intend is to use them as general Terms, to comprehend the feveral Modes and Properties of Body and Mind; which ufually, how improperly foever, are reduc'd to them. For this Difpute belongs to them who enquire after the Nature, and not, as

I do, barely the Existence of Spirit and
Body.

Suppofing now, that our Knowledge of Extenfion proves the Existence of corporeal Subftance, we are to enquire whether our Knowledge of Cogitation proves the fame of incorporeal; and if it does, we must conclude these two Subftances, because we find these two Attributes, to be united in human Nature.

Let us then examin our Ideas of Extenfion and Cogitation; and in the first place it is felf-evident that there is no Connexion betwixt them; that is, neither Thought in general, nor any particular Thought, implies, in its Conception, any corporeal Mode, or Quality whatsoever; and fo vice verfa.

This is granted on all hands, even by
Spinoza bimfelf, who lays it down as an
Axiom, Nullas res fingulares,
præter corpora & cogitandi mo-

Eth.p.2.ax. 5.

dos, fentimus, nec percipimus: Where he's plainly compell'd to make two fingular, and therefore different things in our Conceptions of Body and Cogitation.

The point in question is, whether a difference in the Attributes proves a like difference of the Substances, to which they belong; which Spinoza, and fince him many others deny that it does: And it must be granted that all kind of difference in Pro

perties,

?

perties, does not argue different Substancës: For instance, our Ideas of Solidity and Co lour, are very different, and we find no immediate Connexion between them; and yet we find them co-existent in the fame mate rial Subftance; nay, we find contradictory Qualities, v.g. Hardness and Fluidity to exist, alternately, in the fame Subftance; and this leads us to confider where their Connexion lies, if they have any; and we presently find their Agreement in a third thing; we find Extension fufceptible of Solidity and Colour at once, of Hardness and Fluidity at different times; and being thus united in one Attribute, they refolve into one Nature and Effence.

But when we find any two Properties which, after a thorough Examination, are neither immediately connected themselves, nor mediately by any third thing; we must conclude, by the fame Rule, (and 'tis the only Rule we have in such cases) that they do appertain unto two different Natures and Effences.

Of this latter kind is the difference be tween our Idea of Cogitation and that of Extenfion. If we confider Thought, in its ut moft Latitude, from the first to the last Degree of it, we have not any one Mode of Extenfion offer'd to our Minds in the whole Contemplation; again, if we anatomize

Extenfion,

« 前へ次へ »