been inform'd of any Church-Hiftorain from the other World; nor of any relating to this, that extends his Narration beyond the Fall, to which our Souls are fuppofed præexistent.

2. The next Objection runs thus : Becaufe fuch a Place or Repofitory of Souls præexiftent, Seems to restrain or limit Ibid. the Power of an Omnipotent Creator;

as if at the first Creation God had exhausted his Power at once, and laid up the Stores of Souls, &c. I must crave leave to let him know, what I fuppofe they that believe fuch Stores of Souls, wou'd fay to this Argument.

First, I believe it wou'd furpass their Conception, how the Creation of all Souls at once, reftrains the Power of the Creator, any more than a repeated Creation of them; unless whatever God has not done, limits and restrains his Power, in not doing of it; and then an immediate Creation wou'd have limited his Power in not creating them præexiftent. Secondly, Had fuch an one read Second Thoughts, hé wou'd have found there an Argument against Immediate Creation, that the first Creation of all things by God Almighty, mention'd Genef. chap. 2. verf. 2. terminated the whole Bufinefs of the Creation; and it wou'd be natural for him to inferr, either that the

Account

Account we have from Genefis, restrains the Power of the Creator; or that the Hypothefis of Preexistence does not which Eftibius will choose of these two, I know for there is felf-contradiction in

not,

both.

3. The last Objection is drawn ex abfurdo: If they did præexist, they must be actual fubfifting Forms (notably inferr'd!) Pag. 77. as free, and as independent as we conceive Angels to be: (I fuppofe he means as independent on these Earthly Bodies; for as to any other Independency, it must proceed only from his own independent Thought and Imagination:) But this can never be admitted: For, 1. They must have had the fame Office with Angels, and we don't read that God made them MiniString Spirits no fure, for we read he made Man a little lower than the Angels: But is there any neceffity, fays the Refpondent, for all Unimbodied Spirits, to be Miniftring Spirits? Yes, fays Eftibius; Or elfe, 2. They are fo many idle felefs Beings in the Universe, waiting we know not why or wherefore, to be introduc'd into the Receptacle of the Body. Not fo neither, will he return: Demonftration is very eafy, if one may take for granted what he pleafes; and you may as well fuppofe they are Idle here, because they are not in Heaven; as

that

Pag. 78.

that they were Idle there, because they were not on Earth. 3. Because the Hypothefis makes the Body a Prifon to the Soul, and this State her Punishment (but not excluding her Probation for the State fucceeding) for Crimes committed in the prepræ exiftent State; and what an idle Suppofition this is, he leaves all fober Men to judge. This is all he objects; and here I doubt not but his Adversary will joyn iffue with him: But till fober Men have brought in their Verdict, Eftibius's Appeal to them, will be no Prejudice to the Caufe he appeals against; much lefs to the main Caufe, which does not stand and fall, either with Præexistence, or immediate Creation: For, if there be a Soul in Man, it is certain to Demonstration, it had a Beginning; tho' it be never fo uncertain when it began to be.

Eftibius has now done with his Pag.79.

Argument, but to fhew his Reading as great, as his Reasoning is ftrong, he cannot pass by in Silence the Opinion of Some Learned Men of later Ages, which is concerning the Aftral Spirit; or, as he expreffes it, the Senfitive Soul: But in the Date of this Opinion, he's a little unfortunate, unless his later Ages extend to the Reign of Auguftus; for Ovid, hiftorically relating the Opinions of Men

in his, and many preceding Ages, tells

us,

Terra tegit carnem, tumulum circumvolat umbra.

And befides this, it's fomething unlucky, that he fhou'd forget his own Quotation from the Poet, who fo juftly has deliver'd to us the Opinion of our Forefathers: For there we are told,

Indulfit communis conditor illis

Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque. --

However, the Moderns have refined upon the Notion, and affign'd abundance of Properties to this Senfitive Soul; and fome of them I must confefs whimsical enough, in Paracelfus, Jacob Behmen, and Mr. Webster: Here at laft, 'tis odds our Author's in the right, and all I can fay to him is, that I have long fince learnt this Observation from Tully, and have had a very late Inftance of the Truth of it, that There's nothing fo abfurd, which fome Philofophers will not maintain.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Wherein is fhewn the Infufficiency of all that he advances in his Fourth Chapter, to prove his own to be the True Notion of Human Soul.

A

;

Pag. 82.

MAN that walks altogether out of the Way, had need tread with a little Caution, and not be regardless of the Opinion of others, who are apt to give over fuch Wanderers for quite loft: Eftibius is very sensible, that if he concurrs with the Learned Mr. Hobbs, in this Opinion, that it is a very odd Notion to call any Created Being an Immaterial Subftance, he shall be receiv'd with Cenfure and Prejudice as if all the Censures that have been made on Mr. Hobbs, were attended with Prejudice in the Cenfurers: Whether this is concurring with him or not, I cannot tell; but I am fure it is declaring for the Justice of his Caufe; if Prejudice be so very ill a thing as we have been given to understand it is. But Eftibius is content to say, that the Parts of Ibid. Spiritual Beings are very difficult to be comprehended by our weak Understandings and of this he makes no more doubt, than N

Chap. I.

that