fo well skill'd in the Laws of Mechanism, as to account tolerably for their Actions; but then they and the Objector being agreed in this, that they are only Material Beings, the only thing remaining in difpute between them is, Whether God has made Matter think, or Brutes act so very like Thinking Beings: The one have strong Arguments on their Side, built upon the firft and fureft Ideas of the Subject in hand; the other have at best but what Eftibius call, a Conjecture of the Divine Will, drawn from an Obfervation of the Actions, but no certain Knowledge of the Principle they depend upon; which is an Argument that, neither in Senfe nor Manners, can stand against the former.

The other Opinion of Brutal Souls, is, that they act by a Degree of Consciousness and Thought: And to the Objection these anfwer first, That they can have no Title to an Immortality, as Free and Moral Agents; being entirely govern'd by one predominant Appetite of Senfe; and they prefume that, tho' Eftibins has given them their Freedom, he has not made them accountable for their Talent: The Question then turns upon their Souls furviving the Body, in a State of Numerical Existence; and as to this, the Philofopher thinks where God has been filent, he shou'd

not

not fay much; but he conceives it no Derogation to his Understanding, to profefs his Ignorance; 1. Of their Creator's

Intention towards them, as to the Continuance or Destruction of their whole Nature: And, 2. What Provifion perfect Wisdom can make, or what Purposes a Creature fhall ferve, while continu'd in a State of Existence by Almighty Power. But this he can be pofitive in, That the Moral and Christian Immortality is no way concern'd in the Argument: And he is not more afraid of dying like the Beast, tho' their Souls fhou'd furvive the Body; than he will live like them, because they inhabit the Earth in common with him.

In short, if Brutes are Machins, the Cafe will admit of no Parallel; if they are not, the Parallel cannot be carry'd on to the Detriment of Man's Immortality. The first Step we follow them beyond their Death, we are out of our Depth; and, as the Light we have from Reason and Scripture, to guide us to our own Immortality, gives us not the least Profpect of theirs, but on the contrary; fo neither can it be eclips'd by the Darkness of their Condition, which ought not to be interpos'd, where it is not concern'd: Befides, that every Abfurdity fix'd on a Notion, requires the Objector to proceed upon as evident

and

and uncontestable a Medium or Principle, as if he were to demonftrate the Truth of any Propofition; but he that draws an Inference from the Vital Perfections of Brutes to thofe of Men, infers from he knows not what Premiffes. This I conceive to be a fufficient Answer to the Objection, as it ought to be propos'd, and as it bears the most colourable Pretence of an Argument; to make it appear thus, I have been forc'd to ftrip it of that Philofophic Farrago, and thofe ridiculous Colours Eftibius has put upon it; 164,to 173. for, as appearing in them, it did

From Pag.

not feem to me to deferve a serious, or indeed, an articulate Answer.

I am fure the Reader will not fuffer me to dwell upon the next Argument, taken from Dreams; Which, fays he, Pag. 173. all Philofophers conclude to proceed

from the Animal Part, or Senfitive Soul of Man; and therefore this Philofopher concludes, That there is confeffedly on all hands, fomething befides the Rational Soul, that thinks in Man: And I beg leave of Eftibius, to throw in my Conclufion too; which is, That not the groffeft Ignorance, but moft fhameless Refolution to say what a Man pleafes, nay and to make his Adverfary fay what he pleases, cou'd have fuffer'd this Affertion to take

its Fate in the World. I am fure all the best of the Modern Philofophers suppose it the fame Soul, thinking in Dreams, and awake: However, I am glad to find the Clergy are not the only Tools, but that an old Peripatetic Notion fhall, in spite of all they have fo voluminuofly faid against it, govern all the Philofophers, as well as all the Divines in the World.

But Eftibius proceeds to urge, That his Notion prevents many idle and frivolous Difputes about the Union of Body Pag. 176. and Soul; and therefore is more probable, &c. To make this out, he chooses to inftance in the Hypoftatic Union of the Human and Divine Nature, in the Perfon of our Bleffed Saviour. Now if the Modus of that Union be unconceivable and unintelligible, by our weak Understanding, as unqueftionably it is; I prefume the Grounds of it is from the inadequate Conception we have, or can form to our felves, of the Conjunction of Finite with Infinite, Material with Immaterial: But now by the Doctrin of the Pfychomuthifts, that Difficulty feems to be taken away, and it ceases to be a Mystery, if we allow this Conjunction of Body and Soul to be the Union of an Immortal-Immaterial Spirit to a Mortal-Material Body: Where is then the Mystery of the Hypoftatic Union? The Union of the Soul and Body, no Man ever

yet

yet allow'd to be a Mystery of Religion; therefore either both must be reputed fo, or neither; which God forbid he former fhou'd not, &c. ----- Thefe, to do him no Wrong in an Argument he seems to fet a Value upon, are his own Words: To which I anfwer directly, 1. Admitting we do pretend to frame an adequate Idea of the Modus of Union between Material and Immaterial, yet in the Union of God and Man, here is besides that, Infinite and Finite become one Perfon; which, as it is not parallel'd in the other Cafe, so I take it to be the To Bát of this Mystery. But, 2. Here again is an Ignoratio Elenchi, or something worse. The Union of the Soul and Body is, in a proper Sense, Mysterious; that is, above our Conception, as to the Modus of it. Our Sophist infinuates, that 'tis no Mystery of Religion; but here he has unawares thrown himself into his own Noose I ask, Is it an Article of Religion, or not? If it is, then all the reft of the Book must be facrific'd to the Intereft of this one Argument: If it is no Article of Religion, what Senfe is there in faying, 'tis no Mystery of Religion; for that includes an Article, and something more: And again, To what Purpose can a Man urge, where he fhou'd urge Reason, that either both or neither, must be allow'd a Mystery