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Matter. But not to be too much behind hand with my Author, I shall here present to the Reader's view, a fummary Confutation of the whole Eftibian Hypothefis; by reminding him, in part, of what has been urg'd already; and adding fome farther Confiderations, which have not yet fall'n in with my Method.

us.

In order to this, we need not spend Words in stating the Controversy between Our Notion and Tenent is fufficiently known; and Eftibius, perhaps has made fome farther explication, but has added nothing to Mr. Blount's Notion; or rather, that of the Arabian Heretics (for I don't find Mr. Blount own'd any Refurrection) in the third Century, of which we have given an account. For Explication, he defines the Soul of Man, in general, to be a

Breath originally infus'd by God Pag. 90. into infenfible Matter, by which it lives and exerts Senfe and Reason. This properly is only a Definition of Adam's Soul, and therefore he adds, to conclude the rest of Mankind, that God made the Subject [our Bodies] capable at the

Pag. 100. beginning, and gave it a Power to produce its like; that is, living Creatures to produce living Creatures, and conveigh original Life in the vehicle of feminal Matter, from Generation to Generation. And again, the Soul

Pag. 298.

is only a Power inherent in generated Matter, which depends on it, and perishes with it. These Expreflions contain the Substance of his Notion, which the Author propofes, and accordingly we shall now confider as a Pofition grounded on Reason, and as a Doctrine of Religion.

I. Therefore I affert, That this Notion, of Human Soul can have no manner of pretenfion to reasonable Grounds; as being both unintelligible, and abfurd.

ift, It is an unintellibible Notion, I mean not as to the Senfe, but the Truth of it. A Power inherent in Matter we can underftand; but then at the fame time we conceive Matter naturally fufceptible of that Power, that is to say, we conceive a Capacity in first Matter, of all the fubordinate Powers belonging to it: Now I prefume Eftibius will not affert the Power of fpontaneous Motion, as naturally belonging to firft Matter, for fear of a long train of Abfurdities, already drawn out Part. 1. §. 4, 5, 7. and if this is abfur'd, the other is unintelligible; for here is a Power that has no Foundation in the Nature of the Subject; but as it were forcibly grafted upon it by an Omnipotent hand, after a manner to us altogether unconceivable; and much less is it poffible for us to understand

how

how this Subject fhou'd afterwards exert this Power, nay and exert it of it felf, in the Course of second Causes, without any natural connexion between the Subject and the Power. Eftibius explodes the Solution

by Natural Instinct, because it gives Pag. 98. us not the leaft Light to comprehend any Philofophical Truth; but I wou'd fain know wherein his own Notion differs from this; unless that Inftin&t fuppofes God perpetually to direct material Beings to their End; but this fuppofes him to have given the Body of Man a Power to direct it self, which I am fure is the more unaccountable of the two. And tho' the Patrons of this Notion are very ready, for a known Reason, to condemn Aristotle as an unintelligible Writer; yet they themselves we find, upon Occafion can folve the most noble Phanomenon in the Sublunary World, by an occult Quality.

And if it be unintelligible how this Power was originally communicated to the Human Body, we are still more in the Dark when we endeavour to explain how it was recommunicated by Adam, and every fucceeding Father, in the propagation of Human Race. For, fuppofing now that God had actually lodg'd this unaccounta ble Power in Adam's Body, yet for that Body to communicate the fame Power, with

feminal

feminal Matter, is, to say no worse of it, beyond all Imagination. A Power to communicate Life, must be fomething more than a Power to live; the latter only recurs to Omnipotent Power, which may act beyond our Conception; but the former places an unintelligible Power in fecond Causes, and makes Matter naturally to communicate a Quality, which does not naturally belong

unto it.

Eftibius may answer, or rather object to this, that it's equally unconceivable how the Soul, or any thing immaterial, can move a Body. This, I confefs, is true in fome Senfe, but ftill there is a wide Difference between the Unintelligibleness of the one, and the other Notion. Motion communicated to Matter by an immaterial Agent, is unintelligible in the Manner of it; but that a Body fhou'd move it self, is unintelligible not only in the Manner of being perform'd, but that it fhou'd ever be perform'd. In one Cafe we can demonftrate that something immaterial mov'd Matter originally, vide Part 1. Sect. 3. And if we cou'd as clearly prove that Matter, with or without Spirit, mov'd it felf originally (which it's impoffible we fhou'd, because they are two Parts of a Contradiction) then the Difficulty of Conception wou'd be equal on both fides; but here we find nothing at

all

all intelligible in order to convince us whereas in the other cafe, we find nothing unintelligible, but what, in many cafes, we are forc'd to fubmit to other Evidence which fufficiently proves the thing. Eftibius often ridicules our faying the Soul properly fees, bears, &c. but I am fure he does not mend the matter; for fince the Body has naturally no Confcioufnefs or Perception, he must say, the Life fees, the Life hears, &c. This I'm fure is not lefs ridiculous, if we may laugh at a thing when we cannot yet tell what to make of it.

2dly, This Notion is not only unintelligible, but highly irrational and abfurd; nay, we may pronounce it impoffible, if we have prov'd that phyfically extended Substance, is in its Nature fo utterly incapable of Thought, that no Power can fuper-add that Quality to it, Part 1. Sect 7, 8. The grand Atheiftick Objection against a Creation, is that Axiom of theirs, ex nihilo nihil fit. Now tho' they both mistake the Senfe and the Application of this Axiom (for every thing is eminently in God, and this is only spoken of fecond Caufes and Effects) yet they themselves are really guilty of the Abfurdity they pretend to charge upon their Adverfaries: For to produce Life. Senfe, and Reason, which are unquestionable Realities, out of ftupid and infenfible Matter, out of

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