Bamberg, totally abandoning a very large tract of country. Hitherto the affairs of the allies proceeded almost in an uninterrupted courfe of profperity. It was indeed a degree of profperity altogether aftonishing, and which as at firft it could fcarcely have been expected, fo there was no reafon to imagine it would have any long continuance. For the allies on the fide of Saxony, where M. Sporken acted, in proportion as their activity and fuccefs carried them forward, left the countries on their rear more and more uncovered, and expofed, without any, or with a very infufficient defence, to the attempts of the powerful garrifon of Gottingen. The count de Vaux, who commanded that garrifon, is a very able and enterprifing officer. And he no fooner perceived, that the allies were wholly intent upon driving their enemies from the Werra and Unftrut, and on pushing the advantages they had acquired to the utmoft, than he marched out of Gottingen with a strong detachment, attacked and routed an Hanoverian convoy, fell upon the town of Duderftadt with the utmost violence; and though he failed in his first attempt, he repeated it with fo much fpirit, that at length he carried that town, and afterwards fome of the most confiderable places near it. By thefe fucceffes he prevented M. de Sporken's corps from returning by the way they had advanced, and indeed abfolutely difqualified them from acting feparately from their main army; to which foon after thefe events, they were obliged to join themselves. This junction now became neceffary on another account.

Marshal Broglio, toward the clofe of the laft campaign, had been. obliged, by the enterprifes of the hereditary prince, to detach from his army in Heffe a large body to the Lower Rhine. He now found it equally proper to recal this body together with further reinforcements, in order to maintain his ground in the country northward of the Maine, where he was clofely preffed by the allies, and which he must be compelled fhamefully to relinquish, if Caffel was not relieved in time. Senfible of this, with whatever difficulty, he called in his moft diftant pofts, embodied his army, infpired them with new fpirit, and made them capable, by a more exact order in their difcipline, and a great fuperiority in their numbers, of attempting fomething confiderable.

em

On the other hand, the hopes of the allics depended on the effect of their firft impreffion; they were obliged to attempt too many objects at the fame time, and thefe too arduous for the number of which their army confifted. For it was neceffary that they should keep one army, and that no fmall one, employed on the fiege of Caffel; another was occupied in the blockade of Zigenhayen; a third was played to the eastward of the Fulda; and ftill a fourth was neceffary to cover and fuftain all these va rious operations, and to oppofe itfelf to the attempts of marshal Broglio. It was but too plain, that when the whole of the French Force was collected in one point, it could never be refifted by a part only of the allied army; if they fhould attempt to draw away any of the feparate corps from the critical fervice upon which it was employed, the entire

purpose

purpose of their labours was given up. In a word, prince Ferdinand had three ftrong pofts of the enemy on his rear, and their grand army now perfectly united on his front, and his fituation, which was far from advantageous, obliged him to call in M. Sporken's body which had effected its purpose, and could best be fpared. However the prince kept his pofition as long as poffible; and the fiege was carried on with, as much vigour as a winter operation, and the fpirited defence of a great garrifon ably commanded, would admit.

But marshal Broglio, as foon as he had collected his army, advanced without delay. He caufed the troops under the hereditary prince to be attacked near the village of Stangerode, in the neighbourhood of Grunberg, where he was advanced in front of the beforementioned line of the allied army. The attack was made by the enemies dragoons, the very firft fhock of which broke the whole foot, confifting of nine regiments, Hanoverians, Heffians, and Brunfwickers. The French on this occafion made two thousand prifoners, and poffeffed themselves of feveral trophies of victory; few were killed or wounded on either fide.

After this blow the allied army could no longer think of making head against the French, or of maintaining their ground in Heffe. They broke up the blockade of Zie

genhayn; and foon after raised the fiege of Caffel, after twenty-feven days open trenches. They evacuated the whole country of Heffe, retiring behind the Dymel, and falling back nearly to the quarters they poffeffed before this undertaking.

Thus ended an expedition which was carried on against many difficulties, with much fpirit, and which at firft excited great hopes. It failed indeed in fome of its objects; but it produced its effect in the total of the operations of the year. The French, by the deftruction or feizure of so many of their principal magazines, were for a long time difabled from taking any advantage of their fucceffes in the preceding campaign, or from their late victory. It was not until the season was a good deal advanced that they were in a condition to act. This ceffation was not dearly bought even by the lofs we fuftained at Stangerode, and the extreme hardships the troops had endured during the whole fervice; for circumftanced as both armies were at their quitting the field, without this feasonable check, it is probable we should have at this day no footing in Germany. Both armies, as it were by confent, lay quiet in their winter quarters. During their inaction, the negotiation at London and Paris, whofe commencement we have re lated in the first chapter, was purfued without interruption.

CHAP

IT

T must be observed, that after the judicious feparations which had been made of the interefts of the feveral powers at war, there ftill remained a fufficient fund of intricacy and altercation in each particular difcuffion. In order therefore to make the way to peace as fmooth as poffible, it was refolved previously to eftablifh fome certain and fimple points that might ferve to direct and keep fteady the whole negotiation. Thefe points were but two; indeed they were fo infeparably connected with each other, that they feem rather members of the fame propofition than feparate articles. The firit was, "that the two crowns fhall remain in poffeffion of what they have conquered one from the other." The fecond imported that the fituation in which they shall ftand at certain periods, hall be the pofition to ferve as a bafis for the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers.

As France was known to have had the worst in the war, a propofition of ftatu quo, coming from her, must have appeared an inftance of moderation, altogether furprifing to our minifters. It is certain, that had peace been concluded at that inftant, and upon the fole foundation of this article, England would then have poffeffed all the eonquefts she had made, every one of which was in a very high degree advantageous to her commerce, and her power, and none of which could be confidered as a fubject of future

Cita

difcuffion. On the other hand, France, continuing in poffeffion of the places fhe had conquered, would have acquired no advantage that could at all countervail the expence of keeping them; at the fame time that he would be expofed to end. lefs altercations, and would afford matter of the higheft jealoufy, indignation and difcontent, even to her neareft allies. This bafis being therefore fettled, although it was evident, that the treaty could not reft upon this bafis folely, England had certainly a great fuperiority in the negotiation, and might rationally expect (when they fhould come to talk of reftitutions) to purchase the evacuation of the French conquests in Germany, at a much smaller price than their apparent magnitude might feem to demand. However these were ftill a matter of so much anxiety, and the nature of the precife ftipulations were still fo uncertain, that the negotiation, though it proceeded with ftrong appearance of a defire for peace, met with very frequent checks and delays. Both parties were indeed unanimous in the article of uti poffidetis: than which, it must be admitted, there could not be a better ground to treat upon. But as the war ftill continued, and whilft it continued might make a daily alteration in the fortune of the contracting powers, it was neceffary to fix upon fome epochas to which this poffef fory article fhould refer.

The

The French on this head propropofed, that the fituation in which they shall fand on the first of September in the year 1761, in the Eaft Indies, on the firft of July in the fame year in the Weft Indies, and in Africa, and on the first of May following in Europe, fhould be the pofition, which fould ferve as a bafis to the treaty which may be negotiated between the two powers. They added further, that as thefe epochas might feem too near or too diftant for the intereft of Great Britain, they were extremely willing to enter into a negotiation upon that object.

The English miniftry received this propofition with lefs fatisfaction than its apparent fairness deferved. They entirely rejected the French epochas; and declared that they could not admit, without prejudice to themselves, any other epochas than those which have reference to the day of figning the treaty of peace. Had this refolution been frictly adhered to, it was evident that the negotiation was that moment at an end; For though what was afferted in the French memorial in reply to this declaration, (that the bafis of the propofition of uti poffidetis was neceffarily connected with the particular epochas propofed) is by no means to be admitted; it is on the other hand not eafy to deny the validity of their fubfequent affertion, "that if not thefe, at leaft fome certain periods during the war, ought to be fixed; and that the uti poffidetis could not reafonably have reference only to the time of figning the treaty of peace." For if the contrary principle were once admitted, it would become difficult to know, or even with pro

bability to guess at the nature or the value of the poffeffions which by fuch an article fhould be mutually given away. And if thefe difficulties occurred in the fimplicity of a poffeffory article, they must be increafed tenfold upon every other, and must come to fuch an height as to preclude all poffibility of negotiotion on things of fo intricate a nature as exchanges and equivalents. The French in their memorial infifted fo ftrongly on the propriety of eftablishing these periods, that they threatned to recal the whole propofition, if they were not agreed to.

It must doubtlefs appear at firft view furprifing, to fee France, whofe actual fituation was very indifferent, contending for a near period, and England, whofe affairs were at that time apparently in a profperous fituation, poftponing the uti poffidetis to one more remote. But the truth is, that in that particular neither party confulted their prefant condition. They acted wholly on forefight. For though the English, on the 25th" of March, when this propofition was made, were carrying on the fiege of Caffel, and the other ftrong. places in Heffe, and the enemy had no army in that country to oppofe them, it was notwithstanding evident, that from the flow progrefs of those fieges, and from the alacrity of marfhal Broglio, in collecting his troops, they must be fhortly obliged to abandon the enterprise; it was evident that France muft be reinftated in the abfolute poffeffion of her former conquefts long before the epocha of the firft of May, the period which they fixed for Europe. Both courts were fully

apprized of this. It was therefore the intereft of France to offer, and of England to reject this near period; especially as the fate of the defign on the coaft of France was then depending, and our adminiftration feemed to have conceived no mean hopes of its fuccefs, and no fmall opinion of its importance in the negotiation.

The fleet employed in this expedition failed from Spithead on the 29th of March, and it was foon discovered that Belleifle was the object.

Belleifle, the largest of all the European islands belonging to the French king, is between 12 and 13 leagues in circumference.

The island originally belonged to the earl of Cornouaille, but has been fince yielded to the king: it contains only one little city, called Le Palais, three country towns, 103 villages, and about 5000 in habitants.

The town of Palais takes its name from a castle belonging to the duke de Belleifle, in its neighbourhood, which is now converted into a citadel, which is a regular and trong fortification, fronting the fea, compofed principally of hornwork, and is provided with two dry ditches, the one next the counterfcarp, and the other fo contrived as to fecure the interior fortifications. This citadel is divided from the largest part of the town by an inlet of the fea, over which there is a bridge of communication, from the other part of the town, and which is most inhabited, it is only divided by its own fortifications, and a glacis. There are three nominal harbours in this island, Palais, Sauzon and Goulfard. Every one of which labours under fome capital defect,

entrance.

either in being expofed, fhallow, or dangerous at the The only branch of trade ried on here is the curing pilchards.

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From this state of the island, poor in itself, capable of little improvement, and fo ill circumftanced in point of harbours, a fort of a diflike to the expedition began to arife. Several did not fee of what confiderable fervice fuch a conqueft could be of to England in time of peace, or of what prejudice to the enemy in time of war. They forefaw that it could' not be taken without confiderable lofs, or kept without confiderable expence; and on the whole they apprehended that when exchanges came to be made, France would' lay no great ftrefs upon it. On the other hand it was urged, that though the harbours were bad, yet fmall privateers might iffue from thence, greatly to the moleftation of the French coating trade; and that the fleet of England might ride between it and the continent in a well protected road. They imagined the poffeffion of this ifland, if not of great detriment to the intereft of France, would be a grievous wound to her pride; and that thofe circum-. ftances which had formerly induced her to expend money on the fortifications here, and on the apprehenfion of an invafion to fill them with a powerful garrifon, would likewife perfuade her to fet a value on the place when it came to be eftimated in the treaty.

Whilft they reasoned in this man. ner in England, the fleet under the command of commodore Keppel, and the land forces under general Hodgson, arrived before Belleisle

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