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Concerning the island of Guadaloupe, Marigalante, Minorca, and Belleifle, no great controverfy had fubfifted from the beginning. It had all along been agreed, that thefe conquefts fhould be reciprocally restored. Neither did the French fcruple to adopt our propofal concerning the affairs of the East Indies, nor to make fatisfacto ry declarations concerning Oftend and Neuport.

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So many delicate and interesting points were fettled, that it does not at first appear what it was that could have retarded the peace. A difcuffion of the separate interefts of two powers only that are in earneft to agree, may be fettled with out any very confiderable difficulty. The hard and almost inextri cable part of the knot, is that wherin the croís concerns and interests of allies intervene. There were two points upon which, if we may form a judgment from appearances, this negotiation unfortunately broke off. The first was upon the manner in which England and France might be at liberty to affift their refpective allies; and on the reftitution of Wefel, Gueldres, and fuch other places, as the French had conquered from his Pruffian majesty.

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On the first member of this principal point, the repeated proposals of France for a neutrality in Germany had been uniformly and pofitively rejected by our adminiftration. They confidered therefore as fo many attacks upon national integrity. This fcheme therofore not being admitted, they would or could come to no agreement, and fcarcely to an intelligible explanation either of the mode or the quantity of the affiftance which they should be at li

berty mutually to impart to their German allies, or of the place in which fuch fuccours fhould be employed. As to Wefel and Gueldres, the French obftinately refufed to reftore thofe places. They declared that such a ceffion would be directly against the faith by which they were bound to the em prefs queen of Hungary, for whom they infifted that thefe places had been conquered, and in whofe name alone they were governed, though they had been reduced by the French arms, and were at that moment held by French garrifons.

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As to the fecond point, namely, the reftitution of the captures made' previous to the declaration of war, the negotiating powers were equally pofitive, the one to demand, the other to refuse it. The English argued, that this claim had no fort of foundation in the law of nations, neither was it grounded on any particular convention. That the right of all hoftile operations results, not from a formal declaration of war, but from the hoftilities which the aggreffor has first offered; that the contrary of this propofition is at leaft extremely conteftible ; and fince it can by no means be clearly established, it follows, that the detainment of thofe captures muft be confidered, on the fide of England, as part of the uti poffidetis, originally propofed as the bafis of this treaty.

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France, on the other hand, feemed as fully convinced of the juftice of her pretenfions, and the deemed the arguments with which the fupported them to be fo unanswerable, that the offered to submit them to the juftice of the English tribunals. They urged that this claim of reftitution was founded on the law of [D] 4 nations,

nations, and upon particular convention; on particular convention; by the 19th article of the peace of Utrecht; and by the fecond article of the treaty of commerce; and that this was ftrengthened by the 3d article of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, which renews and confirms thofe articles in the preceding treaties.

By these articles a protection is allowed to the respective fubjects who may have fhips in the ports of either of the powers, because having no opportunity of knowing that a rupture is fallen out, they failed under the fecurity of peace, and under the faith of treaties. By a parity of reafoning, the ships not actually in thofe ports ought to enjoy the fame fecurity; elfe, as they are included in the fame parity of circumftances, it would follow, contrary to the principles of humanity and right reafon, that the fovereigns had provided for the prefervation of one part of their fubjects from the miseries of a fudden rupture, to which they expofe the reft. The particular conventions of thefe treaties, they said, had their foundation in general equity, and the law of nations; fince, as it is impracticable for belligerent ftates to agree amongst themselves which is the aggreffor, it is proper that the fubjects should receive previous notice of the rupture, in order that they may be able diftinctly to know when they are, or are not in. fecurity, or when they may, or may not rely on the treaties which fubfift between their fovereigns.

These topics were, as ufual, bandied, to and fro with great heat and little effect; and as in fuch difcuffions the arguments on both fides are plausible, and there can be no

authorised judge, the weight of the feveral pretenfions commonly depends upon the power of the parties to enforce them. On these two points therefore, the renunciation of German alliances, and the reftitution of captures, the negotiation from the beginning was at a stand; and on these, at length, to all appearance, it finally broke off.

the difagreement even Not but we are fully fatisfied that points might have been only the ofon these tenfible cause of the rupture. The true caufe of the breach feems to have been the unfeasonable interpofition of the Spanish claims. For could France be fuppofed in good earnest to defire peace, that is, to defire fuch a reasonable peace as her circumftances might demand, when the officiously mingled with a foreign and neutral power, which our particular debate, the affairs of had not the fmalleft connection with thofe that were at this time properly under deliberation. culous to urge, that this was done It was ridifrom a prudent forefight, and to prevent a future war, which these difputes might poffibly occafion. The bufinefs was to put an end to the war, which then actually subfisted; and nothing could be farther from affifting this defign than to increase the subjects of debate. France this argument, who herself propofmust be fenfible of the weight of ed in the very beginning of this treaty, as a means almost neceffary for carrying it on with effect, that their particular difpute fhould be feparated from thofe of their Gerhad a more natural connection thane man allies, with which it certainly with those that fubfifted between England and Spain: as all the former parties were then engaged di

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realy or indirectly in the war, to which Spain had then no manner of relation.

The English miniftry finding the French immoveable on the two capital points above mentioned, and having no opinion of the fincerity of their procedure, fent directions to Mr. Stanley to return to England, and to defire that M. Buffy fhould, on the part of his court, re. 20th Sept. ceive the fame orders. An end was thus put to this negotiation, (from which Europe had conceived fuch fanguine hopes of the alleviation of her miferies) after it had continued near fix months. So får indeed was it from producing the happy effects that were propofed from it, fo far was it from appeafing the animofities of the powers originally engaged, or from ex. tinguifhing the old war, that the par

ties feparated with intentions more hoftile, and opinions more adverse than ever; and the war was foon spread to a much greater extent by the taking in of a new party, and may poffibly fpread, ftill more widely, by laying open new fources of contention which may gradually. draw in other powers, and finally involve every part of Europe. It was alfo a means of producing changes in England, which at a time of lefs tranquility, and in circumftances of lefs internal ftrength, might have been productive of the moft fatal confequences. But thefe matters are referved for the subject of the enfuing chapter.

The leading negotiation in London and Paris being thus broken off, that which was propofed at Augfburg never took place.

CHAP. VIII.

Conduct of Spain during the negotiation. Spanish minifter's memorial.
Treaty between France and Spain. Difference in the English ministry.
Mr. P. refigns. Mr. P. letter. Difpute concerning the refignation.
Addreffes. Parliament meets. The German war continued.

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in London, from whom no fort of intimation had been previously received of fuch a defign.

That propofal not only marked out a want of fincerity on the part of France, but it manifested fo ftrange and irregular a partiality on the part of Spain, that it would very little have become the dignity of the king of Great Britain, or his attention to the fafety of his fubjects, to let it pafs without a full and fatisfactary explanation. Accordingly the Spanish ambaffador was called upon to difavow this irregular procedure; but he returned

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a verbal, and foon after was authorifed by his court to return, a written anfwer, in which he openly avowed and justified the ftep taken by the French agent, as entirely agreeable to the fentiments of his mafter. He declared that the kings of France and Spain were united, not only by the ties of blood, but by a mutual intereft. He applauded the humanity and greatnefs of mind which his moft chriftian majefty, demonstrated in the propofition that was complained of. He infifted much on the fincere defire of peace, the only motive which influenced the conduct of the two monarchs; and he added, haughtily, that if his mafter had been governed by any other principles, "his Catholic majefty giving full fcope, to his greatnefs, would have fpoken from himself, and as became his dignity."

It appeared evidently from the whole of this paper, that the court of Spain was regularly, as a fort of party, apprifed of every step that was taken in the negotiation; that her judgment was appealed to upon every point, and her authority called in aid to force the acceptance of the terms which were offered by France; in a word, that there was a perfect union of affections, interefts, and councils between these two courts, and the minifter of the former, fo far from denying or palliating this conduct, feemed to glory in it.

Mr. P. who then took the lead in the miniftry, was fully fatisfied the intentions of Spain were by no ineans equivocal, and that this partiality, which they ftrongly avowed not only by declarations, but by facts, would drive them into all the measures of France. That a war on`

that account was abfolutely inevita ble; and if, for the prefent moment, the Spaniards rather delayed their declaration of war, than laid aside their hoftile intentions, it was in order to strike the blow at their own time, and with the greater effect; that therefore their reasons for delaying to act were the very motives, which ought to induce us to act with the utmost fpeed, and utmost vigour. That we ought to confider the evafions of that court as a refufal of fatisfaction, and that refusal, as a declaration of war. That we ought from prudence as well as from spirit to secure to ourfelves the firft blow; and to be practically convinced that the early and effective measures, which had fo large a fhare in reducing France to this dependence upon Spain, would also be the fittest for deter ing or difabling Spain from affording any protection to France. That, to carry on this war with vigour, it was only neceffary to continue our prefent efforts; no new armament would be neceffary; and that, if any war could provide its own refources, it must be a war with Spain. That their flota had not yet arrived, and that the taking of it, would at once difable theirs and ftrengthen our hands. This procedure fo fuit ed to the dignity of the nation, and the infults it had received, would be a leffon to Spain, and to every other power, how they should prefume to dictate in our affairs, and to intermeddle with a menacing media tion, and an officioufnefs as infidious as it was audacious. That he would allow our enemies, whether fecret or declared, no time to think and recollect themselves.

Thefe fentiments, fo agreeable to the refolute and enterprifing character

racter of this minifter, appeared fhocking to almost all the reft of his collegues. They admitted that we ought not to be terrified from the affertion of our juft demands, by the menaces of any power. They owned that Spain had taken a very extraordinary and very unjuftifiable, ftep; but that we ought to admit, and even to wish for, an explanation;, this court upon a fober, yet fpirited, remonftrance, might recall that rafh proportion into which they. had been perhaps unwarily feduced by the artifices of France; that to fhun war upon a just occafion was cowardice, but to provoke or court it was madness. And, if to court a war was not in ge-, neral a very wife meafure, to defire it with Spain, if poffibly it could be avoided, was to overturn the most fundamental principles of the policy of both nations. That this defire of adding war to war, and enemy to enemy, whilst we had our hands already as full as they could hold, and whilft all our faculties were ftrained to the utmoft pitch, was ill to calculate the national ftrength of our country, which, however great, had its limits, and was not able to contend with all the world; that whilft we were calling for new enemies, no mention was made of new allies, nor indeed of any new refource whatsoever. To plunge into fuch meufures, in the manner propofed, and upon no better grounds, could not fail to fcandalize and to alarm all Europe;, and we could poffibly derive no advantage from this precipitate con-. duct, which would not be more than counter-balanced by the jealoufy and terror it would neceffarily create in every nation near us. As to the feizure of the flota, it was not to be reckoned upon, as at the very time

of that deliberation it might be expected to be fafe in its harbour; and perhaps if we could fucceed in feizing it, we might perform a fervice not very agreeable to neutral nations, and as little advantageous. to our own commerce. If Spain, blind to her true interefts, and mif led by French councils, should give in a more decifive manner into the defigns of that court, and obftinately refufe a reasonable fatisfaction, it would be then the true time to declare war, when all the neighbouring and impartial powers were convinced that we acted with as much temper as refolution, and when every thinking man at home fhould be fatisfied that he was not hurried into the hazards and expences of war, from an idea of chimerical heroism, but from inevitable neceffity; and that in fuch a cafe we might depend upon the utmost fupport which the nation could give to an adminiftration that depended. upon its ftrength, and yet dreaded to wafte it wantonly, or to employ it. unjustly. The minifter, warmed by this oppofition, declared that, "This was the time for humbling "the whole houfe of Bourbon; that "if this opportunity were let flip, "it might never be recovered; and "if he could not prevail in this in"ftance, he was refolved that this "was the last time he fhould fit in "that council. He thanked the "minifters of the late king for their

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fupport; faid he was himfelf "called to the miniftry by the "voice of the people, to whom he "confidered himself as accountable "for his conduct; and that he "would no longer remain in a fitu"tion which made him refponfible for meafures he was no longer "allowed to guide."

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