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figns at Madrid: but he was in hopes, that every ftep fhe took in the treaty, and every conceffion fhe fhould make, would prove a fresh incentive to the jealoufies and apprehenfious of Spain. Thus in effect all the motions which France feemingly made towards peace were in reality fo many steps towards a new war; and whilft at London fhe breathed nothing but moderation, and the most earnest defire of putting a period to the calamities of Europe, at Madrid fhe was taking the most vigorous measures for fpreading them further, and continuing them longer.

On the fide of England, though there was far more good faith in the public procedure, there were alfo, it must be admitted, many circumftances which co-operated to retard the peace. The great and almost unparallelled fuccefs which attended our arms in this war, had raifed a proportionable expectation, and infpired very high thoughts into the minds of the people. They thought it unreasonable to make almost any conceffions to a nation whofe ambition and violence they had always found to correfpond with its power, and whom they now confidered as lying at their mercy. That this was the time for reducing France, which if we let pafs, we could never hope again to recover. In these fentiments it must have fared ill with that admipistration, who should make a facrifice of any of thofe objects on which the people had fet their hearts.

On the other hand, it could not have escaped them, that the fitua tion of affairs in Germany, however they might be artificially feperated in the difcuffion, muft neceffarily have an influence on the final

determination of the treaty. They faw, that after a fevere ftruggle of five years, the affairs of our nearest allies were only not ruined. To fay nothing of the condition of the king of Pruffia, the whole country of Heffe was in the actual poffeffion of France: they likewife held the county of Hanau; and by their occupation of Gottingen, the Hanoverian territory lay open to their arms. If this quarrel should be confidered as a caufe not ftrictly English (though the French in their memorials contended it was), yet certainly the Heffians, and principally the Hanoverians, were allies of fo near a connection, and had done and fuffered fo much in the common cause, that it must have appeared fhocking to all Europe if folely attentive to our own peculiar advantages, we should patch up a peace without any provifion in their favour: and it was very evident, that this provifion could not be made in the fituation in which the laft campaign had left them, unless our government purchased it at a price that would be very grudgingly paid by the English iubjects.

The miniftry, perplexed between the natural expectations of their country, and the reasonable expectations of their allies, muft have found it not a little difficult to know what party they ought to take.

In order to reconcile, as much as poffible, these contradictory defires, the only folution which could be found was to push the war with the utmost vigour; and in the mean time not to hurry the negotiation; in hopes that during its progrefs things might take fuch a turn, as to enable them to purchase peace for their allies out of the acquifitions they should have made

after

after the commencement of the treaty, and without being obliged to have recourse to their conquefts, previous to that æra. On this footing they proposed to fatisfy the demands of the public faith, and at the fame time to preferve the reputation which was fo neceffary to their affairs at home. Accordingly the duke of Brunswick was to profecute with the utmoft vigour, the operations which he had begun in the depth of winter; and an expedition, the object of which was then fecret, was prepared with equal diligence in England.

In thefe equivocal difpofitions,

and in this odd mixture of hoftile and pacific measures, began the year 1761, a year more remarkable, perhaps, than any of those we have hitherto defcribed, for events which will be radically decifive of the future profperity or mifery of Europe, but lefs for thofe matters by which the imagination of the reader is commonly affected. Having in this chapter laid down, as far as we can conjecture, the political motives for the uncommon effort which was made in Germany, in our next chapter we fhall give an account of the military plan of this effort, the execu tion and the fuccefs of it.

CHA P. II.

Prince Ferdinand's plan. Allies enter into Heffe and Thuringia. French retire. Hereditary Prince repulfed at Fritzlar. Fritzlar taken. Several magazines taken. Blockade of Marpurg and Ziegenhayn. Siege of Caffel. Battle of Langenfaltze, Broglio reinforced from the Lower Rhine. Hereditary Prince defeated at Stangerode. Siege of Cassel, &c. raised. Allies retire behind the Dymel.

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T the close of the laft campaign, the French had the entire and undisturbed poffeffion of the whole territory of Heffe: country tolerably provided, and which contains many tenable places. Some of these they had ftrengthened with additional works; and they had amaffed immenfe magazines in the most convenient fituations. This was their condition in the front of their winter cantonments. On their left they had driven the allies from the Lower Rhine, where they kept a confiderable body of troops, which ftreightened our quarters, and checked our efforts on that fide. On their right they poffeffed the town of Gottingen, in which they had placed a very strong garrison ; and thus they shut us up on

this quarter alfo, whilft the king's German dominions lay entirely open to their enterprizes.

If we confider the fituation of the French armies, they will present us with the idea of an immenfe crefcent, the two advanced point; of which were at Gottingen and Wefel and the body extended in Heffe: fo that being perfectly well provided with magazines, and, mafter of all the proper communications neceffary for their current fubfiftence, with ftrong places in their rear, and in both their flanks; in the next campaign they had only to advance their several pofts in a manner to enclofe the allied army, which, without fome fignal fuccefs (from their numbers and fituation, hardly to be expected) would find it [B] 4

felf

felf entirely incapable of making any stand against them.

Prince Ferdinand was very fenfible of thefe inconveniences of his fituation, and of the advantages the enemy had over him. It was extremely difficult to fettle a plan for action; but no action could be at tended with much worfe confequences, than inactivity in a bad condition. He knew from experience, that the French were ill qualified for winter operations in Germany, and that his own foldiers, befides their fuperior hardinefs, and their being inured to the rigour of the climate, could fuffer but little more from field fervice, especially if attended with fuccefs, than they must endure from the badnefs of their winter quarters. It is true that there was fomething difcouraging in the attack of a very fuperior body of the enemy, poffeffed of every advantage against him: but it was clear that this fuperiority, and thefe advantages would not leffen as the fummer approached. It was clear, that every step the enemy gained on him, would render his defence weaker and his refources more fcanty; and that if the enemy found themselves in a condition to commence this campaign where they had concluded the laft, and that no thing fhould hinder their proceeding in the earliest season, he could never reasonably hope to protract the war to another year. For to fpeak the truth, this was the utmoft, which in his circumstances he could promife himself from the moft judicious fcheme of conduct.

Having therefore refolved to act, he loft no time to act with vigour. He appointed three places of ren dezvous on the Dymel, the Rhume, and in Saverland. His army af

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fembled on the 9th of February, without fuffering the enemy to have any previous notice of their intentions. The next day the troops halted, and the duke communicated to his generals the difpofition he had made for the motions of the whole.

The center was led by his ferene highnefs in perfon; it penetrated directly into Heffe, and marching by Zierenberg and Durenberg, made its way towards Caffel. The right and left of the army were each at a very confiderable distance from this body; but they were fo difpofed as fully to co-operate in the general plan of operation, which was very extensive. The hereditary prince commanded on the right: he marched by Stadbergen for Mengeringhaufen; and leaving the country of Heffe to the Eastward, as the alarm was to be as fudden, and as widely diffused as poffible, he pushed forward with the utmost expedition into the heart of the French quarters. Gen. Sporken commanded a corps at a greater diftance to the left, and penetrated into Thuringia, by Duderftadt and Heiligenstadt. The defign of this movement was to break the communication of the French with the army of the empire to open one for ourselves with the Pruffians, and to cut off all intercourfe between the grand army of the enemy, and their garrifon at Gottingen.

By this fudden, extenfive, and vigorous attack, the French were thrown into the utmost confternation: they retreated, or rather fled upon every fide. It could fcarcely have been imagined, that this was the fame army which had but just clofed the campaign with fo much

fuccefs.

fuccefs. Such has been the fport of fortune in this war, even beyond all former examples of her caprice, that the inftances are numerous of inferior and beaten armies, without any apparent change in their circumftances, driving the conquerors before them. So remarkable was the revolution of fortune at this time, that it is highly credible if the French had had their quarters in an open country, their army had been totally destroyed: but happily for them, they had very fufficient means of fecuring their retreat. For as the allies advanced, they were obliged to leave Caffel and Gottingen at their backs; into the former of which the enemy had thrown a garrifon equal to a moderate army; and in the latter they had feven or eight thousand men. Beyond thefe again were Fritzlar, Ziegenhayn, and Marpurg, places of a tolerable degree of ftrength and well garrifoned, befides fome other inferior pofts.

The hereditary prince, whofe party was the most advanced, ftruck the firft blow, by an attempt to furprize Fritzlar. He had received advice that it was not prepared to receive him. He accordingly took only a few battalions and no cannon, in hopes of being able to carry that place at once. But un fortunately he was deceived in his intelligence. The garrifon was prepared and refolute, and though the hereditary prince attacked it with his ufual fpirit, he was obliged for that time to defift, and to draw off with no inconfiderable lofs.

About this time, Marpurg was attempted in the fame manner, and with no better fuccefs. General Breidenback, an Hanoverian officer, of great bravery, experience

and reputation, who commanded there, loft his life in the attack. Thefe two fevere checks at the entrance into action, did not, however, difcourage either the parties that fuffered them, or the rest of the army. They advanced as expeditiously, and with more caution. Cannon and mortar were brought before Fritzlar, which after a defence that was rather made for the credit of the commander, than from any hope of faving the place, 15 Feb. furrendered on honourable terms. A large magazine was found here. The marquis of Granby was employed with fuccefs in reducing the forts and caftles in this neighbourhood. The allied army refolutely advanced, and as they advanced, the French continually retired, abandoning post after poft, and fell back almoft to the Maine. They fired their magazines as they retreated; but the allies pursued with so much rapidity, that they faved five capital ftores; one of which contained no less than eighty thousand facks of meal, fifty thoufand facks of oats, and a million of rations of hay, a very small part of which had been deftroyed. Thefe were acquifitions of the utmoft advantage, as they wonderfully facilitated the progrefs of the army; which as it advanced, still found its fubfiftence; provifion was alfo thereby made for the cavalry, which otherwise it could never have been fupplied with in fuch a feason, and at fuch a vast distance from our original quar

ters.

Notwithstanding this fuccefs in front, it was not here the grand object of our operations lay. Caffel was to be reduced. The French had in that town a garrison of feventeen

feventeen battalions, befides fome other corps, under the command of the count de Broglio; and there was no doubt, that he would defend the place to the utmost. The fortifications of Caffel are mostly in the old manner; they confift of very high but ftrong walls. Some works indeed had been newly added; but the great hope of the enemy was in the ftrength of the garrifon and the rigour of the feafon. The fiege of this place was not to be delayed; however it 'was neceffary previously to clear all the adjacent country of the enemy, and to cut off the communication of the garrifon with their grand army.

Therefore when marshal Broglio had been driven quite out of Heffe, and had retreated towards Frankfort, prince Ferdinand ceased to advance; and having ordered two bodies to the blockade of Marpurg and Ziegenhayn, which ftill obiti nately held out, he formed that part of the army which was with him, into a chain of cantonments, making a front towards the enemy which extended from the river Lahn to the river Ohm, and from the Ohm to the Fulda; thus he propofed to watch the motions of marthal Broglio's army, to cover the fiege of Caffel, and the blockades of the two fortreffes juft mentioned. The fiege of Cafel was carried on by the count of Lippe Schaumburg, a fovereign prince of the empire, reputed one of the ableft engineers in Europe. His management of the artillery at Thornhaufen was a principal caufe in the acquifition of that great victory; and it was not doubted that his abilities would be exerted as effectively at Caffei. Trenwere opened on the firft of arch. All eyes were now directed

ches

to this point; for on the fuccefs of this ftroke depended the whole fortune of the campaign. It was very apparent that if Caffel and its garrifon fhould fall into the hands of the allies, Gottingen and the inferior places must inevitably fall along with it; and this misfortune would be more than equivalent to the loss of a great battle.

Whilft the war was thus carried on in Heffe, M. Sporken who commanded the detachment to the left, on the fide of Saxony, advanced with an intrepidity equal to the reft; he was foon joined by a corps of Pruffians, and the united army loft no time to clear the Werra and the Unftrut of the bodies of French and Saxons which occupied the most important pofts upon these rivers. As thefe bodies were advan❤ tageously pofted, and could be fupported on one fide by the garrifon of Gottingen, and on the other, as they promised themfelves, by the army of the empire, they maintained their ground, and this foon brought on a sharp action. The allies attacked a large body advantageously pof14th Feb. ted at Langenfaltze upon the Unftrut; the event was entirely favourable. Three whole battali ons of Saxons were made prisoners by the Pruffians; M. de Sporken took two battalions. The enemy's lofs was computed at five thoufand men; feveral pieces of cannon were also taken, and a large magazine was abandoned. This blow was well followed; one body of the combined army pushed to Eifenach and Gotha, whilst another by forced marches got forward to Fulda; the French gave way on their right, and the army of the empire on the left; the latter fell back to

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Bamberg

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