wards their proper front, moved forward, along with the centre; thus forming the three sides of a hollow square. While the whole were pushing forward in this order, the French infantry made three desperate attacks, supported by the cavalry, who attempted to charge, and avail themselves of the impression made by the infantry. They were repulsed, however, in every charge, though assisted by a tremendous cannonade from the redoubts, the batteries in the wood and on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, and from the villages which still remained in possession of the enemy. The previous arrangements of Marshal Saxe were most judicious, and his movements well supported by the batteries, which could all bear on the English line when advanced beyond the ravine.

These attacks lasted several hours. The English, although suffering severely, were always gaining ground in advance of the front line of the redoubts. Marshal Saxe, perceiving that no decisive effect was produced, and that, while he was losing his bravest men, the English were gaining upon him, became anxious for the result, and sent notice to the King of France that it was necessary to retire farther from danger. He resolved, however, to make one desperate attack, with every arm which he could bring to bear on the British, who had now advanced so far beyond the confined ground as to be able to form the greatest part of the army into line. He quitted a litter, in which he had been carried the whole day, being much reduced by longcontinued disease, (a dropsy far advanced,) and mounting on horseback, two men supporting him on each side as he rode, he brought up the household troops of the King of France: his best cavalry were posted on the flanks, and the

• Indeed, the fire from two of the redoubts was latterly more noisy than dangerous: the shot being expended, they only fired powder. From the noise and confusion, the deception was not discovered. Though the cannonade from these redoubts was so harmless, they kept up such a rapid and continued fire, that they appeared to be the most active and efficient of the whole.

flower of the infantry, with the King's body guards, in the centre. He also brought forward all his field-pieces, and, under cover of their fire and that of the batteries, he made a combined charge of cavalry and infantry on the English line. This united attack was irresistible. The British were forced to give way, and were driven back across the ravine. The Highlanders who had been ordered up from the attack of the village, and two other regiments ordered from the reserve to support the line, were borne down by the retreating body, and retired along with them. The whole rallied beyond the ravine, and after some delay, the Duke determined on a final retreat, directing that the Highlanders and Howard's (the 19th) regiment should cover the rear of the retreating army, and check the advance of the enemy, who pursued the moment the retreat commenced. The Dutch and Hanoverians retired at the same time.

A great military error seems to have been committed in advancing so far while the fortified villages and redoubts remained in possession of the enemy. On the other hand, Marshal Saxe had not strengthened with sufficient care the ravine, or space between Fontenoy and the wood of Barri. This oversight had nearly lost him the battle; for if the village had been taken by the Dutch, (to whom this duty was intrusted,) before the British forced their way through the ravine, their flanks would not have suffered. Indeed, the enemy could not have maintained their ground had their own guns been turned upon them. Marshal Saxe, in his account of the battle, says, "The truth is, I did not suppose that any general would be so hardy as to venture to make his way through in that place." In this opinion he paid a handsome compliment to the troops who penetrated a defile which this able master of the art of war thought so impracticable, that he neglected the defences which were afterwards found necessary, and for which he had had full time, as he was three days in the position previous to the attack.

A battle of such importance, with a result so unfortunate, occasioned, as may be imagined, much discussion both in

public and in private, and gave rise to numerous pamphlets and publications. I shall adduce such parts of the correspondence of persons present as will, in some manner, show what part the Highlanders bore in the battle. As it was the first in which the regiment had encountered an enemy, the attention of many was directed towards them. Some were suspicious of their conduct in the service of a king to whose authority they were supposed to be adverse. Others, again, anxious for the honour and military fame of Scotland, rejoiced in this opportunity of putting them to the test, and of showing that, opposed to a common enemy, they would well sustain the honour of their country. Captain John Munro of Lord John Murray's Highlanders, (as they were now called,) in a letter to his friend, President Forbes of Culloden, says, "While things were going on in this manner, the left did not succeed so well, and in a short time we were ordered to cross the field, and attack (our regiment I mean, for the rest of the brigade did not march to this attack) the village of Fontenoy. As we passed the field, the French batteries played upon our right and left flanks, but to little purpose, for their batteries being on a

• This impression was so strong in some high quarters, that, on the rapid charges made by the Highlanders, when pushing forward sword in hand nearly at full speed, and advancing so far, it was suggested that they inclined to change sides and join the enemy, who had already three brigades of Scotch and Irish engaged, which performed very important services on that day.

+ This gentleman was promoted the same year, in a manner somewhat startling to our present ideas, of a strict regard to justice, precedency, and length of service. Although there were a major and three captains senior to him in the regiment, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel in room of Sir Robert Munro, and continued in this situation, till succeeded, in 1749, by the late Duke of Argyll, then Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, on half-pay of Lord Loudon's Highlanders. I have not been able to discover if this promotion, from the command of a company to that of the regi ment, was a reward for any marked good conduct in this battle, in which it appears he commanded the regiment, in their more rapid movements, immediately under Sir Robert Munro, who, from his extreme corpulency, and being on foot, could not move with the rapidity sometimes neces

sary.

rising ground, their balls flew over us, and struck the second line. We were to support the Dutch, who, in their usual way, were very dilatory. We were obliged to wait (covering ourselves from the fire) for the Dutch, who, when they came up, behaved so and so. In the course of an hour, the Dutch gave way, and Sir Robert Munro thought we should retire, for we had the whole batteries of the enemy's line playing upon us. We retired, but had not marched fifty yards when we had orders to return and support the Hanoverians, who were at this time advancing on the batteries on the left. They behaved most gallantly and bravely, and had the Dutch taken example by them, we had supped at Tournay.

By two o'clock the whole retreated, and we were ordered to cover the retreat of the army, as the only regiment that could be kept to their duty. The Duke made so friendly a speech to us, that, if we had been ordered to attack their lines afresh, our poor fellows would have done it." •

In the official account of this battle, it is stated, that, "after several other attempts with more or less success, and after the Austrians and Dutch had failed in their attack, it was resolved by the Duke of Cumberland, Prince Waldeck, and the Field Marshal, that the whole army should retire, and the commanding officers of General Howard's, (19th regiment,) and of the Highlanders, were ordered to put themselves in readiness to cover the retreat, which was made in great order; the two battalions fronting and forcing back the enemy at every hundred paces." +

Such confidence in the steadiness of a new regiment, in its first encounter with an enemy, is not common. The first in the attack, they were also the last in the retreat, and, together with another corps, successfully resisted all the attacks of the pursuing enemy, who, elated with success, were consequently the more ardent and enterprising.

The Highlanders were fortunate in being commanded on that day by a man of talents, presence of mind, and a + Official Dispatches.

Culloden Papers.

thorough knowledge of his men. * He knew the way of managing them to the best advantage,—a qualification of great moment to a leader of troops, and the neglect of which, in the choice of officers, has sometimes occasioned serious losses to the service. As there is no moral quality of higher importance to a corps, than that patriotic spirit which leads every individual to connect his own honour with that of his country, so the greatest care should be taken to cherish and propagate this spirit. A judicious selection of officers is one of the primary means to this important end, as, by the influence of their conduct and example, the character of the men will in a great measure be formed. There have been instances, in which national spirit and patriotic feelings have existed among troops for years, independently of example or influence from superiors; but such instances are rare and anomalous. General experience

Colonel Sir Robert Munro of Fowlis, Baronet, chief of his name and clan, the 24th in regular descent from father to son of his family, and Member in several Parliaments for the county of Ross. He served in the latter part of King William's reign, and in Queen Anne's wars, under the Duke of Marlborough, by whom he was appointed to a company in the Scotch Royals in 1712; and in 1714 he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1739, he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the new Highland Regiment. Lord Craufurd the Colonel being abroad, the discipline was conducted by the Lieutenant-Colonel; and in what manuer, and with what success, may be judged from the behaviour of the regiment at Fontenoy. On this account he was promoted to the command of the 37th regiment in room of General Ponsonby, who was killed that day.

He commanded his new regiment at the battle of Falkirk, in January 1746; but on this occasion he was not supported by his men as he had been at Fontenoy, for they fled on the first charge of the rebels. Colonel Munro, disdaining to fly, was cut down, and his brother, who was present, seeing his situation, ran forward to support him, and shared the same fate. He was buried the following day with all the homage due to so honourable a man, and so gallant a soldier; all the rebel officers, and crowds of the men attending his funeral, anxious to show the last mark of respect to a man whom, notwithstanding the difference of their political principles, they so much esteemed.

His family was unfortunate this year. His brother, Captain George Munro of Culcairn, who had retired from the Highland regiment in the