jor-General Spencer, with 6000 men, then on board transports off Cadiz, but not permitted to land, was ordered to join General Wellesley, who was farther to be reinforced with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Robert Anstruther, from England, and 12,000 under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore. To this concentrated force was added the Royal Highland regiment from Gibraltar,* and the Gordon and Cameron Highlanders from England. Previously to this period was fought, on the 21st of August, the battle of Vimiera, subsequently to which, an extraordinary collision of command occurred. General Wellesley, who had gained the battle, was on the same day superseded by two senior generals, (Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore,) and these again, on the following morning, by a third general, Sir Hew Dalrymple. The convention of Cintra which followed, causing the recall of Generals Dalrymple and Burrard, the command of the army devolved on Sir John Moore.

An order to resume active operations was received on the 6th of October, accompanied with instructions to march, with all possible expedition, into the heart of Spain, to cooperate with the Spanish army. A body of troops from England, under Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird, was directed to land at Corunna, and proceed forthwith to form a junction with General Moore. The want of previous preparations retarded the advance of the army from Lisbon,

• It has been already stated, that, in this national corps, the characteristic, so far as regarded the native country of the soldiers, had been well preserved. In 1776 the number embarked for America was 1160 men, all of whom, except 54 Lowlanders, and 2 Englishmen in the band, were Highlanders. In all former periods the proportions were similar. But when the men ordered from the London depot in 1780 were removed from the regiment, not more than one-half of those received in exchange were native Highlanders, 81 being Lowlanders. At the commencement of the war in 1795 the strength of the regiment was low. The proportions were 480 Highlanders, 152 Lowland Scotch, 4 Irish, and 3 English. At the present period there embarked from Gibraltar, in 1808, 383 High, landers, 231 Lowlanders, 7 English, and 5 Irish.

and the Portuguese government and people affording but little assistance, the whole was left to the resources and talents of the commander, who, incredible as it may appear, could obtain no correct information of the state of the country, or even of the best road for the transport of artillery. Labouring under this deficiency of accurate intelligence, and from the best accounts he could procure, believing it impossible to convey artillery by the road through the mountains, in the defective state of the Commissariat, it was judged necessary to form the army in divisions, and to march by different routes.

The division of the Honourable Lieutenant-General Hope, consisting of the brigade of artillery, and four regiments of infantry, of which the 42d was one, marched upon Madrid and Espinar; General Paget's division moved by Elvas and Alcantara; General Beresford by Coimbra and Almeida; and General Mackenzie Fraser by Abrantes and Almeida. All these divisions were to form a junction at Salamanca, and when united would amount to 18,600 men, including 900 cavalry. This force, it was believed, would animate or revive Spanish patriotism, and enable the natives to oppose an effectual resistance to the powerful force which the enemy was preparing to pour into Spain in support of that already in the country. As the army advanced, little enthusiasm was perceived; and nothing was experienced like the reception which might have been expected by men entering the country with the generous and disinterested purpose of aiding the people in throwing off a yoke which, they were taught to believe, the Spanish nation to a man regarded as odious, galling, and disgraceful. General Moore soon found that little dependence was to be placed on the co-operation of the Spanish armies, or on the intelligence furnished by the inhabitants of either Spain or Portugal. Of the incorrectness of the latter he had a striking proof, when he subsequently discovered that the roads were practicable for artillery, that the circuitous route of General Hope was totally unnecessary, and that better information

would have enabled him to bring his troops much sooner to the point of rendezvous. He arrived, however, in sufficient time for those allies with whom he was to act in con cer t;for, from the day he entered Spain, until the 13th of November, when he reached Salamanca, he did not see a Spanish soldier; and so far from having any communication with the Generals commanding the Spanish armies, or any immediate prospect of their concentrating their forces, and acting in concert for the further service of the common cause, it would seem as if he himself had been the only General and army they feared. All vanished at his approach. The army of Estremadura was dispersed; that under Castanos marched away in one direction, while Blake's division took another, increasing the distance from the British army, to whose line of march free access was thus left for the enemy. General Baird had arrived at Corunna, but he was not permitted to land: his troops were kept on board from the 13th to the 31st of October, and when allowed to disembark, no exertion was made to forward his march. On the contrary, had he come with the most hostile intentions, he could not have met with a greater eagerness to extort the highest value for whatever was requisite to equip and forward the troops.

These untoward appearances too fatally confirmed an unfavourable opinion early entertained by Sir John Moore of the cause in which he was engaged. Of the people he always thought well." The poor Spaniards," said he in a letter to his brother, " deserve a better fate, for they seem a fine people, but have fallen into bad hands, who have lost them by their apathy. I am in no correspondence with any of their Generals or armies. I know not their plans or those of the Spanish Government. No channels of information have been opened to me; and as yet a stranger, I have been able to establish no certain ones for myself."

Waiting the junction of Generals Baird and Hope, who were so situated, (the former marching from the north of Spain, and the latter from the south,) that, if he attempted

to move towards the one, he would leave the other at a greater distance, he received intelligence of the defeat and total dispersion of General Blake's army on the 10th of November at Espenora de los Monteros. This disastrous intelligence was soon followed by that of the total defeat and dispersion of the army under General Castanos at Tudela. By this dispersion of the two principal armies of Spain, all hope of farther support vanished from the British, who were now become principals in the war. The Spaniards allowing themselves to be thus beaten in detail, the British General had to make preparations against the concentrated force of the enemy, now about to move in the confident expectation of overwhelming him.

General Moore's difficulties began to be evident. It was the 1st of December; his army had not yet assembled ; General Baird was at Astorga, and General Hope four days' march from Salamanca. "Indeed, few generals have been entangled with so many embarrassments as Sir John Moore was at this crisis, who not only had to contend with the Spanish Government, always exaggerating their resources, and concealing or glossing over their disasters, but also to guard against the secret plots of unsuspected traitors hid in the bosom of the Junta. And now he had to encounter the power and genius of Buonaparte." *

Under such an accumulation of difficulties, it was to be decided how long a force, which, when united, would not amount to 30,000 effective men, including artillery and cavalry, ought to remain in the centre of Spain, opposed to 100,000 men, and these expecting additional reinforcements. The difficulty of the decision must have been increased by the opinion strongly and loudly expressed in the army with regard to its future movements; the prevalent opinion of officers of rank being against a retreat.

Men of common minds would have hesitated to decide in such circumstances, but General Moore determined at once,

• Moore's Narrative.

and called a council of war, "not to request their counsel, or to make them commit themselves by giving any opinion on the subject; he took the responsibility entirely upon himself, and only required that they would immediately prepare to carry his orders into execution." Councils of war are sometimes considered as indications of weakness and indecision in a commander, who wishes, by this means, to procure a sanction for his own opinion, and to divide with others any share of censure that may be afterwards incurred. General Moore, on the contrary, acted from the suggestions of his own mind. He had now been a month in Spain, without being joined by a single soldier of the country; he had seen the Spanish armies dispersed in succession, except the corps under the Marquis of Romana, who, acting independently, served more to obstruct than expedite the plans of the British General, by crossing his line of march, intercepting his provisions, and occupying the carriages and means of conveyance. In this state of affairs, he determined to retire on Portugal, and ordered Sir David Baird to march to Corunna, and proceed thence by sea to Lisbon. But having received favourable accounts of a reviving spirit among the Spaniards, and of a successful resistance to the enemy at Madrid, he was induced to countermand the order for retreat. But later and better intelligence, obtained through the means of Colonel Graham of Balgowan, Mr Charles Stuart, and also an intercepted letter of Marshal Berthier to Marshal Soult, laid open to him the real posture of affairs. In consequence of this intelligence he resumed his original intention of retiring, not indeed to the south, but to the north of Spain, where he hoped to effect a junction with General Baird. Accordingly, the army moved in different divisions, and reaching Toro on the 21st of December, there formed a junction with General Baird's army, making altogether a force of 26,311 infantry, and 2450 cavalry.

On the 23d the army marched to Sahagun, which had been the preceding night occupied by the enemy. Lord Paget being ordered to the front, with a detachment of ca