his strength whereby he would prove that we may not make forcible resistance to unlawful commands, from Rom. xiii., falls to the ground.

Then the Doctor tells us, in the same argument, This power is called an ordinance of man, subjective; wherein he lays this distinction, that power is considered two ways, either as it is subjective amongst men, and so it is avgwwivŋ kriσlę, or else as it is considered causaliter, and so it is anо Orov, of God.

But this is too strait, for it is called ave¿win kiç, not only because it is amongst men, but it is ardewin Kidis, a human constitution, in four respects: 1. Because it is so causaliter, the form of several governments, being an invention of man. 2. Subjective, because it is amongst men. 3. Objective, because it is busied about men. 4. Finaliter, because it is ordained for man and the commonweale, yet power itself is the constitution and ordinance of God.

Then the Doctor proves, that the power is of God, because the magistrate is called the minister of God, Rom. xiii. 4.

But here he slips from the power itself to the person designed to the power; for the power itself is not called the minister of God, which was the thing he undertook for to prove.

And so in this third argument, where he saith to the same purpose, speak those other places: By me kings reign; I have said ye are gods: yet he confesseth, that the forms of government by kings and emperors is an invention of man, in the first argument.

But now suppose the Doctor had proved that the power, abstractively considered, is of God's institution; and had granted that the qualifications of this governing power in several forms of government, and the designation of the person thereto be of man; what hath he gotten from or gained upon his imagined adversary? For suppose that his adversary should say, that they may depose their prince, if he neglect his trust, (which is not our case,) because that his power is originally from them; how doth that which the Doctor hath said, weaken this argument? For though he hath proved that the power of itself is from God, yet having granted that the forms of that government, and the designation of a person thereto, is from the people, they may as well urge and say, therefore we may alter the government, and may depose the

person, because he was of our designing, as well as they might have argued so, if the power itself had been from themselves.

Then the Doctor saith, The imputation is causeless which the pleaders on the other side do heedlessly and ignorantly lay upon us divines, as if we cried up monarchy, and that only government to be jure Divino.

To let pass reproaches, how can we think otherwise if we should believe all that the Doctor saith? For he proves that the power mentioned, Rom. xiii., is jure Divino, and yet he saith (Sect. II.), that the higher power there, is all one with the supreme, or king, in Peter. But this, with the nature of monarchial government, we shall come to consider more aptly in that which follows.

The remaining part of this section is but to prove that the power itself is of God, that the qualification and designation was firstly of man, which we all grant.

SECTION IV.

Now we come to the forfeiture, saith the Doctor, of this power: If the prince, say they, will not discharge his trust, then it falls to the people, or the two houses, the representative body of the people, to see to it, and to re-assume that power, and thereby to resist. This they conceive to follow upon the derivation of power from the people by virtue of election, and upon the stipulation or covenant of the prince with the people, as also to be necessary in regard of those means of safety which every state should have within itself. We will examine them in order.

Herein he doth charge us with this opinion, that we hold it lawful for the people to re-assume their power, in case the prince dischargeth not his trust; making the world believe that we contend for deposing of kings, or that the parliament goes about such a work as that is; for what else is it for the people or parliament to re-assume their power from the prince? whereas we desire all the world should know, that we now take up arms as an act of self-preservation, not endeavouring or intending to thrust the king from his office,

though for the present the state sets some under the king at the stern, till the waters be calmed, as we said before.

Then the Doctor saith, Concerning the derivation of power, we answer, if it be not from the people, as they will have it, and as before it was cleared, then can there be no re-assuming of this power by the people.

How doth this follow? for all that the Doctor had cleared before was this: that power, abstractively considered, was from God, not from the people. Now let us see whether the clearing of that will bring in such a consequence as this, that there can be no re-assuming of this power by the people. If it will enforce such a consequence, then the syllogism is this: If power and magistracy and authority itself be of God, and the forms of government and designation of persons be of man, then there can be no re-assuming of this power by the people. But the power itself and magistracy is of God, the forms of government and designation of persons is of man, saith the Doctor (Sect. III). Therefore there can be no reassuming this power by the people, saith the Doctor (Sect. IV).

Will not his imagined adversaries easily deny the sequel? indeed if he had proved that neither the power, nor the qualification, nor the designation were of man but of God, and cleared that first, then he had taken that argument from his adversaries; but seeing he hath granted that the ways of government and designation of persons to be of man, though he hath proved the power itself of God, sure he hath no way stopped the course of their arguments or practice against whom he disputes.

Then he comes to shew the inconsequence, and saith, If the people should give the power so absolutely as they would have it, leaving nothing to God in it but approbation, yet could they not therefore have right to take that power away, for many things which are altogether in our disposing before we part with them, are not afterward in our power to recal them.

He supposeth we go to take the power away from the prince, which we do not, as hath been said.

There is a difference between disposing of things by way of donation or sale, and disposing of things by way of trust: true, those things which we dispose of by way of donation or

sale are not afterward in our power to recal, as they were before the donation or sale; as if a man give his child land, or sell land to his neighbour, it is not in the power of the father or neighbour to recal or dispose of the land as before the donation or sale. But if a thing be disposed of by way of trust, then if the fiduciary or trusted shall not discharge his trust, it is in the power, at least of the trusting, to look to the matter himself; as in case that a steward be trusted with a man's house. And thus when any government is set up in a land by a people, they trust the governor, they do not give away their liberties or rights, but trust them in the hand of the governor, who if abused that he do not perform his stew. ardly trust as he should, the people, or representative body, as an act of self-preservation, I do not say as an act of jurisdiction, are to look to it. Neither herein do they so reassume their power, as to take away any thing which they gave to the king, but so as to actuate that power which they always had left in themselves, as the power of self-preservation.

Then the Doctor saith: Although it were as they would have it, that they give the power, and God approves, yet because the Lord's hand also and his oil is upon the person elected to the crown, and then he is the Lord's anointed, and the minister of God, those hands of the people which are used in lifting him up to the crown, may not again be lifted up against him, either to take the crown from his head, or the sword out of his hand.

If this be true, then princes that are merely elective, and not hereditary, and whose coming to the crown is merely pactional, cannot be deposed by the people, for they are the Lord's anointed, and the ministers of God; and this is contrary to the Doctor himself, who in this same section saith thus: Although such arguments (speaking of the forfeiture of the prince's power in the next line before) may seem to have some force in states merely elective and pactional, yet can it never be made to appear by any indifferent understanding, that the like must obtain in this kingdom. And to this purpose, saith the Doctor, P. Paræus excuseth what his father had written, on Rom. xiii., in the point of resistance; that it was to be understood of elective and pactional government, and

when the government is elective and pactional, are not the princes the ministers and the Lord's anointed?

Then the Doctor saith: How shall the conscience be satisfied that this their argument grounded upon election, and the derivation of power from the people, can have place in this kingdom, when as the crown not only descends by inheritance, but also hath so often been settled by conquest in the lines of Saxons, Danes and Normans?

I answer, How can the conscience be satisfied in that which the Doctor writes in this his book, where he acknowledgeth, in this section, that it is probable, indeed, that kings at the first were by choice here as elsewhere; and in Sect. V. saith, that the forms of several governments, whereof princedom is one, are from the invention of man, and so by derivation from man?

The Doctor's great design, I perceive, by his frequent touching this matter, is to make our king a king by conquest; for (in Sect. III.) he saith, God's vicegerents here on earth came into their office either by immediate designation, the election of the people, succession and inheritance, or by conquest; now he cannot say that our king came in by immediate designation, and he doth not say that our princes lay claim to the crown by virtue of their election, and if by inheritance, then by the right of an election or by conquest; for by mere inheritance a man hath no more than what those first had whom he doth succeed, inheritance being but the continuation of the first right upon the children; the right of election he doth disclaim, and of derivation of power from the people, therefore the right that he makes our prince to have to the crown is only the right of a conquest: then if any man's sword be longer or stronger than his, he may quickly have as much right to the crown as the king; which opinion of the Doctor's for my own part I must abhor from; what danger will it not expose our dread sovereign to? Did not Athaliah reign as a conqueress six years; and who knows not that she was lawfully thrust from the throne again by a stronger hand than her own; mere conquest being nothing else but an unjust usurpation? And if the conqueror rule the whole kingdom, and keep them under by conquest only, why may not the subject rise and take up arms to deliver them