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tion with Hanna and learned from him that he had sent a telegram to Mitchell assuring him that the miners "could depend on absolute fairness" at Roosevelt's hands.1

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To clinch the business so that there could be no misunderstanding, Root desired that a member of Morgan's firm should come to Washington and confer with the President. Thereupon, two of the prominent partners came. The interview, which took place on October 15, is best described in a private letter of the President to Senator Lodge: "The operators had limited me down by a full proviso to five different types of men, including an 'eminent sociologist.' ... The miners, on the other hand, wanted me to appoint at least two extra members myself, or in some fashion to get Bishop Spalding (whom I myself, wanted) and the labor union man on the commission. The operators refused point blank to have another man added. . . . Finally it developed that what they meant was that no extra man should be added if he was a representative of organized labor. . . . It took me about two hours before I at last grasped the fact that the mighty brains of these captains of industry had formulated the theory that they would rather have anarchy than tweedledum, but if I would use the word tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace. In other words, that they had not the slightest objection to my appointing a labor man as an 'eminent sociologist' and adding Bishop Spalding on my own account, but they preferred to see the Red Commune come rather than to have me make Bishop Spalding or anyone else 'the eminent sociologist,' and add the labor man. I instantly told them that

1 Life of Hanna, Croly, 399.

I had not the slightest objection whatever to doing an absurd thing when it was necessary to meet the objection of an absurd mind on some vital point, and that I would cheerfully appoint my labor man as the 'eminent sociologist.' It was almost impossible for me to appreciate the instant and tremendous relief this gave them. They saw nothing offensive in my language and nothing ridiculous in the proposition, and Pierpont Morgan and Baer, when called up by telephone, eagerly ratified the absurdity; and accordingly at this utterly unimportant price we bid fair to come out of as dangerous a situation as I ever dealt with." 1

2

Roosevelt desired to appoint Grover Cleveland on the Commission in lieu of the army engineer, but to this the operators would not agree. In 1915 Roosevelt wrote to Charles Washburn, "I think the settlement of the coal strike was much the most important thing I did about labor from every standpoint." The President wrote to Senator Hanna: "Last night when it became evident that we were going to get a Commission which would be accepted by both sides, I remarked, 'Well, Uncle Mark's work has borne fruit,' and everybody said 'yes.' The solution came because so many of us have for so long hammered at the matter until at last things got into shape which made the present outcome possible." In effecting such a compromise the personality of men counted for much and Roosevelt and Hanna seemed the men of all men to bring about such a result.

1 Bishop, i. 214; Private Conversation with the President, Nov. 16, 1905.

* Roosevelt, Thayer, 246; Charles G. Washburn, 82.

3 Oct. 16, Life of Hanna, Croly, 400.

The Commission was: Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, retired, formerly Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; E. W. Parker, expert mining engineer, chief statistician of the coal division of the U. S. Geological Survey and editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal; George Gray, Judge of the United States Circuit Court, Delaware; E. E. Clark, Chief of the Order of Railway Conductors, sociologist; Thomas H. Watkins, practically connected with the mining and selling of coal; Bishop John L. Spalding of Illinois; Carroll D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Recorder of the Commission.1 "Most of the miners were Roman Catholics" and "Mitchell and the other leaders of the miners had urged me to appoint some high Catholic ecclesiastic." Bishop Spalding was "one of the very best men to be found in the entire country." Judge Gray was chosen chairman of the Commission.

The miners at once went to work. The relief felt in the eastern part of the country was very great. The well-to-do were spared much hardship, the poor, freezing. Coal, of which there was still a small stock, had advanced to fabulous prices. Now normal conditions obtained. Many homes accustomed to genial warmth blessed Roosevelt because he had used the high office of President to give them comfort.

In five months the Commission made their report to the President, with their different awards. They adjudged that the miners should have an increase of ten per cent in their wages; that there should be no discrimination against union or non-union laborers; a slid

1 Bishop, i. 217.

2 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 507, 509.

ing scale of wages was fixed which should increase the pay of the miners with any advance in the price of coal; the award should continue for three years. The Commission further adjudged that any differences of opinion should be referred to a permanent joint committee to be called a Board of Conciliation, to consist of six persons, three of whom should be named by the mine workers and three by the operators. In the event that the six could not agree, the umpire should be "one of the circuit judges of the third judicial circuit of the United States, whose decision shall be final and binding in the premises."1 John Mitchell maintained that the Commission indirectly acknowledged the miners' union, writing, "While disclaiming the wish to compel the recognition of the United Mine Workers of America, the Commission in actual practice made that recognition inevitable and immediate." 2

"Time," wrote Joseph B. Bishop in 1920, "has completely justified the President's course. Not only did the findings of the Commission secure peace in the anthracite mines during the three stipulated years, but permanently, for since 1902 there has been no strike there and no serious labor trouble." 3

Germans living in Venezuela had claims against her which were assumed by the German Government; there were also British and Italian claims which had been assumed respectively by Great Britain and Italy so that the question of indemnity became one between governments. For our purpose, Italy may be left out of con

1 Report of Anthracite Coal Commission, 80 et seq.
2 Organized Labor, 394.
* Vol. i. 219.

sideration and our attention directed to Germany and Great Britain, between which the printed records of Foreign Relations show a community of interest and feeling. In 1901 these two powers offered a number of times to submit the dispute to arbitration and especially by the note of the German Government of July 16, 1901,1 but Venezuela refused such an offer. In 1902 Germany and Great Britain had a squadron of war-vessels off the Venezuelan coast for the purpose of collecting what was due their citizens. The story would be no other than one of shiftiness on the part of a South American power in her diplomacy and action were it not that the proceeding of the German Government in 1902 gave the occasion of a bout between the President and the Kaiser. In December, 1902, Venezuela desired arbitration, which now Germany did not want, and the suspicion of Roosevelt became aroused that she "intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms on the model of Kiauchau [Kiaochow] 2 with a view to exercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs generally."

England and Germany at this time threatened a blockade and on December 9, 1902, captured all of the Venezuelan war-vessels in the port of Caracas, her capital; and four days later, the united fleets bombarded the forts

1 Foreign Relations, 1904, 507.

Kiaochow Bay, a large inlet in China, "was seized in November, 1897, by the German fleet. . . . The bay and land on both sides of the entrance were leased to Germany for 99 years. During the continuance of the lease Germany exercises all the rights to territorial sovereignty, including the right to erect fortifications." Encyclopædia Britannica, xv. 783.

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