The Court of Inquiry into the disaster was composed of three members and a judge advocate of the American Navy. Captain William E. Sampson was at its head and another member was Captain French E. Chadwick, whose excellent book on "The Relations of the United States and Spain, Diplomacy," gives an account of the transaction. "The situation," wrote Chadwick, "precluded any haste, and the inquiry was carried on deliberately, carefully, and searchingly for twenty-three days and with every effort to reach a fair and just finding." The question in the official and public mind was, did the destruction take place from an external or an internal explosion? Chadwick was one of the two members of the Court who had thought the explosion was internal, and he and his colleague were convinced against their prepossessions." On March 28, 1898, Congress and the public were informed of the finding of the Court by a special message of the President to Congress. The Court determined that the disaster was not in any respect due to the fault or negligence of officers or crew. "In the opinion of the Court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. The Court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons." John D. Long, who at this time was Secretary of the Navy, in his book published in 1903, wrote: "The mystery of the loss of the Maine remains yet to be solved." Chadwick, however, had keener insight, writing in his *Senate Doc. Destruction of Battleship Maine. book published in 1909 that he "would welcome an examination of the wreck by a complete exposure of it as it lies. It could only result in substantiating the description of the injuries by the Court whose examination was too complete to leave chance of serious error." Chadwick's expressed wish was gratified. In 1911, by a fine piece of engineering, the wreck was exposed and a board of one army and four navy officers made an examination of it, reporting on December 1, 1911, that the destruction was due to "the explosion of a charge of a low form of explosive exterior to the ship. . . This resulted in igniting and exploding the contents of the 6-inch reserve magazine, said contents including a large quantity of black powder. The more or less complete explosion of the contents of the remaining forward magazines followed. The magazine explosions resulted in the destruction of the vessel." 2 Contemporaneous material and many later books attribute much influence to Senator Redfield Proctor's speech in the Senate on March 17, which, owing to the confidence reposed in him by the country, held their attention. "My trip," he said, "was entirely unofficial and of my own motion." Of the six provinces in Cuba, "my observations were confined to the four western provinces which constitute about one half of the island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the few fortified towns. . . . All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns 1 Chadwick, 563 n. House Docs. 62d Cong. 2d Sess. No. 310. when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family.. General Blanco's [the governor-general succeeding Weyler] order of November 13 last somewhat modifies the Weyler order but is of little or no practical benefit. . . . In fact though the order was issued four months ago I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning." "I am not in favor of annexation," he declared; and while Senator Proctor suggested no plan it is easy to see that intervention would have from him powerful support. "To me," he said, "the strongest appeal is not the barbarity practised by Weyler, nor the loss of the Maine . . . terrible as are both these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I• ever had knowledge." 1 The Spanish minister 2 in Washington was much impressed, telegraphing to the home government that Senator Proctor's speech had "produced great effect because of his temperate stand. He set forth in black colors the situation of the reconcentrados, declared that the country was opposed to autonomy and favorable to independence. Before making the speech he had seen the President 1 Cong. Record, 2916 et seq. Senator Proctor gave also the estimated population of Cuba with its racial divisions. He also discussed the military and political situations. Proctor had been Secretary of War under Harrison. 'Polo, who succeeded de Lôme. and Day, for which reason more importance is attached to his words. My impression is that the President will try to withstand the powerful public sentiment in favor of the insurrection." 1 2 As early as March 20 the President learned confidentially that the naval board would make a “unanimous report that the Maine was blown up by a submarine mine." This knowledge and Proctor's account dictated Day's midnight telegram of March 25 to Woodford at Madrid: "The concentration of men, women and children in the fortified towns and permitting them to starve is unbearable to a Christian nation geographically so close as ours to Cuba. . . It was represented to the President in November that the Blanco government would at once relieve the suffering and so modify the Weyler order as to permit those who were able to return to their homes and till the fields from which they had been driven. The reconcentration order has not been practically superseded. There is no hope of peace through Spanish arms. The Spanish government seems unable to conquer the insurgents. We do not want the island. .. 3 Peace is the desired end." Be it remembered that Congress, the country and Spain had the report of the Naval Board concerning the destruction of the Maine on Monday, March 28. Next day was submitted to the Spanish ministry what turned out to be the President's ultimatum. Premising that "the President instructs me to say that we do not want Cuba," Woodford said in conversation with Sagasta, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for the Colonies, who, . 1 Spanish Corr. and Docs., 95. 3 * Ibid., 704, 712. being well acquainted with English, acted as interpreter, "we do wish immediate peace in Cuba." The President "suggests an immediate armistice lasting until October 1, negotiations in the meantime being had looking to peace between Spain and the insurgents through the friendly offices of the President of the United States. He wishes the immediate revocation of the reconcentration order." With effect, does Chadwick, in recounting the history of the diplomacy of these days, speak of Spain's "fatal habit of procrastination." On March 31, two days after Woodford's conversation, she showed this in her answer to the President's reasonable request. Far from acceptance of the suggestion relating to the Armistice and consequent negotiations, it laid down propositions utterly inadmissible. Well did Woodford write to McKinley on April 1, "Yesterday's conference was a sorrow to me, for I have worked hard for peace." 1 2 On March 30, the day between the President's request and Spain's answer, Day apprised Woodford of the state of affairs in Washington. "You should know and fully appreciate," he telegraphed, "that there is profound feeling in Congress and the greatest apprehension on the part of most conservative members that a resolution for intervention may pass both branches in spite of any effort which can be made. Only assurance from the President that, if he fails in peaceful negotiations he will submit all the facts to Congress at a very early day, will prevent immediate action on the part of Congress." " It was evident that submission of the question to Congress meant a declaration of war against Spain. Public 1 P. 554. * Foreign Relations, 727. 3 3 Ibid., 721. |