as between the Army and Navy departments in Washington. When the Naval Board announced - an announcement which was endorsed by the Secretary — that it was better to sacrifice a number of soldiers rather than to lose one battleship, such an opinion was regarded as inhuman although probably based on good naval strategy. Shafter, appalled at the losses of July 1, did not want to sacrifice further his men, and desired Sampson to force an entrance into the harbor on the Farragut plan, which, on his part, Sampson did not want to do on account of the risk of losing a battleship. Shafter was ill and telegraphed to Washington on July 3: "I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days,1 but am retaining the command. . . . I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor and will have consultation with him this morning." 11 2 This conference was to be had at Shafter's headquarters, for which place Sampson on his armored cruiser, the New York, started on the morning of July 3. The port at which he proposed to land was eight miles from his position in the blockading squadron. No fortune could have been worse for Sampson. Since June 1 he had maintained a perfect blockade of Santiago Harbor. "The faithful search-light" made him feel secure at night. "When I wake up," he said, "and can see from where I lie the operation of the search-light, I can fall asleep quite contented, knowing that everything is all right." Among the eventualities which he considered, was the escape of

On July 4, after the naval battle of Santiago, Shafter wrote to the Adjutant-General in Washington, “I am still very much exhausted, eating a little this P.M. for the first time in four days." Chadwick, ii. 192. 2 Ibid., 109. 'Long, ii. 7.

ships from the harbor, and he had issued the order, "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore"; but he could have had no idea that the plan of battle which he had considered and carefully thought out would be put into force on that day. Not only was the commander-in-chief and his cruiser New York absent, but the Massachusetts had gone away forty miles in order to coal.

The Spanish squadron consisted of the armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón and two torpedo-boat destroyers; the American, of the armored cruiser Brooklyn, the battleships Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana and the auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen. The Spanish vessels came out of the harbor of Santiago on this Sunday morning, July 3, "a superb day," between 9.35 and 10; the flag-ship Maria Teresa was in advance and, following at a distance of about 800 yards, were the Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón and the Oquendo and at a greater distance the torpedo-boat destroyers. The men on the American ships were at Sunday "quarters for inspection," which was to be followed by divine service. But their officers were on the alert and, at the first sight of the Spaniards, the American ships, carrying out Sampson's standing orders, closed in and began the work of destruction which their careful labor of preparation and accurate firing enabled them to do. The Spaniards advanced with coolness and courage. The Maria Teresa "presented a magnificent appearance," wrote Robley Evans, Captain of the Iowa, and the fleet "came at us like mad

1

1 Long, ii. 7.

2 Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 295.

1

bulls." At first the fire of the Maria Teresa was rapid and accurate, but as the American fire "smothered" her, it grew "ragged and inaccurate." 2 "I felt sure," wrote Cervera, "that the disaster was inevitable . . . although I did not think our destruction would be so sudden." 3

Between ten and half past the Maria Teresa and Oquendo, "with large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the beach" when about seven miles from Santiago. At quarter past eleven the Vizcaya, when fifteen miles from Santiago, "turned in shore and was beached"; she "was burning fiercely and her reserves of ammunition were already beginning to explode." Meanwhile the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers had been smashed by the fire of the battleships and especially by that of the auxiliary, Gloucester, a converted yacht. Remained "the sleek foxy Colón," the "best and fastest vessel" of the Spanish fleet, which was overhauled by the Brooklyn and Oregon; at twenty minutes past one, forty-eight miles from Santiago, she hauled down her colors and surrendered.

"I regard," wrote Sampson in his Official Report, "this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt

seq.

1 A Sailor's Log, 445. 2 Ibid., 446.

3 Chadwick, ii. 138, 185.

• Admiral Sampson's Official Report, July 15. Crowninshield, 507 et

Spears, Our Navy in the War with Spain, 319.

6 Sampson.

to escape at night and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight." 1

President Roosevelt, with a comprehension of naval affairs such as few or no civilians had, after a careful review of all the facts, wrote, "It was a captains' fight." "

The casualties of the Spanish squadron, which numbered 2227, did not exceed 474 and were probably fewer; the American loss was one killed, one seriously wounded." "It is safe to say," wrote H. W. Wilson, an English authority, "that most Englishmen, with their knowledge of 1812 and the feats of the Civil War, confidently expected the Americans to win. It is equally safe to say that no one anticipated that two important victories would be secured at the cost of but one American life. After less than five hours' fighting a modern squadron was completely annihilated with infinitesimal loss and infinitesimal damage to the victors. It is the low cost at which victory was purchased that renders this great battle so honorable to the American Navy." 4

The naval battle of Santiago was a great victory and decisive of the war. "Do not Europeans regard us as barbarians?" was asked of a man, who, though not a

1 Crowninshield, 509. Secretary Long wrote: "The battle of July 3 was actually fought and the great victory won in accordance with the plan of the commander-in-chief," ii. 8. President Roosevelt wrote, Feb. 18, 1902: "Sampson's real claim for credit rests upon his work as commander-in-chief; upon the excellence of the blockade; upon the preparedness of the squadron; upon the arrangement of the ships head-on in a semicircle around the harbor; and the standing order with which they instantly moved to the attack of the Spaniards when the latter appeared." Long, ii. 208.

'Long, ii. 208.

'Chadwick, ii. 176. According to Spanish authority the Spaniards had 323 killed and 151 wounded.

'The Downfall of Spain, 69, 334.

native American, had passed enough time in the United States to speak and write English well and, although devoted artistically to Europe, had gained a thorough comprehension of Americans. 'They did," was the reply, "until you smashed two Spanish fleets, but they think so no longer." Such is the judgment of the civilized world. Our work toward the elevation of humanity, toward the greater diffusion of education, are counted as naught in contrast with these naval victories.

1

Noteworthy as was the victory of Santiago it was supplemented by humane action. "As the Maria Teresa struck the rock, the tars of the Texas began to cheer." But their Captain Philip exclaimed, "Don't cheer, boys; the poor devils are dying." When Captain Robley Evans instantly handed back the surrendered sword to the Captain of the Vizcaya, his "blue shirts" cheered lustily." "So long," he wrote in his report of July 4, "as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women." 3 "This rescue of prisoners," wrote Admiral Sampson in his report, "including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete." 4 Cervera in his report eulogized

1 Long, ii. 39.

A Sailor's Log, 451. 4 Crowninshield, 509.

• Crowninshield, 539.