HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE. CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. MORAL PHILOSOPHY is usually defined to be that part of knowledge which relates to human conduct; treats of the motives which appertain to that conduct; and to what ends and purposes it ought to be directed. Casting our eyes over the actual condition of the human race, so far as personal observation or the observations of others enable us to do so, we see a wonderful difference in their external appearances, habits of life, and mental capacity and acquirements. From the rude wanderer on the bleak B and inhospitable shores of Terra del Fuego, to the intelligent philosopher or statesman in the polished and luxuriant European city, we perceive a wide disparity of nature and condition. But this apparent chasm is filled with various grades of human beings, approximating to each other in bodily appearances and modes of life, so as to present to us such a gradual variation of outline, and a unity of appearance and design, as to force the conclusion on our minds that they are all of the same family or species; and that the varieties we perceive arise more from incidental circumstances than from any general differences in human constitutions. But great and numerous as the differences are in bodily make, colour, modes of life, tastes and habits; yet the moral diversities of our race appear, on a superficial glance, to be still greater, and of a more marked and striking character-we see the inhabitants of one nation performing actions which they consider meritorious and praiseworthy; but which another race of people hold in abhorrence and execration. There are hardly to be found two distinct communities of individuals upon the face of the earth, who have the same standard of right and wrong, or who seem to be actuated by the same passions, feelings, and dispositions. But if we accustom ourselves to look a little beneath the surface of this seeming discordancy, and contrariety of moral feeling and sentiment, we will soon recognise some leading principles of agreement, which exert their influence over every cast and condition of human nature, with a force and precision corresponding to the instincts implanted in the inferior orders of creation-we will see that the moral differences among our race are of an accidental nature, and arise principally from the different external circumstances in which we are placed, and from the different degrees of intellectual vigour imparted to us. These general principles which run through the whole of human nature, in all its modes of existence, manifest themselves in a variety of ways, and form the ground-work of all our reasonings and conclusions respecting the moral conduct of mankind; of their various capabilities of improvements; and of those means which are calculated either to accelerate or retard their present or everlasting welfare. These principles give unity and design to the moral world; convert anomalous and discordant appearances into harmonious agreement; and, in fact, enable us to speak a language intelligible to all mankind, and to move, by one common impulse of sympathy, the affections and feelings of every human being, under whatever clime he may reside. Though a general principle be clearly discernible running through the whole of human nature, and the leading grounds of moral obligation and duty be recognised by all mankind, yet nothing has caused more extended discussions, than inquiries as to the nature of this principle of congruity, and by what name it should be designated. We see clearly from the present, as well as from the history of the past condition of our race, that various interpretations are given to what is meant by the words right and wrong; that mankind differ widely as to their opinions respecting these objects which constitute good and evil; and that they are by no means agreed as to the course of conduct which is most likely to secure the one, or avoid the other. The cause of this discrepancy in the opinions of men as to moral objects, arises partly from the constituted order of things, and partly from mankind being influenced in their general judgments by prejudices, partial examinations of facts, and by paying more attention to insulated and momentary feelings and passions, than they ought to do. Moral philosophy is the same as natural philosophy in one essential particular, namely, that it is built upon observation and fact. The moral rules and principles which are laid down, are all drawn from the nature of man, as that nature is unfolded to us by observation and experiment. In both cases we place nature in a certain situation, and our knowledge consists in perceiving and faithfully registering the results of the experiment. To know men thoroughly, we must just follow the same plan as we do when we want to know the nature of any other creature, or any piece of machinery. We must learn the particular construction of the animal or machine; observe the parts of which the one or the other is composed; see their joint action; and then draw inferences as to the determination of the whole. The science of morals is one so intimately blended and connected with doctrines of such great importance to man, that the cultivation of it cannot but recommend itself to every well-disposed heart, and lover of true wisdom. This study, more perhaps than any other, is calculated to elevate the mind and purify the affections; to give us the most lofty and exalted ideas of our own nature, and of the situation we hold in the scale of being; and to remove the mind from all those ignoble, mean and degrading trains of thought, which lead men into |