resemblances of these qualities, and that our ideas of secondary qualities are not. By our ideas of primary qualities being resemblances, I think he is desirous to prove that our notions of the primary qualities are always the same in all individuals, and in all states of the mind. "We may understand," says he, "how it is possible that the same water may, at the same time, produce the sensation of heat in the one hand, and cold in the other, which yet figure never does." Upon the justness of this opinion which I have ascribed to Locke, I will not at present insist; but his writings on this subject clearly go to prove, that if he did consider our ideas of primary qualities to be resemblances of these qualities, he did not consider the secondary ones in this light, for he himself says they are not resemblances. But Dr. Reid maintains that he did consider secondary qualities, such as heat, coolness, sweet, bitter, &c., to be real copies of external things. The Doctor says, "As to objects of sight, I understand what is meant by an image of their figure in the brain; but how shall we conceive an image of their colour where there is total darkness? And as to all other objects of sense, except figure and colour, I am unable to conceive what is meant by an image of them. Let any man say

what he means by an image of heat and cold, an image of hardness and softness, an image of sound, or smell, or taste. The word image, when applied to these objects, has absolutely no meaning." This is a very strange misapprehension of the doctrines of Locke and his disciples. In what part of any of their writings do they say that we have images of tastes, of smell, of sound, of heat, and of softness? One would almost be led to believe that the Doctor had never read any of the works of the philosophers, of what he calls the ideal system. This quotation constrains us to acquiesce in the opinion of Dr. Priestley, expressed twenty-five years ago, respecting the value of Dr. Reid's writings about ideas; namely, that he was not combating an opinion of Locke's, but a chimera of his own understanding.*

There are, undoubtedly, a few detached passages in his work, which, if literally applied, may give some countenance to the opinion that he meant idea to stand for image; but still these few passages ought not to be put in opposition to the whole scope and tenor of his Essay. I can conceive it possible, (and it is scarcely within the range of

* See Priestley's Examination of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald.

possibility,) that he might think our ideas of extension, solidity, heat, colour, and other primary and secondary qualities of matter, to be images of these qualities; but how am I to think he meant the same by idea, when he treats of the existence and attributes of the Deity, the passions and propensities of men, and the various duties enjoined on us by religion and morality? I cannot conceive he should employ the word idea on these subjects, but in the same sense that we now employ the words notion, thought, and conception. If this be the case, we may safely conclude that he would not have attached a meaning so widely different, without such a difference of meaning being intimated to his readers.

But let us hear what he has further to say himself about the nature of ideas. He seems, from the passage I am going to transcribe, to have almost anticipated these misapprehensions of his opinions, which have been so long current in the world. "To discover the nature," says he, "of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in bodies that cause such perceptions in us, that so we MAY NOT THINK, (as

perhaps usually is done,) THAT THEY ARE EXACTLY

THE IMAGES AND RESEMBLANCES OF SOMETHING IN

HERENT IN THE SUBJECT; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet, upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us."*

140

CHAPTER VIII.

ORIGIN OF EVIL.

ARCHBISHOP KING.

WILLIAM KING was descended from a Scotch family, and was born at Antrim in 1650; and having finished the early part of his education, he was removed in 1667 to Trinity College, Dublin, to pursue his academical studies. Having received priest's orders, in 1674, from the Archbishop of Tuam, he was collated by his patron to a prebend in his own church; and when the Archbishop was advanced to the see of Dublin, Mr. King was preferred to the Chancellorship of St. Patrick, and to other valuable benefices. His learning and abilities qualified him to become a powerful champion in defence of the protestant religion, by the publication of three tracts. While he was engaged in this controversy, he was elected dean of St. Patrick;