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numerous English reprobates can be countervailed by the missionaries of the Church and Wesleyan Societies, judicious and zealous as their exertions are testified to be. Mr. P. insists, urgently, on the necessity of a formal enterprise of colonization, armed with a strong official power, to exercise a coercion over the English propagators of vice and ruin; to protect the natives while endeavouring to civilise them; and to promote cultivation and commerce on a large regular plan; having, in the first instance, obtained by purchase an extensive portion of land. He asserts that such an occupancy would be very acceptable to many of the natives; who can understand that it would be a great benefit to have European improvements introduced among them; to have a traffic secured on equitable regulations; and even to have put over them, or at least to have among them, a foreign authority, able to interpose for the repression of the disorders which are rapidly working their destruction.

Under the auspices of such an establishment, to some extent lords of the soil, with great maritime resources and facilities, and gradually diffusing a mitigating and pacifying influence among the barbarous population, our author thinks the country would be a fine field for emigrants. He expatiates on its fertility, the adaptation of its various climates to all the vegetable productions of necessity or luxury; its noble forests, its thickets of flax growing without cultivation; its beautiful scenery; its commodious harbours. It is placed in strongly advantageous contrast with all but a very minor portion of the Auste man continent; of which it is mortifying to find so vast a proportion doomed to perpetual sterility for want of water; while certain tracts warn off all but the moveable scantling of human existence, by a liability to transient deluges. It is mentioned in favor of New Zealand that it is fitted to be an advantageous point or centre of connexion between our already established colonies and the numerous islands of the Pacific Ocean.

Mr. P. does not take any pains to obviate the fearful apprehensions that might arise in the minds of persons looking to emigration, at the thought of seeking a home in the midst of such a ferocious race. But he assumes, with a facility and confidence which we wish we could share, that these formidable neighbours will speedily divest themselves of their infamous habits; will renounce their favorite amusement of wholesale and retail assassination; will addict themselves with a ready good will to agriculture, the mechanic arts, and traffic; will generally, within a generation or two, learn the English language; and will sweep away their trumpery of atuas, priests, conjurers, and that vexatious annoyance of the taboo, which is encountering every poor mortal at every turn. They are ambitious of acquiring something of what gives the Europeans so evident a superiority. And our author

has seen some of their performances in the nicer parts of carpentry-work, which excelled those they imitated, and greatly elated the vanity of the workmen. Numbers of them are employed in the South Sea whaling and trading vessels ; and soon become as competent to the service, in all its parts, as any other hands on board.

It is highly satisfactory to see in forward preparation, on a respectable scale, and under liberal and powerful patronage, such a scheme as our author recommends. To be sure, we have already colonies more than enough for the purposes of exhibiting bad government, draining the national treasury, instituting episcopal sees, and rendering us vulnerable at so many points to any enemy hereafter powerful at sea. But one really cannot help being sorry that so fine a tract of earth should be worse than useless on the planet, so capable and reclaimable a race of creatures abandoned to destruction, and a large portion of our own population, the while, in desperate competition for bits of ground" to subsist upon.

We ought to have noticed more expressly that our author always speaks of the Missionaries in strong terms of approbation and applause. Besides the general salutary tendency of their labours (but within a sphere by necessity so limited), he mentions various instances of their beneficial interference to prevent deeds of violence, and allay the passions of hostile parties.

The book is very brdsomely printed, and furnished with a map and a few illustrative ones.

Art. III. On the Philosophy of the Mind. By James Douglas, Esq.,

of Cavers. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1839. 8vo. pp. 387. IN N the eager pursuit of physical science, (to say nothing of the

keenness and intensity of feeling with which men now a-days throng the scenes of business, and engage in the conflicts of politics,) the philosophy of the mind has been recently almost forgotten. Nothing, not even poetry, has been such a drug in the literary market, or has stood so little chance of obtaining a fair hearing, as metaphysics.

We are persuaded that this depreciation, or rather neglect,the result partly of the spirit of the times, partly of the impatience with which the generality of men throw from them whatever requires hard thinking—is of ill omen to the interests of a thorough education. We are not, we hope, disposed to overrate the advantages promised by the study of this science, or to exalt it at the expense of others, – the great error into which the advocates of any particular branch of study are so apt to fall. We have learnt at least this great lesson from the study of mental philosophy, and from a survey of man's intellectual powers, not to depreciate any

VOL. VI.

E

one of the few totally different methods of instruction which, being addressed to different parts of the mental constitution, secure for (ach its appropriate discipline, and for the whole a more harmonious and perfect development. Such results as these constitute the chief benefits of education, in comparison with which the mere amount of knowledge—the number of facts imparted in the course of it, are of but secondary importance. The principal methods by which this discipline may be most effectually secured, appear to us, the study of languages, of mathematics, and mental philosophy, including, of course, in the last, the principles which lie at the basis of logic, grammar, and rhetoric. While each of these three great methods of intellectual discipline make demands upon all the powers of the mind, each has its principal strain rather upon some than others. It is true that both mathematics and mental science, principally tend to strengthen the powers of abstraction and generalization; but each, also, involves processes of mind in degree at least peculiar to itself.

While mathematics principally teach the knack of ready logical inference, the data being comparatively few, narrow, and certain, mental philosophy cherishes the habit of cautious induction. This is required by the complexity and subtlety of the phenomena with which it has to deal; and it is a habit of immense importance in every branch of moral science. And though both studies tend principally to exercise the powers of abstraction, it is in very different ways.

Mental philosophy, by the very nature of the investigations which it involves, by the fleeting, subtle, and evanescent character of the thoughts and emotions subjected to its analysis, by the infrequency and reluctance with which men attempt the painful work of introspection, and not least by the absence of all symbols to illustrate the processes of intellect, makes a still stronger demand on abstraction than even the mathematics. In the same manner, the attempt to analyze and to classify phenomena so complex and so transient, affords the highest exercise to the powers of generalization, while the attempt to express these processes and results in language, necessitates habitual caution in the definition and employment of terms. Now, all this we say is a great and important kind of discipline, the benefit of which is not lost nor even diminished by the alleged uncertainty of the study. The analysis of the mental phenomena may be, in a particular case, very unsatisfactory, and the requisite exactness of expression perhaps, in all cases, impossible; it is the habits, nurtured by such pursuits, which constitute the great benefit, not the certainty of the knowledge acquired in them. It is the very difficulties of the subject--difficulties, perhaps, never to be wholly surmounted, which principally render it worthy of attention at all. It is these which have slowly taught the patience, caution, and accuracy which, when transferred to other and more easy subjects of investigation,

are of immense value, but would never be acquired by attention to such easy subjects. With regard to the faculty of correctly appreciating and weighing moral evidence, there can, of course, be little question as to the superiority of the benefits conferred by the study of mental philosophy over those conferred by the study of the mathematics. The very exactness which the mathematics demand, and which is unattainable when we have only probabilities to deal with, often renders a man who has never disciplined his powers of abstraction and reasoning by anything, except the mathematics, unfit for this rough moral computation. This observation is trite, but not less true; and the history of several mathematicians who, with little in their heads but mathematics, have been intrusted with the management of civil or politicalaffairs, singularly confirms it. A not less striking illustration of its value in this respect though we are not aware that it has ever been noticed, is found in the fact, that there is scarcely any writer who has elicited any new truths, or very successfully illustrated old ones, in the several departments of theology, ethics, politics, and political economy, who has not, in the course of his education, paid marked attention to metaphysical inquiries. Most of them have made some attainments in mathematics, a few of them very considerable attainments. This we think right, because we hold the mathematics, like mental philosophy, to be a peculiar, indispensable, and in all respects highly valuable discipline of mind. But the force of our argument, as showing the peculiar relation of the study of the mind to the successful prosecution of the moral sciences, lies in this; first, that we are not aware of any writers, who having neglected this study, have been marked by decided eminence in these branches of science; and, secondly, that almost all who have attained such eminence, have been distinguished by their attention to it. And be it observed, that the success or the failure of the individual speculator in metaphysics, is, in our view, of little consequence; we having placed the chief benefit of intellectual philosophy in the discipline it imparts. Of the many examples which we might cite from the history of our own country alone, in confirmation of this argument, we need mention only the names of Bacon, Locke, Barrow, Chillingworth, Butler, Adam Smith, and most of our greatest lawyers and political economists. As, in our view, mental philosophy holds such an important place as a discipline and preparation for the successful prosecution of the moral sciences, so do the mathematics hold an equally important place in relation to the physical sciences; and similar examples from history would confirm this view also.

Though we regard the study of mental philosophy to be valuable principally as a discipline, it is not solely as a discipline that it is of value. Endless as are its logomachies, and numerous as are its disputes which, though not logomachies, are scarcely

one of the few totally different methods of instruction which, being addressed to different parts of the mental constitution, secure for ( ach its appropriate discipline, and for the whole a more harmonious and perfect development. Such results as these constitute the chief benefits of education, in comparison with which the mere amount of knowledge—the number of facts imparted in the course of it, are of but secondary importance. The principal methods by which this discipline may be most effectually secured, appear to us, the study of languages, of mathematics, and mental philosophy, including, of course, in the last, the principles which lie at the basis of logic, grammar, and rhetoric. While each of these three great methods of intellectual discipline make demands upon all the powers of the mind, each has its principal strain rather upon some than others. It is true that both mathematics and mental science, principally tend to strengthen the powers of abstraction and generalization; but each, also, involves processes of mind in degree at least peculiar to itself.

While mathematics principally teach the knack of ready logical inference, the data being comparatively few, narrow, and certain, mental philosophy cherishes the habit of cautious induction. This is required by the complexity and subtlety of the phenomena with which it has to deal; and it is a habit of immense importance in every branch of moral science. And though both studies tend principally to exercise the powers of abstraction, it is in very different ways.

Mental philosophy, by the very nature of the investigations which it involves, by the fleeting, subtle, and evanescent character of the thoughts and emotions subjected to its analysis, by the infrequency and reluctance with which men attempt the painful work of introspection, and not least by the absence of all symbols to illustrate the processes of intellect, makes a still stronger demand on abstraction than even the mathematics. In the same manner, the attempt to analyze and to classify phenomena so complex and so transient, affords the highest exercise to the powers of generalization, while the attempt to express these processes and results in language, necessitates habitual caution in the definition and employment of terms. Now, all this we say is a great and important kind of discipline, the benefit of which is not lost nor even diminished by the alleged uncertainty of the study. The analysis of the mental phenomena may be, in a particular case, very unsatisfactory, and the requisite exactness of expression perhaps, in all cases, impossible; it is the habits, nurtured by such pursuits, which constitute the great benefit, not the certainty of the knowledge acquired in them. It is the very difficulties of the subject--difficulties, perhaps, never to be wholly surmounted, -which principally render it worthy of attention at all. It is these which have slowly taught the patience, caution, and accuracy which, when transferred to other and more easy subjects of investigation,

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