ページの画像
PDF
ePub

Bramhall, with whom he had a controversy on the subject, he says:

"Of the arguments from reason, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno's beating of his man, which is therefore called Argumentum Baculinum, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this: Zeno held that all actions were necessary: his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer.

"The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion.

"The first inconvenience, he says, is this, that the laws which prohibit any action will be unjust.

"2. That all consultations are vain.

"3. That admonitions to men of understanding are of no more use than to children, fools, and madmen.

"4. That praise, dispraise, reward and punishment are in vain.

"5 and 6. That counsels, arts, arms, books,

instruments, study, tutors, medicines are in vain."

Hobbes's answer to these conclusions is I think quite satisfactory. He says—

"To which arguments his Lordship, expecting I should answer by saying, 'the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means,' adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words, Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?' Wherein his Lordship says right but my answer is not that which he expecteth. I

answer:

"First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the laws that prohibit it unjust. To let pass that not the necessity, but the will to break the law maketh the action unjust, because the law regardeth the will and no other antecedent cause of action, and to let pass that no law can possibly be unjust, inasmuch as every man maketh (by his consent) the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself;-I say, what necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may be justly punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man who by the

strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from stealing? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice? To make the law is therefore to make a cause of justice, and to necessitate justice, and consequently 'tis no injustice to make such a law. The intention of the law is not to grieve the delinquent for what is past and not to be undone; but to make him and others just that else would not be so; and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come. Insomuch as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent would justify his killing in the sight of God.

say

"Secondly, I deny that it maketh consultations to be vain. "Tis the consultation that causeth a man and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a man that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus: 'If I must do this rather than that, I shall do it though I consult not at all;' which is a false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this: If I shall live

till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day.' If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what cause it shall be chosen, which cause for the most part is deliberation or consultation; and therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more necessitated, if more and less had any place in necessity.

"The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience, namely, that admonitions are in vain: for admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time to him that is admonished.

"The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that praise, dispraise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good; good, I say, for me or for some body else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as

I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will of the state, that is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me or him or the commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity? Things may therefore be necessary, and yet praiseworthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, when he says that he was good by nature, et quia aliter esse non potuit.

"To the last objection, that counsels, arts, arms, instruments, books, study, medicines, and the like would be superfluous, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this consequence, if the effect shall come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts, arms. &c. are the causes of those effects."-Page 291.

"His Lordship's third argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow, namely, impiety, and negligence of religious duties, as repentance and zeal to God's service, &c. To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest

« 前へ次へ »