LETTER XI. ABSTRACTION. Different modes of reasoning.-Use of general terms.-Generalization : its peculiar advantages illustrated.-Deficiency in the power of abstraction its consequences, &c. THE subject upon which I am now to enter, has so seldom been addressed to any but the learned, and so seldom treated of but in the abstruse language of metaphysicians, that to render it familiar to such as have never been accustomed to read, to converse, or to think upon the operations of the human mind, may be not a little difficult. I am, however, encouraged to hope, that the difficulty is not altogether insurmountable,being fully persuaded, that many who never heard the term ABSTRACTION made use of, except where it was meant to denote absence of mind, are, nevertheless, possessed of the faculty, and capable of employing it to the best purposes. Such readers may, perhaps, be as much surprised to find themselves in the number of abstract reasoners, as a certain good lady was, on obtaining from a friend an explanation of the word prose. "Bless me !" cried she in great astonishment, "is it possible that I have been talking prose all my life, without knowing it!" If a few have been in the habit of reasoning without knowing it, it is probable, that a still greater number may have been led into an opposite error, and been accustomed to consider that as reasoning, which in fact, was nothing but assertion. It is by 17 VOL. II. : reflection only, that we can be made to perceive the difference and if the conductors of education are not capable of this reflection, it is not to be expected that the reasoning powers of the pupils will ever be properly or effectually cultivated. In treating this important subject, I shall, in the first place, endeavour to distinguish betwixt that exercise of reasoning which is confined to particulars, and which is in reality only another mode of exercising the faculty of judgment; and those more general reasonings which include the exercise of abstraction. I shall then attempt to explain the use and the advantages of generalizing; and having stated and examined the objections which may be made to the cultivation of this faculty in our own sex, and shown it to be essentially necessary in the conduct of life, I shall conclude, by offering such hints as may suggest themselves for its improve ment. Though the terms judgment and reason are frequently applied indiscriminately in familiar conversation, we must endeavour to keep their appropriate signification in mind, in order to have a distinct notion of their several operations. We have already seen, that it is the province of judgment to decide on the truth or falsehood of single propositions. From one or more of these judgments, reason deduces a consequence or argument which must partake of the nature of the judgments. If these have been just and accurate, the argument deduced from them must be convincing: if the judgments have been erroneous, the inference must be false. Reasoning has, by a learned and respected Author, who evinces all its powers,* been * Rev. Dr. Gregory. termed, "the arithmetic of words," and by this happy illustration, a more distinct idea of its operations is conveyed, than by the most voluminous explanations I have ever met with. To those who have never considered the subject, an example may not, however, be altogether unnecessary. I shall take it from the ablest of logicians, St. Paul; and beg you to turn to the account that is given in the Acts of the Apostles of his address to the Athenians. When brought before the most celebrated tribunal of antiquity, to answer to the accusation that was made against him, of being a worshipper of strange gods, observe with what exquisite judg.. ment he manages his defence! All the arguments he makes use of, are obvious deductions from a series of judgments, the truth of which were every one acknowledged by his opponents, who, therefore, heard him with patience, and probably with admiration, until he came to speak of the resurrection from the dead; which appearing to their uninformed or prejudiced minds in the light of an unsupported assertion, was not acknowledged by the multitude to be a just inference from the antecedent propositions. But though "some mocked," and others said, "we will hear thee again on this matter," nevertheless, "certain men clave unto him and believed." An excellent account of the reception which just reasoning, when it opposes the passions and prejudices of mankind, is destined to meet with from the world! If one error in the judgments from which we reason, has a like influence upon our deductions as the mistake of a single figure has in casting up a sum, it follows, that the cultivation of judgment ought as certainly to precede that of reasoning, as the knowledge of figures ought to proceed the at tempt at addition. I should rejoice in being convinced, that it never happened otherwise in education ; and that parents never deceived themselves into the belief, that their children deduced sensible inferences from propositions, which, so far from assenting to, they did not even understand. If sound judgment be essential to that species of reasoning which is confined to particulars, it is still more so, when the mind, losing the consideration of particulars, enters into the wide field of general reasoning. It is here that the faculty of abstraction comes into exercise; for without abstraction there could be no general reasoning; and consequently no general principles, nor comprehensive views of the tendency of doctrine or of conduct. Abstraction, as defined by Mr. Locke, is "that power which the mind has of separating an idea from all other ideas that accompanies it in his real existence." Thus, for instance, colour always exists in company with something coloured: but we can think and talk of the beauty of purple, or of lilac, without combining the idea of these colours with a bonnet or a ribbon and when we think of the colour independently of the body that is coloured, it is an exercise of abstraction. When we speak of the duty of man as an accountable agent, or a member of society, we do not speak of the duty of John, or Thomas, or any individual, but of man, from an abstract consideration of his powers and situation. Here it is evident, that besides the accuracy of the judgments from which we deduce our argument, much will depend upon the ideas we attach to the word duty : if these are just, appropriate, and comprehensive, and our ideas of the powers which we attribute to man, as a species, be the same, our reasonings will be just and true: but if we have inaccurate or erroneous ideas concerning either of the terms made use of, our reasonings will be absurd and inconclusive. Thus we see, that as in every process of abstract reasoning we must of necessity have the mind employed upon the consideration of general terms, it is absolutely necessary that the mind should acquire clear, definite, and accurate conceptions of the meaning of words, without which requisite preliminary we can neither reason or understand the reasonings of others. "The classification of different objects supposes a power of attending to some of their qualities or attributes without attending to the rest, for no two objects are to be found without some specific difference; and no assortment or arrangement can be formed among things not perfectly alike, but by losing sight of their distinguishing peculiarities, and limiting the attention to those attributes which belong to them in common." That this power of attending to some general qualities characteristic of a species, so as to arrange all the individuals in which it is found into one distinct class, has been slowly and gradually attained by human reason, is obvious; as even with regard to those objects with which they are most conversant, the generality of mankind have as yet very imperfect notions concerning it. In the first stage of society, the poverty of language and of ideas probably afforded no other classification than the simple one of animate and inanimate. In the second the animal creation would probably be divided into man and beast; by * Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. 17* VOL. II. |