may or may not be inferred from the fact, ac-asmuch as there is a distinction between our cording to the views of the inquirer. The feelings of pain, resistance, &c., and our coninquiry is an inquiry into the functions and ception and belief of real external existences; operations of mind; and all that can possibly But they differ merely as one affection of be stated as fact on such an occasion, must re- mind may differ from another; and it is plainly late to the state and affections of mind only: unwarrantable to assume the real existence But to assume the existence of a material of external objects as a part of the statement world, in order afterwards to define one func- of a purely intellectual phenomenon. After tion of mind to be that by which it discovers allowing the reality of this distinction, there material qualities, is evidently blending hy-is still room therefore for considering the pothesis in the statement, and prejudging the controversy by assumption. The fact itself, we really conceive not to be liable to any kind of doubt or dispute; and yet the statement of it, obvious as it is, seems calculated to retrench a good deal from each of the opposite assertions. The fact, if we be not greatly mistaken, is confessedly as follows.

covering its qualities. The instinctive and insurmountable belief that we have of its existence, certainly is not to be surrendered, merely because it is possible to suppose it erroneous; or difficult to comprehend how a material and immaterial substance can act upon each other. The evidence of this universal and irresistible belief, in short, is not to be altogether disregarded; and, unless it can be shown that it leads to actual contradictions and absurdities, the utmost length that philosophy can warrantably go, is to conclude that it may be delusive; but that it may also be true.

This is the legitimate and inevitable termination of that determined scepticism which refuses to believe any thing without the highest of all evidence, and chooses to conclude positively that every thing is not, which may possibly be conceived not to be. The process of reasoning which it implies, is neither long nor intricate; and its conclusion would be undeniably just, if every thing was necessarily true which could be asserted without a contradiction. It is perfectly true, that we are absolutely sure of nothing but what we feel at the present moment; and that it is possible to distinguish between the evidence we have The rigorous maxim, of giving no faith to for the existence of the present impression, any thing short of direct and immediate con- and the evidence of any other existence. The sciousness, seems more calculated, we think, first alone is complete and unquestionable; to perplex than to simplify our philosophy, we may hesitate about all the rest without and will run us up, in two vast strides, to the any absolute contradiction. But the distincvery brink of absolute annihilation. We deny tion, we apprehend, is in itself of as little use the existence of the material world, because in philosophy, as in ordinary life; and the abwe have not for it the primary evidence of solute and positive denial of all existence, consciousness; and because the clear concep- except that of our immediate sensation, altotion and indestructible belief we have of it, gether rash and unwarranted. The objects may be fallacious, for any thing we can prove of our perception and of our recollection, certo the contrary. This conclusion annihilates tainly may exist, although we cannot demonat once all external objects; and, among strate that they must; and when in spite of them, our own bodies, and the bodies and all our abstractions, we find that we must minds of all other men; for it is quite evident come back, and not only reason with our felthat we can have no evidence of the exist- low creatures as separate existences, but enence of other minds, except through the me-gage daily in speculations about the qualities diation of the matter they are supposed to and properties of matter, it must appear, at animate; and if matter be nothing more than least, an unprofitable refinement which would an affection of our own minds, there is an end lead us to dwell much on the possibility of to the existence of every other. This first step, their nonexistence. There is no sceptic, protherefore, reduces the whole universe to the bably, who would be bold enough to maintain, mind of the individual reasoner; and leaves that this single doctrine of the nonexistence no existence in nature, but one mind, with its of any thing but our present impressions, compliment of sensations and ideas. The would constitute a just or useful system of second step goes still farther; and no one can logic and moral philosophy; and if, after hesitate to take it, who has ventured deliber- flourishing with it as an unfruitful paradox in ately on the first. If our senses may deceive the outset, we are obliged to recur to the or us, so may our memory:-if we will not be-dinary course of observation and conjecture lieve in the existence of matter, because it is as to the nature of our faculties, it may be not vouched by internal consciousness, and doubted whether any real benefit has been because it is conceivable that it should not derived from its promulgation, or whether the exist, we cannot consistently believe in the hypothesis can be received into any sober reality of any past impression: for which, in system of philosophy. To deny the existence like manner, we cannot have the direct evi- of matter and of mind, indeed, is not to phi dence of consciousness, and of which our losophise, but to destroy the materials of phipresent recollection may possibly be falla-losophy. It requires no extraordinary incious. Even upon the vulgar hypothesis, we know that memory is much more deceitful than perception; and there is still greater hazard in assuming the reality of any past existence from our present recollection of it, than in relying on the reality of a present existence from our immediate perception. If we discredit our memory, however, and deny all existence of which we have not a present consciousness or sensation, it is evident that we must annihilate our own personal identity, and refuse to believe that we had thought or sensation at any previous moment. There can be no reasoning, therefore, nor knowledge, nor opinion; and we must end by virtually annihilating ourselves, and denying that any thing whatsoever exists in nature, but the present solitary and momentary impression.

genuity or power of reasoning to perceive the grounds upon which their existence may be doubted; but we acknowledge that we cannot see how it can be said to have been disproved ; and think we perceive very clearly, that philosophy will neither be simplified nor abridged by refusing to take it for granted.

Upon the whole, then, we are inclined to think, that the conception and belief which we have of material objects (which is what we mean by the perception of them) does not amount to a complete proof of their existence, but renders it sufficiently probable: that the superior and complete assurance we have of the existence of our present sensations, does by no means entitle us positively to deny the reality of every other existence; and that as this speculative scepticism neither renders us independent of the ordinary modes of investi

gation, nor assists us materially in the use of | them, it is inexpedient to dwell long upon it in the course of our philosophical inquiries, and much more advisable to proceed upon the supposition that the real condition of things is conformable to our natural apprehensions.

Now, nothing, we conceive, is more obvious than the fallacy of this reasoning. The l king, or disliking, of men to a particular object, has nothing to do with the perception of its external qualities; and they may differ en tirely as to their opinion of its agreeableness, The little sketch we have now ventured to though they concur perfectly as to the de offer of the abstract, or thorough-going phi-scription of all its properties. One man may losophy of scepticism, will render it unneces- admire a tall woman, and another a short one; sary for us to follow our author minutely but it would be rather rash to infer, that they through the different branches of this inquiry. did not agree in recognising a difference in Overlooking, or at least undervaluing the in-stature, or that they had no uniform ideas of disputable fact, that our sensations are uni- magnitude in general. In the same way, one formly accompanied with a distinct apprehen-person may have an antipathy to salt, and sion, and firm belief in the existence of real external objects, he endeavours to prove, that the qualities which we ascribe to them are in reality nothing more than names for our peculiar sensations; and maintains accordingly, that because men differ in their opinions of the same object, it is impossible to suppose that they actually perceive any real object at all; as a real existence must always appear the same to those who actually perceive it.

another a liking for it; but they both perceive it to be salt, and both agree in describing it by that appellation. To give any degree of plausibility to Mr. Drummond's inferences, it would be necessary for him to show that some men thought brandy and Cayenne pepper insipid and tasteless, and objected at the same time to milk and spring water as excessively acrid and pungent.

In the concluding part of his book, Mr. His illustrations are of this nature. Water, Drummond undertakes nothing less than a which feels tepid to a Laplander, would appear defence of the theory of Ideas, against the cold to a native of Sumatra: But the same arguments of Dr. Reid. This is a bold at water cannot be both hot and cold: therefore tempt; but, we are inclined to think, not a it is to be inferred that neither of them is successful one. Mr. Drummond begins with affected by any real quality in the external the old axiom, that nothing can act but where body, but that each describes merely his it is; and infers, that as real material objects own sensations. Now, the conclusion here is cannot penetrate to the seat of the soul, that plainly altogether unwarranted by the fact; sentient principle can only perceive certain since it is quite certain that both the persons images or ideas of them; against the assumpin question perceive the same quality in the tion of which he conceives there can be no water, though they are affected by it in a dif- considerable obstacle. Now, it is needless, ferent manner. The solution of the whole we think, to investigate the legitimacy of this puzzle is, that heat and cold are not different reasoning very narrowly, because the foundaqualities; but different degrees of the same tion, we are persuaded, is unsound. The quality, and probably exist only relatively to axiom, we believe, is now admitted to be each other. If the water is of a higher tem- fallacious (in the sense at least here assigned perature than the air, or the body of the to it) by all who have recently paid any atten person who touches it, he will call it warm; tion to the subject. But what does Mr. Drumif of a lower temperature, he will call it cold. mond understand exactly by ideas? Does he But this does not prove by any means, that mean certain films, shadows, or simulacra, the difference between two distinct tempera- proceeding from real external existences, and tures is ideal, or that it is not always perceived passing through real external organs to the by all individuals in the very same way. If local habitation of the soul? If he means Mr. Drummond could find out a person who this, then he admits the existence of a manot only thought the water cold which other terial world, as clearly as Dr. Reid does; people called warm, but also thought that and subjects himself to all the ridicule which warm which they perceived to be cold, he he has himself so justly bestowed upon the might have some foundation for his inference; hypothesis of animal spirits, or any other but while all mankind agree that ice is cold, supposition, which explains the intercourse and steam hot, and concur indeed most exactly between mind and matter, by imagining some in their judgments of the comparative heat of matter, of so fine a nature as almost to graall external bodies, it is plainly a mere quib-duate into mind! If, on the other hand, by ble on the convertible nature of these qualities, to call in question the identity of their perceptions, because they make the variable tandard of their own temperature the rule for denominating other bodies hot or cold.

ideas, Mr. Drummond really means nothing but sensations and perceptions (as we have already explained that word), it is quite obvious that Dr. Reid has never called their existence in question; and the whole debate comes back to the presumptions for the exist ence of an external world; or the reasonable

In the same way, Mr. Drummond goes on to say, one man calls the flavour of assafoetida nauseous, and another thinks it agreeable ;-ness of trusting to that indestructible belief one nation delights in a species of food which to its neighbours appears disgusting. How, then, can we suppose that they perceive the same real qualities, when their judgments in regard to them are so diametrically opposite?

which certainly accompanies those sensations, as evidence of their having certain external causes. We cannot help doubting, whether Mr. Drummond has clearly stated to himself, in which of these two senses he proposes to

defend the doctrine of ideas. The doctrine guished by its colour, from the other portions of IMAGES proceeding from actual external that were perceived at the same time. It existences, is the only one in behalf of which seems equally impossible to dispute, however, he can claim the support of the ancient phi-that we should receive from this impression losophers; and it is to it he seems to allude, the belief and conception of an external exin several of the remarks which he makes on the illusions of sight. On the other supposition, however, he has no occasion to dispute with Dr. Reid about the existence of ideas; for the Doctor assuredly did not deny that we had sensations and perceptions, notions, recollections, and all the other affections of mind to which the word idea may be applied, in that other sense of it. There can be no question upon that supposition, but about the origin of these ideas-which belongs to another chapter.

istence, and that we should have the very same evidence for its reality, as for that of the objects of our other senses. But if the external existence of light be admitted, a very slight attention to its laws and properties, will show its appearances must vary, according to our distance from the solid objects which emit it. We perceive the form of bodies by sight, in short, very nearly as a blind man perceives them, by tracing their extremities with his stick It is only the light in one case, and the stick in the other, that is properly felt or perMr. Drummond seems to lay the whole ceived; but the real form of the object is stress of his argument upon a position of indicated, in both cases, by the state and disHume's, which he applies himself to vindicate position of the medium which connects it with from the objections which Dr. Reid has urged our sensations. It is by intimations formerly against it. "The table which I see," says received from the sense of Touch, no doubt, Dr. Hume, "diminishes as I remove from it; that we ultimately discover that the rays of but the real table suffers no alteration:-it light which strike our eyes with the impres could be nothing but its image, therefore, sions of form and colour, proceed from distant which was present to my mind." Now this objects, which are solid and extended in three statement, we think, admits pretty explicitly, dimensions; and it is only by recollecting that there is a real table, the image of which what we have learned from this sense, that Is presented to the mind: but, at all events, we are enabled to conceive them as endued we conceive that the phenomenon may be with these qualities. By the eye itself we easily reconciled with the supposition of its do not perceive these qualities: nor, in strictreal existence. Dr. Reid's error, if there be ness of speech, do we perceive, by this sense, one, seems to consist in his having asserted any qualities whatever of the reflecting obpositively, and without any qualification, that ject; we perceive merely the light which it it is the real table which we perceive, when reflects; distinguished by its colour from the our eyes are turned towards it. When the other light that falls on the eye along with it, matter however is considered very strictly, it and assuming a new form and extension, acwill be found that by the sense of seeing we cording as the distance or position of the body can perceive nothing but light, variously ar- is varied in regard to us. These variations ranged and diversified; and that, when we are clearly explained by the known properties look towards a table, we do not actually see of light, as ascertained by experiment; and the table itself, but only the rays of light evidently afford no ground for supposing any which are reflected from it to the eye. Inde- alteration in the object which emits it, or for pendently of the co-operation of our other throwing any doubts upon the real existence senses, it seems generally to be admitted, that of such an object. Because the divergence we should perceive nothing by seeing but an of the rays of light varies with the distance assemblage of colours, divided by different between their origin and the eye, is there the lines; and our only visual notion of the table slightest reason for pretending, that the mag(however real it might be) would, therefore, nitude of the object from which they proceed be that of a definite portion of light, distin-must be held to have varied also?

(April, 1807.)

An account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie, LL. D. late Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen: including many of his original Letters. By Sir W. FORBES of Pitsligo, Baronet, one of the Executors of Dr. Beattie. 2 vols. 4to. pp. 840. Edinburgh and London: 1806.

DR. BEATTIE's great work, and that which was undoubtedly the first foundation of his celebrity, is the "Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth;" on which such un*The greater part of this article also is withheld from the present reprint, for the reasons formerly stated; and only those parts given which bear upon points of metaphysics.

measured praises are bestowed, both by his present biographer, and by all the author's male and female correspondents, that it is with difficulty we can believe that they are speaking of the performance which we have just been wearying ourselves with looking over. That the author's intentions were good, and his convictions sincere, we entertain no

the least doubt; but that the merits of his book have been prodigiously overrated, we think, is equally undeniable. It contains absolutely nothing, in the nature of argument, that had not been previously stated by Dr. Reid in his "Inquiry into the Human Mind;" and, in our opinion, in a much clearer and more unexceptionable form. As to the merits of that philosophy, we have already taken occasion, in more places than one, to submit our opinion to the judgment of our readers; and, after having settled our accounts with Mr. Stewart and Dr. Reid, we really do not think it worth while to enter the lists again with Dr. Beattie. Whatever may be the excellence of the common-sense school of philosophy, he certainly has no claim to the -honours of a founder. He invented none of it; and it is very doubtful with us, whether he ever rightly understood the principles upon which it depends. It is unquestionable, at least, that he has exposed it to considerable disadvantage, and embarrassed its more enlightened supporters, by the misplaced confidence with which he has urged some propositions, and the fallacious and fantastic illustrations by which he has aimed at recommending many others.

His confidence and his inaccuracy, however, might have been easily forgiven. Every one has not the capacity of writing philosophically: But every one may at least be temperate and candid; and Dr. Beattie's book is still more remarkable for being abusive and acrimonious, than for its defects in argument or originality. There are no subjects, however, in the wide field of human speculation, upon which such vehemence appears more groundless and unaccountable, than the greater part of those which have served Dr. Beattie for topics of declamation or invective.

His first great battle is about the real existence of external objects. The sceptics say, that perception is merely an act or affection of the mind, and consequently might exist without any external cause. It is a sensation or affection of the mind, to be sure, which consists in the apprehension and belief of such external existences: But being in itself a phenomenon purely mental, it is a mere supposition or conjecture to hold that there are any such existences, by whose operation it is produced. It is impossible, therefore, to bring any evidence for the existence of material objects; and the belief which is admitted to be inseparable from the act of perception, can never be received as such evidence. The whole question is about the grounds of this belief, and not about its existence; and the phenomena of dreaming and madness prove experimentally, that perception, as characterised by belief, may exist where there is no external object. Dr. Beattie answers, after Dr. Reid, that the mere existence of this instinctive and indestructible belief in the ality of external objects, is a complete and sufficient proof of their reality; that nature meant us to be satisfied with it; and that we cannot call it in question, without running into the greatest absurdity.

This is the whole dispute; and a pretty correct summary of the argument upon both sides of the question. But is there any thing here that could justify the calling of rames, or the violation of decorum among the dis putants? The question is, of all other ques tions that can be suggested, the most purely and entirely speculative, and obviously disconnected from any practical or moral consequences. After what Berkeley has written on the subject, it must be a gross and wilful fallacy to pretend that the conduct of men can be in the smallest degree affected by the opinions they entertain about the existence or nonexistence of matter. The system which maintains the latter, leaves all our sensations and perceptions unimpaired and entire; and as it is by these, and by these only, that our conduct can ever be guided, it is evident that it can never be altered by the adoption of that system. The whole dispute is about the cause or origin of our perceptions; which the one party ascribes to the action of external bodies, and the other to the inward development of some mental energy. It is a question of pure curiosity; it never can be decided; and as its decision is perfectly indifferent and immaterial to any practical pur pose, so, it might have been expected that the discussion should be conducted without virulence or abuse.

The next grand dispute is about the evidence of Memory. The sceptics will have it, that we are sure of nothing but our present sensations; and that, though these are sometimes characterised by an impression and belief that other sensations did formerly exist, we can have no evidence of the justice of this belief, nor any certainty that this illusive conception of former sensation, which we call memory, may not be an original affection of our minds. The orthodox philosophers, on the other hand, maintain, that the instinctive reliance we have on memory is complete and satisfactory proof of its accuracy; that it is absurd to ask for the grounds of this belief; and that we cannot call it in question without manifest inconsistency. The same observations which were made on the argument for the existence of matter, apply also to this con troversy. It is purely speculative, and without application to any practical conclusion. The sceptics do not deny that they remember like other people, and, consequently, that they have an indestructible belief in past events of existences. All the question is about the origin, or the justice of this belief;-whether it arise from such events having actually happened before, or from some original affection of the mind, which is attended with that impression.

The argument, as commonly stated by the sceptics, leads only to a negative or sceptical conclusion. It amounts only to this, that the present sensation, which we call memory, re-affords no conclusive evidence of past existence and that for any thing that can be proved to the contrary, nothing of what we remember may have existed. We think this undeniably true; and so we believe did Dr. Beattie. He thought it also very useless; and there, too,