I, on the contrary, maintain that the argument from right is perfectly decisive of the whole Question; because nations, and societies of men large and varied enough in their elements to form distinct nations, have an eternal right to possess political power over themselves; and if they unite with other societies, it follows that as each, when separate, had a right to the whole government of itself, so each, when united, has a right to a share of the government of itself and its associate.

I further maintain, that the argument from charity, or a regard to the general welfare of the society to which we belong, is no less decisive than the argument from right; that the welfare of this whole nation, both temporal and spiritual, will be highly advanced by the removal of a perpetual cause of discord between two important parts of it, and the consequent growth of "peace and happiness, religion and piety," as the natural fruits of an act founded on "truth and justice." And this argument from charity is in all national questions of internal policy another name for the argument from expediency. For where no foreign nation is concerned, the welfare of his country, or what is most expedient for the good of that country, is to a statesman precisely the object which, as a member of it, he is most bound to promote; and to aim at which is not selfishness, but comprehensive charity.

I maintain, thirdly, that the dread of occasioning physical and moral evil to others, especially when we ourselves shall partake, perhaps, of the moral evil, but are not likely to be affected by the physical, is a most honourable and Christian terror; and that he who is without it is in a degraded state, both intellectually and morally. And the terror of provoking a civil war in Ireland, the terror of sweeping slaughter, conflagration, massacres, and executions; the terror of letting loose without restraint all the worst passions of human nature, while they themselves would be living in peace, and would be certain of political victory without incurring any personal risk or suffering,

this is the terror which the legislators and ministers of England are reproached with, as if it were no other than the low and unworthy fear which shrinks from danger.

So much then for what Mr. Faber calls "the palpable folly" of the argument from right; and so much for his assertion that "the argument from expediency involves in its very nature a total disregard to moral honesty, if such moral honesty stand in the way of fancied convenience :' and "the argument from terror avowedly reposes on a disgraceful confession of the most degrading moral cowardice."

But having thus disposed of these arguments for concession, he proceeds to bring forward what he considers a decisive argument against it; namely, the argument from "religious responsibility." Of this, he says, he has never heard the slightest mention; but, on the contrary, "he has sometimes noted the objection that the question is purely political, and that it has no concern with religion." Now I agree so far with Mr. Faber, that I think we do hear too little "mention of our religious responsibility;" that is, that we are not enough accustomed to consider ourselves responsible to God for all our actions whether in private life or in public: and liable to his judgment alike for national and political as for individual injustice, when we make it our own act by instigating it, or trying to prevent its removal. In this sense therefore I think that the Catholic Question has a great deal to do with religion. But if those who say that it has no concern with religion mean, as Mr. Faber must know that they do mean, that in doing justice to our neighbour the consideration of his religious belief is wholly foreign to the question; and that a judge who were to make a lawsuit between a Catholic and a Protestant a religious question in Mr. Faber's sense of the term, and were to regard not the merits of the case but the religious belief of the parties, would not be more "religiously responsible

for his unjust judgment, than the government which should decide a dispute between a Catholic and a Protestant people on the same grounds, then they mean no more than is perfectly true, and Mr. Faber has said nothing that can shake their statement.

Let us see however what his argument against concession from "religious responsibility" is built upon. The Members of both Houses of Parliament before they take their seats make an oath, in which is contained the following clause. "I do believe that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous." Therefore, says Mr. Faber, every Member of both Houses has sworn that he believes Popery to be idolatry: and to vote therefore" for a national union with the Romanists" is to vote "for a national union with those whom he has declared to be idolaters;" that is to say, it is to vote " for the perfect engraftation of idolatry" upon what Mr. Faber and others "have fondly deemed their exclusively Protestant constitution." And in order to extend this argument to those who are not members of the Legislature, he reminds all persons who have subscribed to the thirty-nine Articles, that is, all the clergy and all graduates at both universities, that "our national Church in her accredited Homilies (Homilies recognised in her Articles) has pronounced Popery to be idolatry."

I believe I have stated Mr. Faber's argument fully and fairly. Now although I have subscribed the Articles, in which the Homilies are recognised, yet I do not feel myself at all bound to think or to call the Roman Catholic religion "idolatry," in Mr. Faber's meaning of the term; nor should I feel myself bound to do so, if I had taken the oath imposed on all Members of Parliament. And if I did believe that Popery was idolatry, I should no less think that concession to the claims of the Roman

Catholics of Ireland was, in our circumstances, a positive Christian duty. These several statements I am now to endeavour to justify.

I have subscribed to the thirty-fifth Article of the Church of England, which declares, that "the second book of Homilies doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times, as doth the former book of Homilies:" "and therefore," it proceeds, "we judge them to be read in churches by the ministers, diligently and distinctly, that they may be understanded of the people." In saying that a book "doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine," do I pledge myself to maintain the justice of the exact degree of condemnation which it attaches to those who hold the opposite doctrine? nay, do I even pledge my assent to all the doctrine which it may itself contain? The Homilies do "contain a godly and Christain doctrine," for they contain the doctrines of the Gospel, and their predominant character is according to that Gospel. But may these doctrines never be stated with some exaggeration, and may they not be accompanied with too fierce a tone of condemnation against those who differ from them? Jewell's Apology contains a "godly and Christian doctrine," but do I, by saying this, pledge my approbation or assent to that passage which I have already extracted, in which he declares that the Church of England detests all whom it considers heretics, to the gates of hell, and punishes them by the secular arm wherever it can find them? Nay, with regard to the Homilies, I conceive, that the omission of the Bishops for many years past to enforce "the diligent reading of them in the churches" expresses their belief as well as that of the majority of the clergy, that although they were necessary for the times to which the epithet "these" was applicable when the Article was written, yet that the word "these" has not a perpetual varying application, so as to signify all times from the sixteenth century downwards. And for those who extol the Revolution of

1688 with a claim of such exclusive attachment to it, do they conceive themselves bound to admit all the doctrines of the "Homily against Rebellion?"

"But the Members of both Houses of Parliament have sworn that they believe Popery to be idolatry." They have sworn to no such thing, but simply, "that the invocation or adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous." The adoration of any creature, that is to say, the putting any created being in the place of God, and worshipping him as the Author of spiritual good, would certainly be idolatry; but this adoration the Roman Catholic Church disclaims as earnestly as we do. "D. Peut on adorer les anges et les saints? R. Non, on ne peut adorer que Dieu seul; mais nous honorons et nous invoquons les anges et les saints comme les amis et les serviteurs de Dieu. D. Adorons nous les Tres-Sainte Vierge? R. Non, il n'est pas plus permis d'adorer la Tres-Sainte Vierge que les autres saints; mais nous l'honorons d'une manière plus particulière que les saints et les anges." Catechisme imprimé par Ordre de son Excellence Monseigneur l'Archevêque de Rheims, pour l'usage de son Diocèse. Rheims, 1822, p. 112, 113. The invocation of creatures after they have departed from this world and no longer stand to us in any human relation, is so apt to border upon worship, and as it is now used in the more ignorant Roman Catholic countries, so often becomes worship, that it may justly be termed in practice, that is, as it is now used in the Church of Rome, superstitious and idolatrous. In practice it is idolatrous: but does it therefore follow that the whole Roman Catholic religion is to be branded as idolatry, that is, as an apostacy from the worship of God and the substitution of some creature or creatures in the place of God, because one of its doctrines is superstitious and of dangerous consequence, and leads amongst the ignorant to idolatrous practice, not necessarily or designedly, but