when impartially examined and confidered, yield very little folid fatisfaction; I say, as this is the cafe, not only with the gospel according to St. Mark, but also with the other three, as they all are upon a foot in these refpects; the queftion is, how muft we act, so as to behave properly with regard to them? Here is a mày and a may not be, with regard to all thofe points, abovementioned, of which we cannot poffibly come to any certainty on either fide; that is, St. Matthew may have been the Author of the history afcribed to him, and he may not; St. Matthew may have been well qualified to know the truth of what he related, and he may not; he may have been a person of fuch veracity as to have teftified the truth of what he knew, and he may not; his gofpel may have been faithfully tranfmitted to us, and it may not; it may have been justly rendered into our language, and it may not; and therefore, as I faid before, the question will be, how are we to act, fo as to behave properly towards those books, and as the importance of the fubject requires that we fhould? are we blindly to admit them all, in the grofs, as guides to our judgments and actions, without taking any further care

or

or thought about them? this, furely, would be carrying the matter too far, by giving fuch truft and confidence as the nature and importance of the subject will by no means admit or justify. Or are we in like manner to reject them all? This, perhaps, would be carrying the matter too far on the other fide, by extending our diftruft and jealousy beyond their proper bounds, feeing there is a may be, as well as a may not be, in the prefent cafe. Or are we not rather to admit them, under proper restrictions and limitations; by carefully examining them, feparating the probable from the incredible, and making credibility and a conformity to our natural notions of things, and to the eternal rules of right and wrong in the subject, the boundaries of our faith and practice? this, in my opinion, would be acting properly, and as the nature and the importance of the fubject feem to require.

AND as this is a matter of great moment; fo, furely, it cannot be amifs to enter a little farther into this queftion. As, in cafes of this nature, fraud and impofition may poffibly take place; and as all high and extravagant demands upon the understanding minifter just ground for fufpicion that bad .practice

practice, of fome kind or other, has been ufed; fo this renders this highly just and proper, and even neceffary, that, when we admit books to be guides to our judgments and actions, it should be under the forementioned limitations. First, I fay, we must separate the probable from the incredible; and the reason of this is obvious, viz. because incredibility minifters juft ground for fufpicion that there must have been fomething wrongly represented at first, or else that the subject has fuffered in and by the conveyance; and therefore fuch a demand is not fit to be fubmitted to. For example, Mat. iv. 8. Again, the Devil taketh him (viz. Chrift) up into an exceeding high mountain, and fheweth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them: This is fuch a demand upon the human understanding, that a man must unman himself to fubmit to it. That Chrift should be fet upon a mountain of fuch height, as that all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them should be brought to his view, was impoffible; feeing it must be a very fmall kingdom that can be viewed upon the highest mountain, fo as that the glory of it may be perceived without the help of glaffes; with refpect to which help to the fight,

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fight, the hiftorian has not informed us that the Devil had made any provifion of that kind. It is probable that St. Matthew, or whoever else was the author of this branch of hiftory, knew very little of the fyftem of nature, knew nothing of Antipodes; but thought this earth to be such a flat, as that upon fome eminence the whole might be feen. Again, I fay, that not only credibility, but also a conformity to our natural notices of things, and to the eternal rules of right and wrong in the fubject, ought to be the boundaries of our faith and practice; and the reafon of this is moft evident, because whatever is repugnant to our natural notions of things, or to the eternal rules of right and wrong, is, under that appearance, repugnant to the human understanding, the one in a natural and the other in a moral view; and therefore is not fit to be fubmitted to. For example: Suppose it should be faid of the Deity, that he is tircumfcribed within certain bounds, and that he lays upon one agent the iniquity of another; these propofitions are repugnant, the one to our natural notions of a Deity, when confidered in his natural capacity; and the other to the moral rectitude of his nature, as it is acting

con

contrary to the eternal rules of right and wrong. And when any thing of this kind appears in books that are to be admitted as guides to our judgments and actions; then, fuch high and extravagant demands upon the understanding minifter juft ground for fufpicion, that there was fomething originally wrong in the history or book in which fuch demands are contained; or elfe, that fuch book has fuffered fome injury in and through the conveyance; and whether it comes from the one or the other, it is a juft ground for us to reject it, because otherwise we shall not do justice to truth nor ourselves. Befides, the bounding our faith and practice, as aforefaid, is a proper fecurity against all dangerous and hurtful errors, fuppofing we fhould err, either on the right hand or on the left, by believing too little or too much; because, if we limit and confine our faith and practice, as aforefaid, then we cannot err greatly, we cannot err dangerously; whereas, if our faith and practice be not bounded, as aforefaid, then we lie expofed to the most hurtful errors. As to myfteries in religion, it does not appear that any good purpose can be answered by them; and therefore, I think, I may venture to call

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