and therefore, we can only take into confideration those ways of which it is faid that he has communicated knowledge as aforefaid, and which I apprehend to be thefe four; viz. by vifions, by voices, by dreams, or by impreffions on men's minds. Now, whether it be by one, or by another, or by all these ways, that God communicates knowledge to men, it must be a matter of uncertainty whether the revelation be divine, or not; because we have no rule to judge, and from which we may diftinguish, with certainty, divine revelation from delufion; at least, there has no fuch rule come within my notice, or that my difcerning faculty has enabled me to discover. Suppose a revelation be made by a vifion, or by a voice; as we have no criterion, no way by which we can diftinguish, with certainty, divine vifions from other vifions, nor divine voices from other voices; therefore, it must be uncertain whether the revelation produced by them be divine, or not. Or fuppofe a revelation be made by a dream, or by an impreffion on the mind, as we have no certain rule by which we can diftinguish divine dreams from other dreams, nor divine impreffions from other impreffions; therefore,

it muft, in the nature of the thing, be a matter of uncertainty whether fuch revelation be divine, or not. And if this be the cafe of those who receive the revelation at firft hand, then, furely, it must be uncertain to those who receive it from them, And though the subject matter of a divine revelation cannot be known what it is, before it be promulged; yet it may be known what it is not, antecedent to fuch promulgation. For, as the moral character of the Deity may be known, independent of revelation; fo the negative moral conduct of the Deity, or what God will not do, may be known, independent of revelation alfo. God is abfolutely and perfectly wife and good, and he is known to be fo, independent of revelation; this, I prefume,is a propofition that is univerfally admitted; and therefore, as nature does not afford a motive or temptation to the Deity to act below, or unworthy of fuch a character; fo this affords a moral certainty to us, that he never will do fo. Befides, when we take a view of the works of God, fo far as they come within our notice, it evidently appears, that the divine power and the divine intelligence have been conftantly and uniformly employed in promoting a

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public or general good; and if nature is thus directed, then, whatever is preter-natural, (as divine revelation must be) it will, furely, be directed to the fame end. So that, whatever view we fee the cafe in, it is evident, that the divine conduct is always, and in all instances and cafes, directed by the most perfect wisdom and goodness. And therefore, though the goodness and propriety of any thing that is revealed is no token or proof that the revelation is divine; yet the unworthiness and the impropriety of what is revealed, or it's being contrary to wisdom and goodness, is a manifest token of the contrary; that is,it is a proof that the revelation is not divine; and this affords a negative rule to us,or a standard by which all revelation may be tried, and from which we may judge, with certainty, what revelations are not divine, though we cannot, from this rule, form a like judgment what revelations certainly are fo. If a revelation comes forth under a heavenly character, and if, upon examination, it appears to be below and unworthy of the most perfect wisdom and goodness, this is an evident token that it is not divine; and which, furely, will justify our rejecting it: but then, if it should apB 4

pear

pear to be worthy of God, fuch worthinefs would not prove it to be divine; because there are a multitude of propofitions worthy of the Deity, which are knowable and promulgable, independent of divine revelation. And as the human understanding has truth both natural and moral for it's object, and which it naturally purfueth; fo it as naturally gives judgment according to the evidence that appears, whether it be for or against the question in debate; and whether it be certain, or probable, or whether it judges the evidence to be equal on both fides of the queftion; I fay, this will be the cafe, except the judgment, by craft or violence, is led or conftrained to the contrary. As to thofe mifcarriages in judgment that arise from careleffness and inattention, thefe I do not bring into the account; and as to craft and violence, I do not mean by thefe any thing external to a man's felf, but only what takes place in his own breast, and by which his judgment is led, or pushed on to affent upon weak evidence, or, perhaps, upon what has only the flight appearance of being fo, against evidence that is obviously much stronger, when fairly examined, or fuffered to appear in it's proper light. And,

as

as the human judgment is capable of being prejudiced, or rather over-ruled, by appetite, paffion, corrupt views of intereft, party zeal, and the like; fo, I apprehend, there are no fubjects upon which that judgment has more frequently fuffered Shipwreck, than those that relate to religion and divine revelation; and this fhould engage us carefully and cautiously to examine all questions of this kind, left we should be craftily betrayed, or violently pushed into error, for want of being fufficiently upon our guard; this being what the importance of thofe fubjects feem to require at our hands. And,

As divine revelation is preter-natural, or above and out of the ordinary course of nature; fo we can have no previous ground to prefume or expect that there is or will be any such thing, until it has appeared and proved itself to be fo. The fyftem of nature, furely, like it's author, is most compleat and perfect, as being altogether fufficient to anfwer the intention of it's founder, without any thing fuperadded; because otherwife the author of nature would not have done juftice to his own defign. As to the evils that may be supposed to refult from, buman agency, thefe are no blemish, no dedefect

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