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I AM fenfible it may be urged, it is not unnatural to fuppofe that those who are endowed with the gift of prophecy, are or be endowed with the gift, or a superiority of knowledge alfo; which I grant; but then, as this is no more than a bare fuppofition, fo more ought not to be laid upon it than it has strength to bear. And therefore, if it fhould be inferred from a man's having the gift of prophecy, that he has the gift of knowledge; and if the former fhould be made an evidence of the latter, in fuch a cafe the conclufion would be much too Strong for the premises; because it is drawn from a meer fuppofition, the contrary to which may be the truth of the cafe. St. Paul has obferved 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10. That to one was given the word or gift of wisdom, to another knowledge, to another faith, to another the gift of healing, to another the working of miracles, to another prophecy, to another diverfe kinds of tongues, to another the interpretation of tongues; fo that, according to the account given of this matter by St. Paul, the forementioned gifts have no connection with, dependance upon, nor do they generally, much less always, açcompany one and other. And therefore,

tho' a man is endowed with the gift of prophecy, which enables him to know more of futurity than others can; yet it does not follow from thence that he knows more than others in other refpects; becaufe, notwithstanding his prophetick gift, his knowledge, in all other respects, may be as much limitted and confined as the knowledge of other men. Suppofe a man fhould now foretel that some great events will take place two bundred years hence, and should be very particular as to the circumstances which would attend thofe events; and fuppofe this man should deliver, as divine truths, doctrines to the people, that they could not attain to the knowledge of by the exercise of their naral powers, viz. that we shall know, and be known to each other in futurity, as we now know, and are known; and that the relations and friendships men contract in this world, fhall be revived, and continued in the world to come. If, when the forementioned fixed time is fully expired, the predicted events should not have taken place ; then, I prefume, it will be allowed that not any thing is proved by those predictions, either with regard to the predictions themfelves or any doctrine that had been taught

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by the predicter. If, when the time is expired as aforefaid, the events predicted fhould have taken place, under all the circumftances foretold; then the question will be, what do thofe predicted events prove? And the answer is moft obvious, viz. that the predicter may, at leaft, have been endowed with the gift of prophecy, and thereby knew (as far as that gift extended) more of futurity than other men. And this conclufion would be just and natural, as we cannot discover any other way by which he might attain to fuch foreknowledge. If it should be asked, whether the events anfwering the predictions do not also prove the above mentioned doctrines, (viz. that we fhall know, and be known to each other in futurity, &c.) to be certain truths? the answer is alike obvious, viz. they do not: For as the predicted events are altogether i relative to the aforefaid doctrines; therefore, they cannot poffibly prove any thing concerning them. If it fhould be argued, that as the man had the gift of prophecy, fo he must have had the gift of knowledge alfo ; that as he foreknew certain events that took place in this world, therefore he must certainly have foreknown what will take place

in the world to come. Here the conclufions are much too strong for the premises; because, according to St. Paul, the gifts of knowledge and prophecy do not ufually, much lefs always, take place in the fame person; to one is given the word of knowledge, to another prophecy. And tho' proper evidence may be produced, that proves a man knew or foreknew one thing, or two things, or ten things; yet that evidence does not prove that he knew or foreknew all things. Events anfwering predictions prove that thofe events were foreknown, and, perhaps, that the foreknowing perfon was endowed with the gift of prophecy; and that is all the natural and proper evidence that arises from them. The training of evidences beyond their natural firength, and extending them to what they properly have no relation, is, furely, bad practice; and were it to be admitted in our courts of justice, it would be of bad confequence; because if it can be clearly fhewn that a man has looked over a hedge, that may be admitted as good evidence against him, that he has stole a horse. And tho' this would be looked upon as very bad practice in a court of justice; yet it is too common in argument, an inftance of

which we have in the cafe before us. To apply this, let it be admitted that the book of Revelations is a prophetick history, and that the feveral vifions and epistolary difcourses therein contained were intended to predict thofe very events which Sir Isaac Newton has annexed to them; the question is, what do those predicted events prove more than this, viz. that thofe vifions and discourses were real prophecies; and that be to whom they were imparted was endowed with the gift of prophecy, and was a true prophet? I fay, what do they prove more than this? Not, furely, that whatever this prophet said and taught beside these was a divine oracle; much lefs do they prove what is contained in other books, or was taught and promulged by other is fo; I fay, they do not in the least prove these, because they are altogether irrelative to them. The foreknowing the rife and fall of states and empires, the increase or decreafe of religious parties, and the like, which events may be the fubjects of prophecy; fuch foreknowledge does no more fuppofe or imply the knowledge of the refurrection of the body, or any other supernatural doctrine, than the looking over a

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