of the embargo act, was none other than that | fication to the causes, and occasions, leaving all great man, of whom the gentleman has made these qualifications, like the case itself, in the honorable mention, Samuel Dexter. He was discretion of the State governments. It must then, sir, in the fulness of his knowledge, and be a clear case, it is said, a deliberate case; a the maturity of his strength. He had retired palpable case; a dangerous case. But then the from long and distinguished public service here, State is still left at liberty to decide for herself, to the renewed pursuit of professional duties; what is clear, what is deliberate, what is palpacarrying with him all that enlargement and ex-ble, what is dangerous. Do adjectives and epipansion, all the new strength and force, which thets avail any thing? Sir, the human mind is an acquaintance with the more general subjects so constituted, that the merits of both sides of discussed in the national councils, is capable of a controversy appear very clear, and very paladding to professional attainment, in a mind of pable, to those who respectively espouse them; true greatness and comprehension. He was a and both sides usually grow clearer as the conlawyer, and he was also a statesman. He had troversy advances. South Carolina sees unconstudied the constitution, when he filled public stitutionality in the tariff; she sees oppression, station, that he might defend it; he had ex- there, also; and she sees danger. Pennsylamined its principles that he might maintain | vania, with a vision Lt less sharp, looks at the them. More than all men, or at least as much same tariff, and sees no such thing in it-she as any man, he was attached to the general sees it all constitutional, all useful, all safe. The government and to the union of the States. His faith of South Carolina is strengthened by oppofeelings and opinions all ran in that direction. sition, and she now not only sees, but resolves A question of constitutional law, too, was of all that the tariff is palpably unconstitutional, opsubjects, that one which was best suited to his pressive and dangerous: but Pennsylvania, not talents and learning. Aloof from technicality, to be behind her neighbors, and equally willing and unfettered by artificial rule, such a question to strengthen her own faith by a confident asgave opportunity for that deep and clear analy-severation, resolves, also, and gives to every sis, that mighty grasp of principle, which so much distinguished his higher efforts. His very statement was argument; his inference seemed demonstration. The earnestness of his own conviction, wrought conviction in others. One was convinced, and believed, and assented, because it was gratifying, delightful, to think and feel, and believe, in unison with an intellect of such evident superiority.

warm affirmative of South Carolina, a plain, downright, Pennsylvania negative. South Carolina, to show the strength and unity of her opinion, brings her assembly to a unanimity, within seven voices; Pennsylvania, not to be outdone in this respect more than others, reduces her dissentient fraction to a single vote. Now, sir, again, I ask the gentleman what is to be done? Are these States both right? Is he bound to Mr. Dexter, sir, such as I have described him, consider them both right? If not, which is in argued the New England cause. He put into the wrong? or rather, which has the best right his effort his whole heart, as well as all the to decide? And if he, and if I are not to know powers of his understanding; for he had avow- what the constitution means, and what it is, till ed, in the most public manner, his entire con- those two State legislatures, and the twenty-two currence with his neighbors, on the point in others, shall agree in its construction, what have dispute. He argued the cause, it was lost, and we sworn to, when we have sworn to maintain New England submitted. The established tri- it? I was forcibly struck, sir, with one reflecbunals pronounced the law constitutional, and tion, as the gentleman went on in his speech. New England acquiesced. Now, sir, is not this He quoted Mr. Madison's resolutions, to prove the exact opposite of the doctrine of the gentle- that a State may interfere, in a case of deliberman from South Carolina? According to him, ate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power instead of referring to the judicial tribunals, we not granted. The honorable member supposes should have broken up the embargo by laws of the tariff law to be such an exercise of power; our own; we should have repealed it, “quoad” and that, consequently, a case has arisen in New England; for we had a strong, palpable, which the State may, if it see fit, interfere by and oppressive case. Sir, we believed the em- its own law. Now it so happens, nevertheless, bargo unconstitutional; but still that was mat- that Mr. Madison deems this same tariff law ter of opinion, and who was to decide it? We quite constitutional. Instead of a clear and thought it a clear case; but, nevertheless, we palpable violation, it is, in his judgment, no did not take the law into our own hands, be- violation at all. So that, while they use his cause we did not wish to bring about a revolu- authority for a hypothetical case, they reject it tion, nor to break up the Union: for I maintain, in the very case before them. All this, sir, that, between submission to the decision of the shows the inherent-futility--I had almost constituted tribunals, and revolution, or dis- used a stronger word-of conceding this power union, there is no middle ground-there is no of interference to the States, and then attemptambiguous condition, half allegiance, and half ing to secure it from abuse by imposing qualirebellion. And, sir, how futile, how very futile fications, of which the States themselves are to it is, to admit the right of State interference, and judge. One of two things is true; either the then attempt to save it from the character of laws of the Union are beyond the discretion and unlawful resistance, by adding terms of quali-beyond the control of the States; or else we

have no constitution of general government, and are thrust back again to the days of the confederacy.

do they find the power to interfere with the laws of the Union? Sir, the opinion which the honorable gentleman maintains is a notion, founded in a total misapprehension, in my judg ment, of the origin of this government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it to be a popular government, erected by the people; those who administer it, responsible to the people; and itself capable of being amended and modified, just as the people may choose it should be. It is as popular, just as truly emanating from the people, as the State governments. It is created for one purpose; the

Let me here say, sir, that if the gentleman's doctrine had been received and acted upon in New England, in the times of the embargo and non-intercourse, we should probably not now have been here. The government would very likely have gone to pieces, and crumbled into dust. No stronger case can ever arise than existed under those laws; no States can ever entertain a clearer conviction than the New England States then entertained; and if they had been under the influence of that heresy of opin-State governments for another. It has its own ion, as I must call it, which the honorable member espouses, this Union would, in all probability, have been scattered to the four winds. I ask the gentleman, therefore, to apply his principles to that case; I ask him to come forth and declare, whether, in his opinion, the New England States would have been justified in interfering to break up the embargo system under the conscientious opinions which they held upon it? Had they a right to annul that law? Does he admit, or deny? If that which is thought palpably unconstitutional in South Carolina justifies that State in arresting the progress of the law, tell me, whether that which was thought palpably unconstitutional also in Massachusetts, would have justified her in doing the same thing? Sir, I deny the whole doctrine. It has not a foot of ground in the constitution to stand on. No public man of reputation ever advanced it in Massachusetts, in the warmest times, or could maintain himself upon it there at any time.

I wish now, sir, to make a remark upon the Virginia resolutions of 1798. I cannot undertake to say how these resolutions were understood by those who passed them. Their language is not a little indefinite. In the case of the exercise by Congress, of a dangerous power, not granted to them, the resolutions assert the right, on the part of the State, to interfere, and arrest the progress of the evil. This is susceptible of more than one interpretation. It may mean no more than that the States may interfere by complaint and remonstance, or by proposing to the people an alteration of the Federal Constitution. This would all be quite unobjectionable; or, it may be, that no more is meant than to assert the general right of revolution, as against all governments, in cases of intolerable oppression. This no one doubts; and this, in my opinion, is all that he who framed the resolutions could have meant by it: for I shall not readily believe, that he was ever of opinion that a State, under the constitution, and in conformity with it, could, upon the ground of her own opinion of its unconstitutionality, however clear and palpable she might think the case, annul a law of Congress, so far as it should operate on herself, by her own legislative power.

I must now beg to ask, sir, whence is this supposed right of the States derived?-where

powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a constitution emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the creature of the State governments. It is of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the State legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the State. It is a duty which the people, by the constitution itself, have imposed on the State legislatures; and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice of President with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition, that this whole government, President, Senate, and House of Representatives, is a popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The governor of a State (in some of the States) is chosen, not directly by the people, but by those who are chosen by the people, for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of electing a governor. Is the government of the State, on that account, not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of State legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volitions of its creators.

The people, then, sir, erected this government. They gave it a constitution, and in that constitution they have enumerated the powers which they bestow on it. They have made it a limited government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it to the exercise of such powers as are granted; and all others, they declare, are reserved to the States, or the people. But, sir, they have not stopped

here. If they had, they would have accom- | plished but half their work. No definition can be so clear, as to avoid possibility of doubt; no limitation so precise, as to exclude all uncertainty. Who, then, shall construe this grant of the people? Who shall interpret their will, where it may be supposed they have left it doubtful? With whom do they repose this ultimate right of deciding on the powers of the government? Sir, they have settled all this in the fullest manner. They have left it, with the government itself, in its appropriate branches. Sir, the very chief end, the main design, for which the whole constitution was framed and adopted, was to establish a government that should not be obliged to act through State agency, or depend on State opinion and State discretion. The people had had quite enough of that kind of government, under the confederacy. Under that system, the legal action -the application of law to individuals-belonged exclusively to the States. Congress could only recommend-their acts were not of binding force, till the States had adopted and sanctioned them. Are we in that condition still? Are we yet at the mercy of State discretion, and State construction? Sir, if we are, then vain will be our attempt to maintain the constitution under which we sit.

But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the constitution itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers to Congress; and restrictions on these powers. There are, also, prohibitions on the States. Some authority must, therefore, necessarily exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring, sir, that "the constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

This, sir, was the first great step. By this the supremacy of the constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so will it. No State law is to be valid, which comes in conflict with the constitution, or any law of the United States passed in pursuance of it. But who shall decide this question of interference? To whom lies the last appeal? This, sir, the constitution itself decides, also, by declaring, "that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States." These two provisions, sir, cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the arch. With these, it is a constitution; without them, it is a confederacy. In pursuance of these clear and express provisions, Congress established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode for carrying them into full effect, and for bring

ing all questions of constitutional power to the final decision of the supreme court. It then, sir, became a government. It then had the means of self-protection; and, but for this, it would, in all probability, have been now among things which are past. Having constituted the government, and declared its powers, the people have further said, that since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the gov ernment shall itself decide; subject, always, like other popular governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, sir, I repeat, how is it that a State legislature acquires any power to interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people, "We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake to decide that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them!" The reply would be, I think, not impertinent"Who made you a judge over another's servants? To their own masters they stand or fall."

Sir, I deny this power of State legislatures altogether. It cannot stand the test of examination. Gentlemen may say, that in an extreme case, a State government might protect the people from intolerable oppression. Sir, in such a case, the people might protect themselves, without the aid of the State governments. Such a case warrants revolution. It must make, when it comes, a law for itself. A nullifying act of a State legislature cannot alter the case, nor make resistance any more lawful. In maintaining these sentiments, sir, I am but asserting the rights of the people. I state what they have declared, and insist on their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it, like other constitutional powers.

For myself, sir, I do not admit the jurisdiction of South Carolina, or any other State, to prescribe my constitutional duty; or to settle, between me and the people, the validity of laws of Congress, for which I have voted. I decline her umpirage. I have not sworn to support the constitution according to her construction of its clauses. I have not stipulated, by my oath of office, or otherwise, to come under any responsibility, except to the people, and those whom they have appointed to pass upon the question, whether laws, supported by my votes, conform to the constitution of the country. And, sir, if we look to the general nature of the case, could any thing have been more preposterous, than to make a government for the whole Union, and yet leave its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen, or twenty-four, interpretations? Instead of one tribunal, established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all-shall constitutional questions be left to four-and-twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, to give a new construction on every new election of its own

members? Would any thing, with such a prin- | collector that he must collect no more duties ciple in it, or rather with such a destitution of under any of the tariff laws. This, he will be all principle, be fit to be called a government? somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a No, sir. It should not be denominated a con- grave countenance, considering what hand South stitution. It should be called, rather, a collec- Carolina, herself, had in that of 1816. But, sir, tion of topics, for everlasting controversy; the collector would, probably, not desist at his heads of debate for a disputatious people. It bidding. He would show him the law of Conwould not be a government. It would not be gress, the treasury instruction, and his own oath adequate to any practical good, nor fit for any of office. He would say, he should perform his country to live under. To avoid all possibility duty, come what might. Here would ensue of being misunderstood, allow me to repeat a pause: for they say that a certain stillness again, in the fullest manner, that I claim no precedes the tempest. The trumpeter would powers for the government by forced or unfair hold his breath awhile, and before all this miliconstruction. I admit that it is a government tary array should fall on the custom-house, colof strictly limited powers; of enumerated, speci- lector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some fied, and particularized powers; and that what- of those composing it, would request of their soever is not granted, is withheld. But not- gallant commander-in-chief, to be informed a withstanding all this, and however the grant little upon the point of law; for they have, of powers may be expressed, its limit and extent doubtless, a just respect for his opinions as a may yet, in some cases, admit of doubt; and lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. the general government would be good for They know he has read Blackstone and the nothing, it would be incapable of long existing, constitution, as well as Turrene and Vauban. if some mode had not been provided, in which They would ask him, therefore, something conthose doubts, as they should arise, might be cerning their rights in this matter. They would peaceably, but authoritatively, solved. inquire, whether it was not somewhat dangerAnd now, Mr. President, let me run the hon-ous to resist a law of the United States. What orable gentleman's doctrine a little into its would be the nature of their offence, they would practical application. Let us look at his proba- wish to learn, if they, by military force and ble" modus operandi." If a thing can be done, array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a an ingenious man can tell how it is to be done. law of the United States, and it should turn out, Now, I wish to be informed, how this State after all, that the law was constitutional? He interference is to be put in practice without would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer violence, bloodshed, and rebellion. We will could give any other answer. John Fries, he take the existing case of the tariff law. South would tell them, had learned that some years Carolina is said to have made up her opinion ago. How, then, they would ask, do you proupon it. If we do not repeal it, (as we probably pose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, shall not,) she will then apply to the case the but treason has a way of taking people off, that remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must we do not much relish. How do you propose to suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring defend us? "Look at my floating banner," he the several acts of Congress, usually called would reply; see there the nullifying law!" the tariff laws, null and void, so far as they Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. would then say, that if we should be indicted So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy for treason, that same floating banner of yours enough. But the collector at Charleston is col- would make a good plea in bar? "South lecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws Carolina is a sovereign State," he would reply. -he therefore must be stopped. The collector That is true-but would the judge admit our will seize the goods if the tariff duties are not plea? "These tariff laws," he would repeat, paid. The State authorities will undertake their are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, rescue; the marshal, with his posse, will come dangerously." That all may be so; but if the to the collector's aid, and here the contest be-tribunal should not happen to be of that opinion, gins. The militia of the State will be called shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for out to sustain the nullifying act. They will our country, but it is rather an awkward busimarch, sir, under a very gallant leader: for I ness, this dying without touching the ground! believe the honorable member himself com- After all, that is a sort of hemp tax, worse than mands the militia of that part of the State. He any part of the tariff. will raise the nullifying act on his standard, and spread it out as his banner! It will have a preamble, bearing, That the tariff laws are palpaple, deliberate, and dangerous violations of the con.stitution! He will proceed, with this banner flying, to the custom-house in Charleston:

"All the while, Sonorous metal, blowing martial sounds."

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma, like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is war-civil war.

Direct collision, therefore, between force and force, is the unavoidable result of that remedy for the revision of unconstitutional laws which the Arrived at the custom-house, he will tell the gentleman contends for. It must happen in the

very first case to which it is applied. Is not trusted their safety, in regard to the general this the plain result? To resist, by force, the constitution, to these hands. They have reexecution of a law, generally, is treason. Can quired other security, and taken other bonds. the courts of the United States take notice of They have chosen to trust themselves, first, to the indulgence of a State to commit treason? the plain words of the instrument, and to such The common saying, that a State cannot com- construction as the government itself, in doubtmit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. ful cases, should put on its own powers, under Can she authorize others to do it? If John their oaths of office, and subject to their reFries had produced an act of Pennsylvania, an- sponsibility to them: just as the people of a nulling the law of Congress, would it have State trust their own State governments with a helped his case? Talk about it as we will, similar power. Secondly, they have reposed these doctrines go the length of revolution. their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, They are incompatible with any peaceable ad- and in their own power to remove their own ministration of the government. They lead servants and agents, whenever they see cause. directly to disunion and civil commotion; and, | Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial therefore, it is, that at their commencement, power, which, in order that it might be trustwhen they are first found to be maintained by re-worthy, they have made as respectable, as disspectable men, and in a tangible form, I enter my public protest against them all.

interested, and as independent as was practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in The honorable gentleman argues, that if this case of necessity, or high expediency, on their government be the sole judge of the extent of known and admitted power, to alter or amend its own powers, whether that right of judging the constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenbe in Congress, or the Supreme Court, it equally ever experience shall point out defects or imsubverts State sovereignty. This the gentle- perfections. And, finally, the people of the man sees, or thinks he sees, although he cannot United States have, at no time, in no way, diperceive how the right of judging, in this mat-rectly or indirectly, authorized any State legister, if left to the exercise of State legislatures, has any tendency to subvert the government of the Union. The gentleman's opinion may be, that the right ought not to have been lodged with the general government; he may like better such a constitution, as we should have under the right of State interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact; I ask him to meet me on the constitution itself; I ask him if the power is not found thereclearly and visibly found there?

But, sir, what is this danger, and what the grounds of it? Let it be remembered, that the Constitution of the United States is not unalterable. It is to continue in its present form no longer than the people who established it shall choose to continue it. If they shall become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient partition and distribution of power, between the State governments and the general government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If any thing be found in the national constitution, either by original provision, or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the people know how to get rid of it. If any construction be established, unacceptable to them, so as to become, practically, a part of the constitution, they will amend it, at their own sovereign pleasure: but while the people choose to maintain it, as it is; while they are satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can give, to the State legislatures a right to alter it, either by interference, construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen do not seem to recollect that the people have any power to do any thing for themselves; they imagine there is no safety for them, any longer than they are under the close guardianship of the State legislatures. Sir, the people have not

lature to construe or interpret their high instrument of government; much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and operation.

If, sir, the people, in these respects, had done otherwise than they have done, their constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it have been worth preserving. And, if its plain provisions shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being, as its enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every State, but as a poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to be; and will be, no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion, sees fit to grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence.

But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this, their own chosen constitution, for forty years, and have seen their happiness, prosperity, and renown, grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength. They are now, generally, strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined, nullified, it will not be, if we, and those who shall succeed us here, as agents and representatives of the people, shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust-faithfully to preserve, and wisely to administer it.

Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my dissent to the doctrines which have been advanced and maintained. I am conscious of having detained you and the Senate much too long. I was drawn into the debate, with no previous deliberation such as is suited to the discussion of so grave and important a subject. But it is a subject of which my heart is full, and