"Bridegroom" without a Bride? or who is the Bride apart from the Bridegroom? What joy such as of the Bridegroom and the Bride? What glory, brighter witness, either of the worthiness of the Lamb, whose wife she is―or of the rich, divine grace of the Father's heart. May we remember whose we are, and serve him with a whole heart.

W.

P. S. Let the children of God weigh this paper. The writer prays-that wherein it is defective (much more, if in any matter it is wrong) in PRINCIPLE or unguarded in STATEMENT,—they may detect and object; and only receive what is of the Lord. Of the general value and

correctness he has no doubt whatsoever in his own mind.

The Headship of Jesus to his church, and his being Lord of all, closely connected as they are, are quite distinguishable. The distinction hangs upon the difference, not of "relative positions," so much as of "subsisting relationships."

The saint knows his headship now, as a member of the body of which Christ is head, and as a servant in the kingdom in which he is Lord. This paper, though in principle applying to both, treats more of the former than of the latter. I notice this, because "profession and responsibility arising thence" are little treated of here, as more pertaining to the kingdom. Moreover, my object being to keep the elements of first principles, and their development before the mind, I have intentionally avoided entering into any details of properties connected with these elements. What I mean is this, God separates me to himself from the world, the flesh, and the devil. This is my subject. Whenever He acts, he acts worthily of himself; this gives what characterises his acts. In redemption, how richly does the savour and fragrance of it fill all things, and rest upon the saint! This, though most precious, is not my subject, and is therefore little entered upon.

ON THE GREEK ARTICLE.

THE doctrine which, for nearly thirty years, has satisfied my own mind on the subject of the use of the Greek article is so simple, and at the same time (as being merely the intelligent application of a universally well-known principle of Greek grammar) so readily appreciable, that I have been surprised no one has stated and developed it. Nothing but my own habits, the conviction of how little I could pretend to critical scholarship, and the pressure of other service, has hindered my giving it publicity. But as it is a material help to the study of Scripture, I venture

to do so.a

The rule is simply this-illustrated in the known form of a proposition in Greek, that whenever a word presents the OBJECT about which the mind is occupied, as objectively present to it, the article is used; whenever a word is merely characteristic, it is not.

In most simple cases, this will be self-evident. It will confirm, also, many subordinate rules given in treatises on the subject; as, for example, those relating to abstract nouns, previous references, and the like. In some cases it will leave a choice of using or not using the article, so far as the sense is concerned, and merely affect vigour of style: in some it will require the power of abstraction, a power absolutely demanded for the critical study of the Greek Testament. But it will explain all, and give the special force of a vast number otherwise left uncertain. This last reason, and the more perfect understanding of Scripture connected with it, is what leads me thus to give it publicity.

The metaphysical reasons may be subordinately interesting, and confirm the rule. It may cause the article to retain its name of "definite", though I should perhaps prefer

The rule itself I did state, I find, some years ago in the "Christian Witness," but entered into no general development of it.

It has been suggested, that "combination of words" should be added. As indebted to the suggestion of another, I add it in a

note.

"objective." It may explain its early Homeric pronominal use. It may shew, that in translating Greek into English, "a," or "the," or neither, may be required; for that depends on the genius of English; our inquiry, on the genius of Greek. Our great point will be the truth of

the fact.

If I say ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζωὸν λογικὸν, the object before my mind to be described is ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Ζωὸν λoyikov is the description-that which characterises, in an explanatory way, the object about which I am occupied: it is not an object, but the character given to an object. The object is avoрwπоs. It may be the archetypal idea ἄνθρωπος. of the race (that is, an ideal object), or an actual individual previously spoken of; but it is the object before my mind to be spoken of; o designates it; äv@pwπоs names the thing designated. The anarthrouse word describes, or attaches a descriptive idea to, the designated object. Hence, though the usage was subsequently lost, we can easily conceive that where some one had been named, it stood alone as a pronoun, answering to he;" and in many phrases is rightly rendered "this," or "that," when in English the reference is specific, though equally well in general" the."

Hence, too, the well-known usage in reciprocal propositions-that both nouns have it. That is, they are coextensively predicable, one of the other; or, rather, they both name or designate one identical object. This will only be the case as to the terms themselves, when the two words stand alone. When one is limited by the

As in the case of an abstract word, which in Greek has the article, in English not:-e. g., ó vóμos law.

d Hence, when the article is used, it always marks the totality of the subject named, because it is a definite entire object before my mind, and of course complete in itself. This is sometimes of little, sometimes of great moment, but always true. The word to which the article is attached is universal; i. e., an ideal abstract, or individual, that is, a particular case of the term, and to the exclusion there of others. It cannot have the sense of some. A word without the article may be numerically one, as is evident, if in the singular; but it is not any particular one, but characteristic.

e ANARTHROUS. Editor's note:-avapepos without limbs, or joints (Liddell and Scott). From a priv., and äp✪ov, a joint, especially the socket of a joint: Anarthrous, inarticulate.-ED.

annexation of a governed noun or otherwise, it will only be true, of course, within that limit; i. e., of the terms so modified. Thus, in ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, the terms are reciprocal, because both are taken in the abstract totality of the things in their nature. But ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων necessarily limits the reciprocity to the historical facts by the verb, and to a certain sphere of fact by the genitive following rò pws. That is, the article, as presenting an object, presents the whole thing named. If it be abstract, it is the whole thing in its nature, as ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἡ ἀνομία; and in this case the terms are properly reciprocal. If not, it affirms it as a fact within the limits given in the sentence. It requires some close attention of mind to see that limited propositions are reciprocal; but they are really so. In practice and in translations it is little attended to. The mind generally makes an ordinary proposition of it, and has all that is really important; but it would not have become me to pass over the case, as explaining the use of the article. The doctrine that an article to each noun makes the proposition reciprocal, is one universally admitted; so that it does not affect my idea of the article. It was the limited case which had to be explained.

And now to open a little more the metaphysical order in the mind. The mind is ignorant; that is, has to receive, and be directed to, an object whose existence is assumed, or recognised: it has to be informed about that object. O turns its attention to an object (designates it, as an intellectual finger-post), supposed, I suspect, in all cases to be before the mind, named or unnamed; and next, what accompanies ó gives the object its name, as ἄνθρωπος. The predicate informs the mind about the object. Now, in a reciprocal proposition, both are names attached to the same object. Hence both are objective. and both descriptive. Ἡ ἀνομία ἐστὶν ἡ ἁμαρτία. ̓Ανομία, lawlessness, is the object before my mind-that is, sin. So also sin is avoμía. They are different titles of the same object. But wov Xoyikov is not an object at all. It is a descriptive idea, to enlarge so far my idea of my object, aveρwπos. It may be applied, perhaps, to other ἄνθρωπος. objects.

Hence, too, the effort of the ancient logicians to define by the genus and essential difference; because one gave the general race or character of being, and the other that which distinguished the object from all other classes, and thereby made it one to itself. It was really classification, and so far well, but no more. Locke's attempt to give, instead of that, all the qualities, informed more but was not a remedy: first, because many of those qualities were common, and not distinctive; secondly, because some might be individual. Hence the various efforts at classification in different branches of natural history by collections of distinctive marks sufficiently generalised.

EXEMPLA.

To take, now, various examples, as they present themselves in a chapter of the New Testament (John i.):Oeòs v oλóyos, the question is not at all if eòs is supreme; it is something affirmed of λόγος. Were it ὁ Θεὸς, it would exclude from Deity the Father and the Spirit, and confine the unity of the Deity to the Word.

Ο λόγος ἦν. Λόγος is the object before my mind. It existed in the beginning.

Ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Here again God is an objective being to my mind, with whom the Word was. It has been supposed that there can no rule be given for prepositions. I believe, though the cases require more power of abstraction and apprehension of the relation of ideas, the one rule holds.

Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Here the same word characterises λόγος. We have again πρὸς τὸν for the above reason (verse 2).

The passage now leads us to another case-the use of the article with a verb substantive. This is generally left as optional. It is true, the noun accompanying such verb is used with and without an article; but the meaning is not the same. Ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν. Is it not evident here that the possession of Con characterises the person or being spoken of? And on becomes a noun characteristic of the existence affirmed. Hence constantly with verbs substantive, when the thing is generally affirmed, the article is wanting. A thing which could be called life