fitures sustained by the French in the Peninsula. In proceeding to give this narrative, however, it must first be clearly announced and explained, that not the slightest detraction from the well-earned laurels of the Third Division, whose behaviour at Salamanca will be recorded as long as the memory of that celebrated conflict, is either intended or thought of for an instant. The intention of this statement is merely to claim for the brigade of heavy cavalry the tribute to which it is conceived they are justly entitled, for their effective and prominent co-operation with the infantry at that part of the position in the defeat of the left wing of the French. It would be idle to assume that the cavalry could have performed this alone, but they ought to have the full credit of having made the very best advantage of the confusion which arose among the French when they found their flank was turned, by so resolutely following up what the Third Division had begun; because it is well known, that after the first onset at five o'clock, until about seven, when the cavalry halted, that Division advanced with little opposition, securing the prisoners whom the dragoons were sending to the rear by whole battalions.

To proceed to the statement of facts, it will be recollected that in the middle of July, 1812, Marshal Marmont, who was on the right bank of the Douro, after making various demonstrations to deceive Lord Wellington as to the point where he desired to effect his passage across that river, at length executed it on the night of the 17th. As soon as this was known at the British head-quarters, orders were issued for the whole army to march towards their right, in order to counteract the intentions of the French general, whose object had been all along to force back his opponents by threatening their flanks and communications. On the morning of the 18th, the movement of the French towards their left, in order to prosecute that object, was gallantly kept in check by Major Bull's and Ross's troops of horse artillery, with the light dragoons and part of the light division, while a larger force was brought forward near the village of Torrecilla della Orden. There being, however, no position at that place, Lord Wellington caused every thing to fall back upon the heights between Carrigal and Fuente della Peña, which was not executed without some partial fighting, in which three or four hundred men on both sides were either killed or wounded.

On the 19th of July nothing of any moment occurred till towards evening, when, it being discovered that the French were again in motion towards their left, some corresponding movements were made by Lord Wellington, the result of which was, that the two armies appeared opposite to each other in order of battle at daybreak on the morning of the 20th. No engagement, however, ensued; but Marmont continuing his flank march to his left, the British army moved accordingly in the same direction. On the 21st, both armies, still prosecuting their parallel movements, crossed the river Tormes, and next day took up their respective positions on two opposite heights, near the village of Arapiles, about five miles from Salamanca, thus bringing to issue a brilliant and most skilful series of manoeuvres, which had now lasted for several days, without the French having been able to gain their object.

Under cover of a heavy cannonade, (he outnumbered us in artillery,) Marmont followed his former plan of extending towards his left, until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when Lord Wellington, attended by a single aide-de-camp, having from the right of his own position re

connoitred the march of the French columns, determined on turning their left, and instantly causing the Third Division to be brought forward for that purpose, they accordingly came into action on the flank of the French soon after five o'clock. They were received by a brigade of infantry, who, with numerous skirmishers, attempted to check their attack, and give time for bringing up a heavier force to meet it. This resistance was, however, soon overcome, and they drove the French over the crest of the heights at the point of the bayonet.

It was at this critical juncture that the heavy cavalry brigade, 3d and 4th dragoons, and 5th dragoon guards, received from Sir Stapleton Cotton their orders to advance; and, moving rapidly forward between the flank attack of the 3d and the more direct one of the 5th division, which was the right of our infantry line, came first into contact with the 66th (French) regiment, consisting of three battalions, and formed in a sort of column of half-battalions, thus presenting six successive lines, one behind the other. Strange to say, though drawn up in that formidable manner, their fire was so ill-directed, that it is believed scarcely a single dragoon fell from its effects; and no check taking place, the cavalry bore vigorously forward at a gallop, penetrating their columns, nearly the whole of which were killed, wounded, or taken, leaving the broken infantry to be made prisoners by the 3d division as they cleared the ground before them, to assist in which one squadron of the 4th dragoons was for the moment detached. They presently came upon another column, however, of about 600 men, who brought down some men and horses by their fire, but attempted no stand of any consequence, and, falling into confusion, were left as before to be captured by the advancing infantry.

The nature of the ground, which was an open wood of evergreen oaks, and which grew more obstructed as they advanced, had caused the men of the three regiments of Cavalry to become a good deal mixed in each other's ranks; and the front being at the same time constantly changing as the right was brought forward, the whole had now crowded into a solid line, without any intervals. In this order, but without any confusion, they pressed rapidly forward upon another French brigade, which, taking advantage of the trees, had formed a colonne serrée, and stood awaiting their charge. These men reserved their fire with much coolness till the Cavalry came within twenty yards, when they poured it in upon the concentrated mass of men and horses with a deadly and tremendous effect. The gallant General Le Marchant, with Captain White, of his staff, were killed; Colonel Elley was wounded; and it is thought that nearly one-third of the dragoons came to the ground; but as the remainder retained sufficient command of their horses to dash forward, they succeeded in breaking the French ranks, and dispersing them in utter confusion over the field. At this moment Colonel Lord Edward Somerset, discovering five guns upon the left, separated from the brigade with one squadron, charged, and took them all.

Here terminated the series of attacks we have endeavoured to describe; for by this time, (about forty minutes after the first charge, which took place soon after five o'clock,) it was with difficulty that three squadrons could be collected and formed out of the whole brigade, and any further advance would have been unnecessary as well as imprudent. The spot where Lord Edward captured the guns was about three miles from where the first shot was fired by the Third Division, U.S. JOURN., No. 60, Nov. 1833.

2 A

Meantime the British attack along the whole front was in progress; the infantry went gallantly on to the attack of the heights with general success; and by seven o'clock the French were entirely driven from their position, nor could anything but the approach of night have enabled Marshal Marmont in any degree to rally his dispersed and discouraged troops.

The circumstances we have detailed speak for themselves; and it is hardly necessary to disclaim again any idea of detracting from the glory so gallantly gained by the British infantry in general, and especially by the 3d division, at Salamanca. But what unprejudiced man can talk of our cavalry being deficient in impetuosity or resolution after what we have recalled to the recollection of the military reader? It may certainly be argued that the French did not prepare for receiving the attacks of our heavy Cavalry brigade, by forming squares; and possibly if they had, a better stand might have been made by them: but whatever suppositions we may make, or whatever conditional results we may imagine, one thing is perfectly obvious, namely, that if nothing but their actual annihilation could have stopped the career of the heavy brigade of cavalry on this occasion, the serious loss they suffered at the time General Le Marchant fell would, in all common probability, have done so. Indeed, if other proof were wanting to controvert the arguments of J. M., where can a stronger fact be found than this? A body of cavalry, advancing with great rapidity, in excellent order, and with all the excitement of success, fall upon a mass of infantry in close column, a formation by no means so defensive as the square; and though they charge them home, and utterly scatter and disperse them, yet do not effect this without the fall of nearly a third of their own number from a single volley of musketry, not only quite unsustained, but followed by complete rout and disorder. If, under circumstances like these, the condensed fire of infantry be able to create such havoc, what must be its comparative effect when delivered from a square in a state of perfect preparation, with every man animated by the consciousness of the formidable attitude of that imposing array of which he forms a part?

When J. M. so confidently asserts that if cavalry will only persist in dashing onwards, after receiving the fire of a square, they have every certainty of success, he should recollect that the sudden fall of men and horses, when it exceeds a certain proportion, entirely annuls the physical force of the squadron, and makes its continuing to dash forward, not a matter of will or courage, but a question of possibility. Let him then found his theories on some better basis than the notion of the courage of the British cavalry soldier failing in the hour of need, or the vague supposition that the age of chivalry could boast of more heroism than was so often displayed by our squadrons during the eventful scenes of the Peninsular war.

In conclusion, the writer of this paper entirely disclaims any controversial disposition; and if any part of this statement be illustrated or corrected by eye-witnesses, it is not his intention again to take up his pen, his object having been merely to vindicate from comparative oblivion what must always be considered a brilliant day for the British Cavalry.

A. Z.

NAVAL ARCHITECTURE.

AN INQUIRY RESPECTING THE FORM OF LEAST RESISTANCE FOR A SHIP.-THE PROPER POSITION OF THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY WITH RESPECT TO THE SHIP'S LENGTH;-AND THE MEANS OF REDUCING THE MOTIONS OF PITCHING AND SCENDING TO A MINIMUM,

BY WILLIAM HENWOOD, NAVAL ARCHITECT.

THE determination of that form for the bottom of a ship which will meet with the least resistance in moving through the water, is obviously the desideratum in the science of naval architecture. That there must be a form of body for a ship which can be impelled more easily in water than any other body of equal magnitude and weight, it is scarcely possible to doubt. The great number of experiments on the resistance of fluids to the motions of solid bodies of different forms, which have been made by various scientific individuals, and by learned bodies and societies, in this and in foreign countries, makes this point sufficiently certain, and shows that the form of least resistance for a ship has universally been regarded as an object of pursuit of very great importance.

The endeavours of several highly distinguished writers to apply mathematical science to the investigation of the form of least resistance for a solid body moving in water, have, it is well known, been altogether unsuccessful. Every theory of resistance hitherto propounded has been so completely built upon hypotheses, unsupported by, or at variance with facts, that the mathematical investigations in each and all of them must be regarded merely as exercises in that science, which has been most advantageously applied in developing the principles of the motions and equilibrium of solid bodies. It has been, and perhaps it ever will be, found utterly impracticable to form an hypothesis, upon which a theory of resistance of fluids can be established, that shall include all the circumstances which materially affect the velocity of a solid body moving in a fluid. And unless such an hypothesis can be discovered, it is in vain to look for a theory of resistance that may with confidence be applied in comparing the relative excellence of ships as fast sailers.

The little advantage which has been derived from the numerous attempts to ascertain the comparative resistances of water to the motions of solid bodies, by means of experiments with models of an almost innumerable variety of forms, renders it improbable that a result of practical utility would ever be obtained from a repetition of experiments made in a similar manner. Experiments from which it would be reasonable to anticipate results useful for the purposes of naval architecture, must be made on ships, and not on bodies of insignificant dimensions and weight. The amount of expense that would be incurred by making experiments on ships at sea, is, however, so great, that it is very unlikely much benefit will accrue to naval science from the source just mentioned.

Whilst, therefore, it appears we are unable to avail ourselves of the assistance of mathematical calculation in the investigation of the form of least resistance for the bottom of a ship, and whilst so little advantage can be expected from experiments made either with models or with ships, we may, in the mean time, endeavour to arrive at a solution of the problem of least resistance for a ship, in as strict a manner as the nature of the subject admits by the method of induction, from observations and well-ascertained facts.

Let us, in the first place, endeavour to ascertain the effects which necessarily arise in consequence of the action of the water on the bottom, when a ship is sailing with considerable velocity.

Suppose a ship, 150 feet long, to be moving at the rate of 15 feet a second, so as to pass over a space of 75 feet, or half her length, in five seconds. It

is evident that, during this period, a body of water, which must be represented in cubic content by the area of the midship section of the ship, multiplied by half her length, has been removed from the situation in which it was at the previous instant of time. And the important question which presents itself for our careful consideration is, whither, and in what direction, has so large a body of water been impelled and dispersed in so short a period?

It is perfectly well known that, when a ship is sailing with considerable velocity, there is an elevation of the water afore the greatest breadth, and a contemporary depression of the fluid abaft. The attempts which have been made to ascertain the exact height of the elevation of the water at the bows have not been successful. Chapman, the celebrated Swedish naval architect, has assumed, in his treatise on ship-building, that, when a ship is sailing with a velocity of 20 feet a second, the elevation of the water forward is six inches, and the depression abaft six inches. The same writer, however, has stated, that "unless the ship sails in smooth water, the elevation or depression of the fluid will be reduced to nothing, or to very little." As the sea is never remarkably smooth when a ship is sailing with a velocity of 20 feet a second, it is to be supposed Chapman would have assumed a greater height of elevation, and a greater depth of depression of the fluid, if he had not entertained the extraordinary notion that the elevation and depression of the water at the head and stern of a ship are much less when the sea is rough than when it is smooth. Dr. Robison has stated, in his Mechanical Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 288, that he has often looked into the water from the poop of a second-rate man-of-war, when she was sailing eleven miles per hour, which is a velocity of sixteen feet per second nearly; and he not only observed that the back of the rudder was naked for about two feet below the load water-line; but that also the trough or wake made by the ship was filled up with water, which was broken and foaming to a considerable depth, and to a considerable distance from the vessel."

It has by some persons been supposed that the height of the elevation of the water at the bows of a ship might be found by observation, when a ship is at anchor in a strong tide. It has been argued that there is then a sort of prow of water formed by the running stream before the bows of a ship at anchor, which must be exactly similar to the accumulation and heaping up of the water at the fore-part of a ship when she is sailing in the open sea, with a velocity of motion corresponding with that of the tide. It also has been supposed that there must be a similar depression at the stern in the two instances. Dr. Robison appears to sanction this notion, when, in his celebrated article on the resistance of fluids, in the volume above referred to, he says, p. 265, "The force which is necessary for keeping a body immoveable in a stream of water flowing with a certain velocity, is the same with what is required for moving the body with this velocity through stagnant water."

That there is, however, a very material difference between the force required to move a ship with a given velocity in still water, and that requisite to prevent her from being moved by a strong tide, the surface of which moves with the same velocity, is most obvious. In the one case, every point of the ship, from the keel to the water-line, passes through the water with the same velocity; and in the other case, the water at the surface flows past the ship with a greater velocity than the water below the surface; and perhaps at a much less depth than that of the keel of the vessel, the water is nearly, if not perfectly stationary. There is, therefore, so essential a dissimilarity in the two cases, that the elevation of the water before a ship, moving in still water, cannot possibly be the same with that before a vessel lying at anchor in a running stream.

That the height of the elevation of the water cannot, with any degree of certainty, be found by observation, will appear, if we consider that the direct resistance of the water against a ship, would of itself tend to elevate the