METEOROLOGICAL REGISTER,

KEPT AT THE OBSERVATORY OF CAPT. W. H. SMYTH, AT BEdford.

TACTICS.NO. III.

GENERAL RECAPITULATION.

"I have been taught this piece of wisdom, that generality brings nothing to good issue, but that, before any matter can be fully finished, it must be brought to parti culars."-KING JAMES I.

GREECE Occupied itself in time of peace with war as a science. The use of arms, just theories of formations and of marches, the principles according to which they were to be applied, together with the mode of conducting war and providing against its various casualties, belonged to those branches of knowledge that every good citizen was expected to be acquainted with, and which were taught accordingly by regular masters. Rome was not so enlightened in this respect. The Roman citizen learnt, indeed, to throw the dart, to use the sword, to raise works, to perform long marches, and to carry heavy burthens; and thus trained, took the field, individually, a better soldier than the Greek; but the higher branches of the science were entirely overlooked; the Republic blindly entrusted the command of its armies to whatever talents or experience those might possess on whom such high offices devolved. Thus, a Sempronius, a Varro, a Mummius and others, all illiterate and barbarous as the senate that appointed them;-an inexperienced Lucullus, a Cæsar, who himself acknowledged that he had never done anything, were sent forth at the head of the legions, in the good hope that, if they wanted theory, the chances of war would, nevertheless, present them with opportunities for employing to advantage the welltrained soldiers placed at their disposal. During a long succession of martial ages, and under a government constantly at war, many of the leaders so selected naturally proved themselves men of the highest talents; a far greater number owed their success to the gallantry of the soldiers and to the admirable system of organization and discipline that pervaded the Roman armies. Such men purchased, with the blood of their subordinates, the spoils, triumphs, and renown, justly due to high military genius alone. Yet neither the bravery nor the skill of the legionaries, which were never surpassed in the ancient world, saved the Republic from mourning the loss of entire armies, sacrificed by the presumption of a Flaminius and the folly of a Crassus.

During the dark ages there was no science to learn; and, from the first revival of the art, down to our own time, the idea has pretty generally prevailed that a knowledge of war could only be acquired in war. Those who had served flattered themselves, therefore, that they were already masters of the subject; whilst those who had not been in the field consoled themselves with the belief that they also would acquire an equal degree of knowledge whenever chance should furnish them with the requisite experience. It never occurred to such men that the military knowledge acquired in the field alone must be purchased at the expense of "human bones," and can, at the best, be only imperfect. War is a time of action, and for the application, far more than the acquisition of knowledge; and those who do their duty towards their country and their profession must bring with them into the field as much science and as much of the habit and power of thought as can be gathered from the experience of those who have gone before them. It U. S. JOURN. No. 61, Dec. 1833.

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is not in the lists that the champion must be trained and instructed; he must bring science with him to the combat, and then practice and experience will improve his skill, and confidence will nerve his arm.

But in our time and country these views have not prevailed. We have profited neither by the theory of the Greeks nor the practical ability of the Romans; we have not been warned by the disasters which the weak points of their different formations drew down upon those ancient nations, nor by the losses occasionally sustained by our own and other tactical armies, when contending against adversaries who, from accident, skilful leading, or from some peculiar mode of warfare, happened to strike at one of the many weak points of the Prussian system of tactics. I purposely say the Prussian system, in order that we may not allow ourselves to be deceived by the new names applied to old practices, for we are still, after the lapse of a century, and at the expiration of a war carried on for five-and-twenty years with unparalleled fierceness in every quarter of the globe, following the system originally introduced into the Prussian army by the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, and subsequently improved by Frederick II. Either the science of tactics already attained absolute perfection under that celebrated monarch, or the great masters of the age of intellect have not been great enough to advance it a single step. And it is indeed no easy matter to perfect or advance a system founded upon charcoal and saltpetre. Epaminondas himself, were he to rise from the dead, would be amazed to see the soldiers of his wedge, or embolon, struck mangled to the ground by the fire of batteries placed upon distant heights. Human intrepidity must rise above its usual level to remain calm and collected under a storm of these artificial thunderbolts, more destructive than those of nature itself.

In the first and second part of this Essay I endeavoured to point out the insufficiency of modern tactics, particularly as contrasted with the qualities of British soldiers, as well as the utter helplessness in which this modern arming and training must necessarily leave the infantry, when encountered, on level ground, by bold and resolute horsemen. Opinions so much at variance with the military maxims of the day could not be expected to pass altogether unchallenged; and these Essays have, in consequence, been honoured with some attention, as well as criticism, both in our own and in foreign countries. The arguments in support of the present system, formerly published in this Journal, were replied to at the time; and I now deem it right, before proceeding to the more important subject of strategy, briefly to go over the objections more generally urged against the views taken in these papers. I shall select, for this purpose, the article on tactics that appeared in the Caledonian Mercury of the 19th of July, 1832, as it embraces not only all that other writers have advanced against me, but also gives-what is so very rare in modern controversy-a clear analysis of the opinions under review. I ascribe the critique to the acute and learned author of the admirable articles "Army" and " Battle" in the seventh edition of the Encyclopædia.

It would now be as useless to omit the name of the present writer as it would be to insert the flattering terms in which it is introduced by the reviewer; for the person of the author can go for nothing in this controversy, and all deviation from the matter under discussion to the pretensions of an individual may be safely looked upon as unwilling

confessions of defeat. The opinions contained in these papers must stand or fall by the facts and arguments brought forward in their support: if the facts are correctly stated, and if the inferences to which they lead are logically drawn, then will the humble rank and unknown name of the writer detract as little from their value as higher rank and greater pretensions could add to the weight of opinions founded upon erroneous premises or discordant conclusions. Though logic is banished from political controversy, we must retain its use in all military discussions, for we shall never, by a false system of reasoning, arrive at a just system of tactics.

I now proceed to give the reviewer's statement, on which I shall have to offer a few remarks of my own, and shall conclude the subject with some additional observations in support of the arguments already brought forward.

'Major Mitchell, formerly of the Marquis of Anglesey's Staff*, and an officer, &c. &c., has published in the United Service Journal two Essays on Tactics; one of which has for its object to show, that the general system of tactics at present acted upon is defective in various essential points, and particularly in the non-developement of the energies of men in close combat, and the tendency (1) to trust to strategical combinations and manœuvres, rather than to put the issue to the speedy and decisive arbitrement of battle sword in hand; whilst the purport of the other is to prove, both from principles and facts, that cavalry, when properly led, are capable of overthrowing infantry in any formation. With regard to the first of these treatises, we have only to say, that we agree entirely in Major Mitchell's views, in as far as these are merely of a practical nature, and that we consider his exposition of the defects of the present tactical system as deserving of deep and earnest meditation. No attention whatever, or at least next to none, is paid to the training of the soldier in his capacity of an individual; no effort is made to develope his fighting qualities, to teach him to depend on his own energies, or to familiarize him with the idea of that species of combat which, in the case of men naturally brave, robust, vigorous, and persevering, is sure to prove decisive. He is armed with a clumsy and not very manageable weapon, adapted chiefly to distant fighting; he is taught to depend not on himself, but on the mass of which he constitutes a unit; the object of the discipline to which he is subjected is to convert him into a sort of living machine, capable of moving or acting only as he is impelled; there is nothing to excite his enthusiasm, nor to produce that high and chivalrous daring, under the influence of which death loses its terrors, and victory flashes in living colours on the soul of the warrior; he stands to shoot or be shot, as chance may determine; the force of moral causes is destroyed; and when his formation is disordered, he is lost. He has no reliance upon, no resource, in himself. He is merely one of a disciplined mob, and when the coherence is dissolved, he is at the mercy of any assailant. One great branch of military instruction is neglected. The mass is carefully disciplined, but the individual is forgotten; and, as a natural part of the same system, he is not provided with any means of action or defence, except collectively-and even these are bad.

"The second essay, which has for its object to show that, under the actual system, cavalry, when properly led, are capable of overthrowing infantry in any formation, is not less deserving of attention than the first, though the views which the author here labours to establish are more at variance with received opinions than those regarding the general character of modern tactics. At the same time, his induction is, in many respects, very striking, and some of the facts stated seem to warrant conclusions more favourable to

*D. A. Quarter-Master General.

the power of cavalry, when opposed to infantry, than have been recently sanctioned by military writers of talents and experience (2). Major Mitchell, however, rests too much on detached examples, where accident and surprise on one side, or unprecedented daring on the other, may have led to unexpected results (3); and he has not examined, as we think he ought to have done, that still more numerous class of instances where the efforts of cavalry against infantry have been foiled, notwithstanding the attack of the former was made under every advantage. The account, in short, is not equally balanced; one side of it only is brought prominently forward; and although the individual cases specified are, for the most part, accurately stated, circumstances most material to the right understanding of the point at issue are often unconsciously omitted. Good cavalry, for instance, will always succeed against bad infantry; and, on the other hand, steady, welldisciplined infantry will uniformly repulse indifferent cavalry. But what safe conclusion can be drawn from cases of either kind? The contending parties are not in pari casu. To make out his point Major Mitchell must establish that, upon equal terms, and in the open field, no infantry whatever can resist the shock of a cavalry charge delivered in compact order, and with the requisite energy and determination. But has he done so? (4) He has proved, we think, that cavalry can do more than they have hitherto effected; but he has not shown that they are capable of accomplishing this. It is easy to theorise, and the Major has done so skilfully; but he almost always confines his attention to isolated cases. A single square may be broken; but where there are numerous squares, the success in one instance would only accelerate the destruction of the assailants, who, disordered by their very victory, would fall an easy prey to the musketry and artillery of the surrounding squares, as happened at Waterloo.

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Accordingly, it may be stated as a general fact that cannot be disputed, that cavalry, however excellent and enterprising, have never, in any instance, been able to make a serious impression on veteran infantry in close formation, and prepared to receive them. The Mamelukes were allowed to be the finest body of horse in the world; yet they failed in their attack on the French army, under Napoleon, at the battle of the Pyramids, although they rushed on like a living tempest,' at full speed, and were headed by Mourad, the bravest and most enterprising of all the Beys. This was perhaps the most desperate charge executed by cavalry in modern times; it was made with the fury of a hurricane from the desert, and persevered in with a determination to conquer or perish; yet, although some of the squares were broken by the violence of the shock, the attack completely failed; and these brave horse were driven from the field with the loss of near half their numbers. They could make no serious impression on the tried veterans of the army of Italy. Kleber's twelve hundred infantry resisted for nearly as many hours all the efforts of eighteen thousand Turkish horse at Mount Lebanon, and finally disengaged themselves without any great loss. At Smolensko, the Russian army, then under the able.command of Barclay de Tolly, retired in squares, followed by the French cavalry, under Murat, which repeatedly dashed at them in the gallantest manner possible; but, though animated by the chivalrous example of their heroic leader, the latter were unable to make almost any impression on them. Each square seemed a blazing ball of fire; and as the retreat was conducted with admirable coolness and in perfect order, the squares. mutually supporting each other, it was found impossible to approach them. Why has Major Mitchell neglected these and hundreds of similar examples that might be quoted? It is not by taking instances on one side, and omitting altogether those on the other, that any induction can be rendered either satisfactory or conclusive. Both sets of cases must be carefully analysed and compared (5) before any inference can fairly be drawn from them; and proper allowances must also be made for accidents, surprises, and inequalities in discipline, numbers, and moral force, which are alto