Unfortunately, moreover, the theory of Cudworth has failed to receive an equal amount of verification from the researches of subsequent investigators.

Utilitarianism

There was another feature in the philosophy of Hobbes Hobbes's which contrasted yet more strongly with the creed of the Platonists. Utilitarianism, in its coarsest form, was the groundwork of his system. Pleasure, self-interest, personal well-being, were the basis of all human actions. Regard for the happiness of others could only arise from a conviction that one's own happiness is involved therein; patriotism was only a mode of asserting one's belief that the welfare of the individual is bound up in the prosperity of the State; virtue is solely recommended by its productiveness of pleasure. Of a future existence, and of this life as one of probation and preparation for another, the founder of Utilitarianism had no conception.

It will at once be seen how such an estimate of human purposes and destinies must have revolted all those who sought both in faith and practice a nobler mark at which to aim. The duty of self-discipline, the deep significance of the inner life, the attainment of moral purity, truths which even the pagan philosopher had discerned through the mists of superstition and tradition, and which the Anglican and the Platonist of the seventeenth century regarded as inalienable from all adequate conceptions of man's life, were, to Hobbes and his disciples, only as the fancies of a vague and baseless mysticism. "It will not follow from hence," says Cudworth in his preface to the Intellectual System, "that whosoever shall read these demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, must therefore be of necessity presently convinced whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true which some have affirmed, that were there any

interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain at least sceptical about them. Wherefore mere speculation and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified and having a contrary interest of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice may, without syllogistical reasonings and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted. assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher: Η κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀρίστων eival, Purity possesses men with an assurance of the best things; whether this assurance be called a vaticination or divine sagacity, (as it is by Plato and Aristotle) or faith, as in the Scripture."

To Hobbes, this language must have appeared unintelligible. The gulf between him and the Platonists was, in fact, so vast, that the arguments of each seem, like spent arrows, to fail to traverse it. We are reminded of an encounter between two logicians, where each refuses to accept the definitions and nomenclature of the other. We have, in the present day, seen the Utilitarian philosophy expounded and defended by a writer of powers not inferior to those of Hobbes, but of a spirit far more temperate and comprehensive. As interpreted by Mr Mill, Utilitarianism no longer appears associated with Atheism and degrading views of human nature, but as the philosophical expression of the most benign and catholic tenets of Christianity, a

censure of the

day.

radiant minister of light. We cannot but think, however, that somewhat severe measure has been dealt out to our forefathers, because, when the celestial visitant saw fit to appear to them in a totally different guise, they failed to recognise his divine mission. Mr Buckle has animadverted Mr Buckle's on their “prejudices" with extreme severity. "This pro- Clergy of the found thinker," he says, speaking of Hobbes, "published several speculations very unfavourable to the Church, and directly opposed to principles which are essential to ecclesiastical authority. As a natural consequence he was hated by the clergy; his doctrines were declared to be highly pernicious; and he was accused of wishing to subvert the national religion, and corrupt the national morals1."

Now it is quite certain that if Hobbes did not desire to "subvert the national Church," it could only be because he did not think his own principles worth carrying into. practice; as for "corrupting the national morals,”—let

from which

should be re

us turn for a moment to estimate the real facts as our Point of view forefathers saw them. We have already noticed how the their position tenets he held directly challenged those axioms on which garded. morality and religion were at that time supposed to rest. With him might was right, conscience was but fear, right, and wrong were merely conventional forms of speech; man himself the creature of necessity, devoid of liberty and choice. It is difficult, then, to understand how the ministers of a Christian Church, to whom the teachings of the New Testament had aught of significance and reality, as the embodiment of principles which it was the duty of the Christian moralist to interpret into the language of daily life, could well avoid the conclusion that such opinions if widely disseminated could hardly fail to

1 Hist. of Civilization in England, Vol. 1. p. 390.

lower, as they certainly afterwards did, the moral tone of the whole people. Nor is it just to represent as the antipathy of a class, feelings which were undoubtedly shared by the majority of the most thoughtful and moderate men of that time. It was only natural that the clergy should occupy a prominent part in a controversy wherein those principles were so rudely assailed which they were specially called upon to defend; but it must be remembered that the doctrines of Hobbes had also to encounter the stately rebuke of Clarendon, and, later in the century, the severest condemnation of a writer, who certainly had little sympathy with the clergy,—the author of the Character istics1.

It would seem, indeed, not improbable that, though he is generally believed to have been a man of blameless private life, his political tergiversation may have thrown suspicion on the purity of his motives. He had followed Charles the Second into exile, and attached himself to the English court at Paris; from thence he had written in defence of Cromwell's government, and had subsequently returned to England. At the Restoration, he turned with equal facility to enjoy the substantial favour and patronage of his sovereign, who seems to have ignored the former defection of his old preceptor. When we add to this, that it was also Hobbes's fortune to gain the plaudits and admiration of a Court more openly immoral than any which our country had before seen, where no ecclesiastic

1 Shaftesbury, in his Letter to a Student in the University, says that it was Locke who struck the home-blow, for "Hobbes's character and base slavish principles of government, took off the poison of his philosophy.”

2 There was nothing, however, that Charles, without principles himself, could so easily condone as a want of principle in another. Clarendon tried hard to prevail upon the indolent monarch to read the "Leviathan" through, feeling certain that he would then think more seriously of the matter, but without success,

could appear without immediately becoming a butt for sarcasm and ridicule, we think we have sufficient reason for understanding that his life and teaching must have alike incurred the condemnation of really candid and tolerant men, who may have been unable to refrain from recognising the natural connexion between precept and practice, in the principles of the philosopher and the morals of his followers.

We must now take our leave of the Cambridge Platonists. From whatever stand-point we may seek to estimate their merits and demerits, our verdict will scarcely be one of unqualified approval, but it will, we think, at the same time be conceded, that their faults were to no small extent redeemed by disinterested aims and noble virtues; that, at a time when infidelity on the one hand, and fanaticism on the other, seemed threatening to absorb the earnest thought and mental vigour of the country, the leaders of this school strove, not unsuccessfully, to hold the middle course; that, if in their hands the trembling balance failed accurately to compare the claims of reason and the claims of faith, they were yet watchful guardians of the sacred fire on the altars where it already grew faint and dim; and the dispassionate critic, while he views with regret so much genius and learning devoted to labours which posterity has so imperfectly rewarded, will probably allow that those defects of thought, which we trace in the writings of this school, were in a great part the accidents of an age wherein their virtues were all their

own.

We shall venture, in concluding this chapter, and with it, our remarks on that portion of the century preceding the Civil War, to quote the admirable criticism of Coleridge, on a period which he so thoroughly knew and so intimately understood: