sistance. These were the men who, in the pay of a wealthy jacobin, and under the guidance of fanatic philosophers, overturned all order and government in France, and will overturn it in every other country, where they exist in great numbers, and are not opposed with great force and unceasing vigilance. But, fortunately for America, there are few sans-culottes among her inhabitants; very few indeed. Except some small portions of rabble in a few towns, the character is unknown among us; and hence our safety. Our people are all, or very nearly all, proprietors of land, spread over a vast extent of country, where they live in ease and freedom, strangers alike to oppression and want. Those who reside in the largest towns are possessed of property, have homes, families and regular occupations; and among such a people, the principles of sans-culottism never did, and never will, make much progress. If a new duke of Orleans were here, with a Mirabeau for his privy-counsellor, and an annual revenue of three hundred thousand guineas to supply the means of corruption, he could not raise a mob sufficient to drive this body from their seats, or overawe their deliberations. We have jacobins in plenty, and philosophers not a few: but while we are free from sans-culottes, and it is probable that the nature of our government, and the abundance of untilled land in our country, will secure us from them for ages, we need not apprehend great danger. We ought, no doubt, to watch and withstand the enterprizes of the pioneers and generals; but while they remain without troops, they are not much to be dreaded.

Having made these observations on the purity of gentlemen's motives, observations which were due not only to candor and truth, but to the respect I feel for their personal characters, I hold myself at full liberty to explain the tendency of the present amendment, and of that system of policy of which it is a part. I mean not to impute any ill intentions to gentlemen, when I declare, and attempt to prove, that this tendency is to

the utter subversion of the present government. It is my firm and most deliberate opinion, that the amendment now under consideration, and the principles of that system to which it belongs, lead directly to the introduction of anarchy and revolution in this country; and if not steadily opposed, must sooner or later produce that effect. This opinion it is my purpose to support, by the observations which I am about to of fer; and it is by a full conviction of its truth, that I have been induced to consider it as a most sacred duty, to combat the system at all times, and by all the means in my power.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gallatin,) has denied this to be the tendency of his system, and contends that our principles, not his, lead to revolution and anarchy. Revolution and anarchy, he tells us, in emphatic language, are the results of a system of expense, of war, of oppression and of arbitrary sway; the last leaf of that book, in which are written the excesses of tyranny. I agree fully with the gentleman in this position; but there is another question anterior to this, which he has omitted to discuss. It is, by what means tyranny, by what means the excesses of arbitrary government, are most likely to be produced? This question I propose to discuss with the gentleman from Pennsylvania. I mean to compare his system, his principles with ours, and to inquire which of the two is most likely to introduce arbitrary government into this country. And I hope to convince, not that gentleman himself, but the House, that if ever arbitrary government should exist here, it must owe its existence to the system of policy which that gentleman supports.

How, let me ask, Mr. Chairman, have the governments of other countries been converted from free, into arbitrary governments? By one of two ways; either a military chief, possessing little political authority, but hereditary, and having at his disposal the military force of the state, has availed himself of the frequent wars by which neighboring states are so apt

to be afflicted, has augmented that military force, and finally employed it in extending and confirming his own authority; or in states where no military chief of this description existed, popular leaders, possessed of talents, and actuated by an inordinate ambition, have formed a strong party among the people, have invaded and finally subverted the authority of the government, and erected to themselves an absolute dominion. Every state that has lost its liberty, since the foundation of the world, till the present day, except in cases of conquest by a foreign power, has lost it by one or the other of these two methods. The first is the natural death of free monarchies, the second, of free republics; and both ancient and modern history furnish many examples of both. It was by the first, that all the feudal states were converted into absolute monarchies, except England and Poland; the former of which was protected, by its insular situation, from the necessity and also from the consequences of a great military power in the hands of its chief, and thus preserved its liberties; while in the latter, powerful individuals retained the military force in their own hands, divided it among themselves, kept their chief in subjection, and at length, by their feuds and civil broils, destroyed the strength of the state, and delivered it over to be subdued and divided by the neighboring powers. It was by the concentration and exercise of military force, in the hands of an hereditary chief, that the Cortes of Spain were broken under Ximenes, and the states general of France, under Richlieu and Mazarine. It was thus the great princes of Germany became absolute, in their respective dominions; and that the Russian despotism was founded, on the ruins of feudal aristocracy.

This danger, however, does not exist in popular governments. They have no great military chief, of hereditary power, who, disposing absolutely of the public force, may use it for the extension of his own authority and of all republics that ever have existed.

none ever was so little threatened with danger from that quarter as ours. It is needless to dwell on the reasons of this particular advantage; for they are obvious to every one. When republics fall, they fall by other means; by gradual inroads on the principles of their governments; by popular encroachments on regular authority; by the concentration of their powers in some popular body, where artful, able and aspiring demagogues obtain sway, and establish arbitrary power under the name of the people. This is the quarter from which all popular governments have been assailed, for the most part with success; and from which ours will be successfully assailed, should the principles of the gentleman from Pennsylvania ever be adopted. Thus fell Rome under the power of Cæsar; thus fell the republic of England under the power of Cromwell; and thus will fall the United States under some future Cæsar or Cromwell, unless a steady opposition be given to the system of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, of which this amendment, let it be repeated, forms a part.

When the examples of the ancient republics was adduced by my friend from Massachusetts, (Mr. Thatcher,) the gentleman from Pennsylvania denied it to be applicable, because the government of those republics was different from ours. I know, Mr. Chairman, that our government is different from that of Athens or Rome, and I wish it to keep so. That is the object of all my exertions, of all my zealous opposition, to motions like the present. To make our government like those of Athens or Rome, is, in my apprehension, the object and tendency of the system, advocated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. How is this to be effected? By inducing this House, sometimes under this, and sometimes under that plausible pretence, to establish precedents of encroachment on the other departments; to practise on these precedents, and extend them further and further; until at length all pow

er shall be concentrated in this House, and exercised according to the good pleasure of those members, who can obtain influence here. In Athens all power was concentrated in the hands of one body, and it was abused at the pleasure of those, who, by their eloquence, their wealth, or by any other means, could obtain the confidence, and influence the determinations of that body. In Rome, the case was somewhat different; but even there, for want of a well fixed balance in her government, the mass of the people gradually usurped all power, and transferred it to their favorites or their purchasers. By pursuing the principles of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the same effect must be produced here. This House first begins the attack on the President. It controls his appointments, directs his measures, gives him orders under the name of advice, and if he refuses to obey them, withholds all the supplies for the service of the government. All this is justified under the gentleman's doctrine of appropriations. A favorable moment is seized for laying the corner-stone, for fixing the principle, and plausible pretexts are adduced. A treaty is made, and a popular clamor is excited against it. Advantage is taken of this clamor, to refuse an appropriation for carrying the treaty into effect, and thus a precedent of interfering in treaties is attempted to be established. A foreign minister is appointed, the reasons for whose appointment are capable of being obscured or misrepresented. The occasion is seized to deny an appropriation; and, under the pretence of saving public money, and preventing the expense of an useless appointment, an attempt is made to acquire a control over the appointments of officers. These points being carried, the precedents are soon drawn into practice, and further enterprizes are undertaken in due season. Every success gives further strength and boldness for new assaults, the cannon of every bastion that is taken, is immediately turned on the remaining works: and