Cadence. 2 66 in a ship; and elsewhere for the compacts binding men together, which the Gods were called to witness. And in the Homeric hymns the Goddess Harmonia seems to represent the general fitness of things in the universe. Harmony, therefore, is improperly applied to the degrees of a single quality, for instance Tone, which constitutes what Mr. Steele and Mr. Mitford more properly call the Melody of Speech;" whilst the latter seems to mean by the Harmony of Language," a pleasing result of all its qualities judiciously combined. Even this, however, is by no means what is meant by harmony in its modern application to music; for in that art it signifies the fit adaptation of concurrent notes (that is tones) in different parts, of one or more instruments or in voices of different pitch, with or without instruments: and that in certain mathematical proportions. And as the musical acceptation of the term is so well and so generally known, it would be advisable not to apply it in a different sense to speech; whilst the term melody, as used by the two glossologists abovementioned, agrees well enough with the use of the same term in music; and moreover answers to the terms μéλos and vμéλɛia of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.' 235. In respect to time, the word Cadence has, I think, been injudiciously adopted by some writers for rhythm. Cadence is used, in the standard works on music, to signify a certain progression of sounds at the end of a piece, without which the hearer would experience a sense of incompleteness. It is derived from the Latin cado, to fall, and is alluded to in the beautiful speech of the enamoured Duke to the musicians That strain again—it had a dying fall! O! it came o'er my ear, like the sweet south, Mr. Steele uses it as analogous in speech to a bar in music, which is 1 Γόμφοισι δ ̓ ἄρα τήν γε καὶ ἁρμονίησιν ἄρηρεν. Odyss. 5, 248. 2 Αλλ ̓ ἄγε δεῦρο θεοὺς ἐπιδώμεθα, τὸ γὰρ ἄριστοι 3 Iliad, 22, 254. 8 Αυτὰρ ἐϋπλόκαμοι χάριτες, καὶ ἐΰφρονες Ωραι, Prosodia Rationalis, p. 24. Harmony of Language, p. 11. Shakspeare, Twelfth Night, a. i. sc. 1. 7 Prosod. Ration. p. 24. its largest sense be most nearly expressed in English by the word Cadence." And again, “ Cadence is determined by the quantity of time employed in the pronunciation of syllables." This word having a distinct signification in the art of music, I think (as I said of harmony) it should not be applied, in a sense totally different, to speech. And generally speaking, as a thorough knowledge of any language cannot be obtained without attention as well to the tone, time, and force of its utterance, as to its articulations, it becomes necessary that the terms used to express these qualities, and their respective modifications, should be well defined, and that they should not be employed with a variety of significations. 1 Harmony of Language, pp. 10, 11. CHAPTER IX. OF INTERJECTIONS. Application 236. HAVING taken a general view of the various systems of speech, of Principles. which, under the name of Languages, Dialects, and Idioms, it is the Mind. province of Glossology to examine and to compare, and having explained their material elements, namely, Articulation, Accent, "Quantity, and Emphasis, I proceed to inquire how mankind, in ages and countries near and remote, have applied to speech, so constituted, the principles of universal grammar. Those principles, I have elsewhere said, are developments of the idea of language (that is, of language considered universally) as "a signifying or showing forth of the mind." But for the readier understanding of the disquisitions about to be entered upon, it may be expedient to state more precisely the meaning here attached to the terms " Mind," and " signifying or setting forth." 237. First then, as to Mind. This word is the Anglo-Saxon mynde, which was no doubt taken from mente, the ablative of the Latin mens, and that probably from the same root as the Sanskrit men or man, explained by WESTERGAARD, putare, credere, opinari, cogitare, meminisse, nosse, scire; and by SCHOEBEL, penser, réfléchir, méditer, se souvenir, croire, opiner, entendre: and a like variety of significations is found in its derivatives, as well Latin, Italian, and Spanish, as Gothic, German, Swedish, Danish, &c. In English, Johnson gives six explanations of it as a substantive, and three as a verb. I shall mention two senses, one limited and the other comprehensive, which have afforded occasion to different grammatical systems. In the limited sense, mind is applied to the faculty of reason in contradistinction to feeling: it is the power by which we perceive, distinguish, know, reflect, foresee, conjecture, judge; but not that by which we enjoy pleasure, suffer pain, or entertain fear, hope, desire, aversion, or any other passion or emotion. In this limited sense it is used by Milton, when he makes Satan say— What pow'r of mind, Foreseeing or presaging from the depth Of knowledge, past or present, could have fear'd, As stood like these, could ever know repulse? Paradise Lost, 1, 626. 1 Univ. Gram, s. 51. 3 2 Radices, Sansk. p. 192. Analog. Constit. p. 88. So, when Uriel speaks of the desire to know the works of God, he adds But in a more comprehensive sense, the word mind includes all our incorporeal faculties, and is used in simple contradistinction to the body. Thus Lear says When the mind's free, If we adopt the narrower view of mind as the basis of grammar, we must found that science on logic exclusively; that is to say, we must consider language as a signifying or showing forth, not of our whole internal consciousness, but of a certain limited part only. In this view I cannot acquiesce; for I understand by the ideal conception of language above stated a showing forth of the whole mind; and I think a slight degree of observation and reflection will convince any one, that if we regard only our reasoning powers, we shall leave untouched a most important and interesting section of the philosophy of language. Moreover, in the greater part of life it is practically impossible to separate the faculties of perceiving, distinguishing, and knowing, from those of loving, desiring, and enjoying, or their respective contraries. They act together, at the same moment, on the same individual, conscious being, in the closest communion, mingling with and modifying each other; so that, except in the profoundest depths of scientific meditation, or in the unbridled passions that touch upon madness, it is difficult to estimate precisely the preponderance of thought or feeling in any conscious state of the human mind. This difficulty will be still more obvious, when we reflect how shadowy is the line between the conscious and unconscious parts of our mental being. And here I must again advert to a remark in one of my earliest publications, which still appears to me pregnant with important consequences in the philosophy of mind, and consequently in the philosophy of language. I then said, "the frame of the mind has a like unity and a like variety with that of the body. If any strict line of distinction could be drawn, one would suppose it might be between the fixed and the fleeting parts of our nature. In a general view, we can readily separate strong feelings, clear notions, marked events, from the thousand nameless affections, and vague opinions, and slight accidents, which pass by us like the idle wind. Yet even these latter are gradations in the ascent from nothingness to infinity; these dreams, S :s. Grammatical and shadows, and bubbles of our nature are a great part of its essence and the chief portion of its harmony; and gradually acquire strength and firmness; and pass, by no perceptible steps, into rooted habits and distinctive characteristics." It has been truly said, that "the unit of thought is a judgment;" but our incorporeal being (to say nothing of its spiritual character) includes not only thoughts but feelings; and the unit of feeling is an emotion. From what I have said, however, it will be obvious, that the unit of consciousness may not only be made up of both faculties in various proportions, but may be either well or ill defined. It may be a slight bias of opinion, or an unalterable conviction of mathematical truth; the fleeting shadow of a momentary wish, or the fixed resolution of a hero or a martyr. When once a thought or a feeling becomes a fact of consciousness (and not before), it may be shown forth by some external sign. 238. Now, these signs are various-a gesture, a look, a frown, a smile, a sound of the voice, inarticulate or articulate. Hence Homer gives irrevocable force to the nod of Jove— ου γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον, ουδ ̓ ἀπατηλὸν Οὐδ ̓ ἀτελεύτητον γ', ὅ, τι κεν κεφαλῇ κατανεύσω. For that can never be recalled, nor vain, Nor ineffectual, which my nod confirms. Iliad, 1, 526. And the effect of smiles is admirably described in the exquisite lines Your smiles are winds, whose ways we cannot trace, Sonnet to Miss Kelly. But the vocal signs which constitute speech are far more complex in their nature. It is a common error to regard words alone as the only vocal signs of the mind; whereas the finer shades of consciousness both in thought and feeling are frequently signified by the simpler elements of voice. A slight change in articulation, a variation of tone, a lengthening or shortening of the time of utterance, a more or less forcible emphasis, may indicate to the hearer either a diversity of feeling in the speaker, or a difference in his thoughts. Still it is to be remembered that these sounds, whether simply elementary or combined into words, are but material instruments which the mind employs. They do not represent the mind, as the picture of a man represents a man; they merely indicate its state and acts; and this they may equally do, whether the state or act be one of feeling or of thought; and whether the sign be a simple elementary sound, or a combination of such sounds in a word or words. 239. Of the opposite grammatical systems which are built on the limited and comprehensive significations of the term mind, the former assumes that there can be no philosophical analysis of language but 1 Remarks on Local Scenery, vol. ii. p. 331. |