innumerable local inconveniencies, to which men are not habituated, muft not arife. But thefe I pafs over, because it requires an accurate knowledge of the country, which I do not poffefs, to specify them.

When these state furveyors came to take a view of their work of measurement, they foon found, that in politics, the most fallacious of all things was geometrical demonftration. They had then recourse to another bafis (or rather buttress) to fupport the building which tottered on that falfe foundation. It was evident, that the goodness of the foil, the number of the people, their wealth, and the largeness of their contribution, made fuch infinite variations between fquare and fquare as to render menfuration a ridiculous standard of power in the commonwealth, and equality in geometry the most unequal of all measures in the diftribution of men. However, they could not give it up. But dividing their political and civil reprefentation into three parts, they allotted one of thofe parts to the fquare measurement, without a fingle fact or calculation to afcertain whether this territorial proportion of reprefentation was fairly affigned, and ought upon any principle really to be a third. Having however given to geometry this portion (of a third for her dower) out of compliment I fuppofe to that fublime science, they left the other two to be fcuffled for between the other parts, population and contribution.

When they came to provide for population, they were not able to proceed quite fo fmoothly as they had done in the field of their geometry. Here their arithmetic came to bear upon their ju ridical metaphyfics. Had they ftuck to their me taphyfic principles, the arithmetical process would be fimple indeed. Men, with them, are ftrictly S equal,

equal, and are entitled to equal rights in their own government. Each head, on this fyftem, would have its vote, and every man would vote directly for the perfon who was to reprefent him in the legiflature. "But foft-by regular degrees, not yet." This metaphyfic principle, to which law, cuftom, usage, policy, reason, were to yield, is to yield itself to their pleasure. There must be many degrees, and fome ftages, before the reprefentative can come in contact with his conftituent. Indeed, as we fhall foon fee, these two perfons are to have no fort of communion with each other. First, the voters in the Canton, who compofe what they call primary affemblies, are to have a qualification. What! a qualification on the indefeasible rights of men? Yes; but it fhall be a very small qualification. Our injustice shall be very little oppreffive; only the focal valuation of three days labour paid to the public. Why, this is not much, I readily admit, for any thing but the utter fubversion of your equalifing principle. As a qualification it might as well be let alone; for it answers no one purpose for which qualifications are established: and, on your ideas, it excludes from a vote, the man of all others whofe natural equality ftands the most in need of protection and defence; I mean the man who has nothing elfe but his natural equality to guard him. You order him to buy the right, which you before told him nature had given to him gratuitously at his birth, and of which no authority on earth could lawfully deprive him. With regard to the perfon who cannot come up to your market, a tyrannous ariftocracy, as against him, is established at the very outlet, by you who pretend to be its fworn foe. 4

The

:

The gradation proceeds. Thefe primary affemblies of the Canton elect deputies to the Commune; one for every two hundred qualified inhabitants. Here is the firft medium put between the primary elector and the representative legiflator; and here a new turnpike is fixed for taxing the rights of men with a fecond qualification for none can be elected into the Commune who does not pay the amount of ten days labour. Nor have we yet done. There is ftill to be another gradation. Thefe Communes, chofen by the Canton, choose to the Department; and the deputies of the Department choose their deputies to the National Affembly. Here is a third barrier of a senseless qualification. Every deputy to the national affembly muft pay, in direct contribution, to the value of a mark of filver. Of all thefe qualifying barriers we must think alike; that they are impotent to fecure independence; ftrong only to destroy the rights of men.

In all this process, which in its fundamental elements affects to confider only population upon a principle of natural right, there is a manifest attention to property; which, however juft and reasonable on other schemes, is on theirs perfectly unfupportable.

When they come to their third basis, that of Contribution, we find that they have more completely loft fight of their rights of men. This last bafis refts entirely on property, A principle totally different from the equality of men, and utterly irreconcileable to it, is thereby admitted; but

*The affembly, in executing the plan of their committee, made fome alterations. They have ftruck out one ftage in thefe gradations; this removes a part of the objection: but the main objection, namely, that in their scheme the first constituent voter has no connection with the reprefentative legislator, remains in all its force. There are other alterations, fome poffibly for the better, fome certainly for the worfe; but to the author the merit or demerit of these smaller alterations appear to be of no moment, where the fcheme itfelf is fundamentally vitious and absurd.

no fooner is this principle admitted, than (as usual) it is fubverted; and it is not fubverted, (as we shall prefently fee,) to approximate the inequality of riches to the level of nature. The additional share

in the third portion of reprefentation, (a portion reserved exclusively for the higher contribution,) is made to regard the diftrict only, and not the individuals in it who pay. It is eafy to perceive, by the course of their reafonings, how much they were embarraffed by their contradictory ideas of the rights of men and the privileges of riches. The committee of conftitution do as good as admit that they are wholly irreconcileable. "The relation, with regard to the contributions, is without doubt null (say they) when the question is on the balance of the political rights as between individual and indi"vidual; without which perfonal equality would be

destroyed, and an aristocracy of the rich would be "eftablished. But this inconvenience entirely difappears when the proportional relation of the «< contribution is only confidered in the great maffes, and is folely between province and pro"vince; it ferves in that cafe only to form a juft reciprocal proportion between the cities, without "affecting the perfonal rights of the citizens."

Here the principle of contribution, as taken between man and man, is reprobated as null, and deftructive to equality; and as pernicious too; because it leads to the establishment of an aristocracy of the rich. However, it must not be abandoned. And the way of getting rid of the difficulty is to eftablish the inequality as between department and department, leaving all the individuals in each department upon an exact par. Obferve, that this

parity

parity between individuals had been before destroyed when the qualifications within the departments were fettled; nor does it feem a matter of great importance whether the equality of men be injured by maffes or individually. An individual is not of the fame importance in a mafs reprefented by a few, as in a mass reprefented by many. It would be too much to tell a man jealous of his equality, that the elector has the fame franchife who votes for three members as he who votes for ten,

Now take it in the other point of view, and let us fuppofe their principle of reprefentation according to contribution, that is according to riches, to be well imagined, and to be a neceffary bafis for their · republic. In this their third basis they affume, that riches ought to be respected, and that justice and policy require that they should entitle men, in fome mode or other, to a larger fhare in the administration of public affairs; it is now to be feen, how the affembly provides for the pre-eminence, or even for the fecurity of the rich, by confering, in virtue of their opulence, that larger meafine of power to their diftrict which is denied to them. perfonally. I readily admit (indeed I fhould lay it down. as a fundamental principle) that in a republican government, which has a democratic bafis, the rich do require an additional fecurity above what is neceffary to them in monarchies. They are fubject to envy, and through envy to oppreffion. On the present scheme, it is impoflible to divine what advantage they derive from the aristocratic preference upon which the unequal reprefentation of the maffes is founded. The rich cannot feel it, either as a fupport to dignity, or as fecurity to fortune: