of Great Britain has been able so long to maintain her independence amidst the beleaguering efforts of the number of nations with whom she has been imprudent enough to form treaties of commerce; and who, from her insular situation, have it in their power to beset and hem her in on all sides. How lucky it is for the United States, that at least one side is covered by Spain, and that this formidable line of circumvallation cannot be completely perfected! or rather how hard driven must those be, who are obliged to call to their aid auxiliaries so preposterous!

Can any good reason be given, why one side of a country should not be accessible to foreigners, for purposes of trade, equally with another? Might not the cultivators on the side from which they were excluded, have cause to complain, that the carriage of their productions was subject to an increased charge, by a monopoly of the national navigation; while the cultivators in other quarters enjoyed the benefit of a competition between that and foreign navigation? and might not all the inhabitants have a right to demand a reason, why their commerce should be less open and free, than that of other parts of the country? Will privileges of trade extend the line of territorial circumvallation? Will not the extent of contiguous British territory remain the same, whether the communications of trade are open or shut? By opening them, may we not rather be said to make so many breaches in the wall, or intrenchment of this newly-invented circumvallation? if indeed it be not enchanted!

The argument upon this article has hitherto turned, as to the trade with the white inhabitants of the British territories, on European and East India goods. But there can be no doubt that a mutually-beneficial commerce in native commodities ought to be included in the catalogue of advantages. Already there is a useful interchange of certain commodities, which time and the progress of settlement and resources cannot fail to extend. It is most probable, too, that a considerable part of the productions of the British territories will find the most convenient channel to foreign markets through us; which, as far as it regards the interest of external commerce, will yield little less advantage, than if they proceeded from our own soil or industry. It is evident, in

particular, that as far as this shall be the case, it will prevent a great part of the competition with our commodities which would exist, if those productions took other routes to foreign markets.

In considering the subject, on the side of a trade in home commodities, it is an important reflection, that the United States are much more advanced in industrious improvement, than the British territories. This will give us a material and growing advantage. While their articles of exchange with us will essentially consist in the products of agriculture and of mines, we shall add to these manufactures of various and multiplying kinds, serving to increase the balance in our favor.

In proportion as the article is viewed on an enlarged plan and permanent scale, its importance to us magnifies. Who can say how far British colonization may spread southward and down the west side of the Mississippi, northward and westward into the vast interior regions towards the Pacific Ocean? Can we view it as a matter of indifference, that this new world is eventually laid open to our enterprise, to an enterprise seconded by the immense advantage already mentioned, of a more improved state of industry? Can we be insensible, that the precedent furnishes us with a cogent and persuasive argument to bring Spain to a similar arrangement? And can we be blind to the great interest we have, in obtaining a free communication with all the territories that environ our country, from the St. Mary's to the St. Croix?

In this large view of the subject, the fur trade which has made a very prominent figure in the discussion, becomes a point scarcely visible. Objects of great variety and magnitude, start up in perspective, eclipsing the little atoms of the day, and promising to grow and mature with time.

The result of the whole is, that the United States make, by the third article of the treaty, a good bargain—that with regard to the fur trade, with equality of privileges and superior advantages of situation, we stake one against seven, or at most one against six-that as to the trade in European and East Indian goods and in home productions, we make an equal stake with some advantages of situation-that we open an immense field of future enterprise, -that we avoid embarrassments and dangers ever attendant on

an artificial and prohibitory policy, which, in reference to the Indian nations, was particularly difficult and hazardous-and that we secure those of a natural and liberal policy, and give the fairest chances for good neighborhood between the United States and the bordering British territories, and consequently of good understanding with Great Britain, conducing to the security of our peace. Experience, no doubt, will demonstrate that the horrid spectres which have been conjured up, are fictions; and if it should even be slow to realize the predicted benefits (for time will be requisite to give permanent causes their due effect in controlling temporary circumstances), it will at last prove that the predicted evils are chimeras and cheats.

CAMILLUS.

NO. XIII.

1795.

The fourth and fifth articles of the treaty, from similarity of object, will naturally be considered together. The fourth, reciting a doubt, "whether the river Mississippi extends so far northwestward, as to be intersected by a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods, in the manner mentioned by the treaty of peace," agrees, that measures shall be taken in concert between the two governments, to make a joint survey of that river, from a degree of latitude below the falls of St. Anthony, to the principal source or sources thereof, and of the parts adjacent thereto; and that if in the result it should appear that the said river would not be intersected by such a line as above mentioned, the two parties will proceed by amicable negotiation, to regulate the boundary line in that quarter, as well as all other points to be adjusted between them, according to justice and mutual convenience, and the intent of the treaty of peace. The fifth, reciting that doubts have arisen, what river was truly intended under the name of the river St. Croix, mentioned in the treaty of peace, and forming a part of the boundary therein described, provides that the ascertainment of the point shall be referred to three

commissioners, to be appointed thus: one to be named by his Britannic majesty, another by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the third by these two, if they can agree in the choice; but if they cannot agree, then each of them to name a person, and out of the persons named, one drawn by lot in their presence to be the third commissioner. These commissioners are to meet at Halifax, with power to adjourn to any place or places they may think proper -are to be sworn to examine and decide the question according to the evidence which shall be laid before them by both parties— and are to pronounce their decision, which is to be conclusive, by a written declaration under their hands and seals, containing a description of the river, and particularly the latitude and longitude of its mouth and of its source.

These articles, though they have been adjusted with critical propriety, have not escaped censure. They have even in one instance been severely reprobated, as bringing into question, things about which there was no room for any--and which a bare inspection of the map was sufficient to settle.

With regard to the Mississippi, there is no satisfactory evidence that it has ever been explored to its source. It is even asserted, that it has never been ascended beyond the 45th degree of north latitude, about a degree above the falls of St. Anthony. Fadeus's map in 1793, will serve as a specimen of the great uncertainty which attends this matter. It notes that the river had. not been ascended beyond the degree of latitude just mentioned, and exhibits three streams, one connected with the Marshy Lake in that latitude, another with the White Bear Lake near the 46th degree, and the third with the Red Lake in the 47th degree; denominating each of the two first, "the Mississippi by conjecture," and the last, "Red Lake River, or Laboutan's Mississippi,"--all of them falling considerably short in their northern extent, of the Lake of the Woods, which is placed as high as the fiftieth degree of north latitude. Thus stands this very clear and certain point, which, we are told, it was disgraceful on the part of our envoy to have suffered to be brought into question.

There is, however, a specific topic of blame of the article

which has greater plausibility. It is this, that it does not finally settle the question, but refers the adjustment of the closing line to future negotiation, in case it should turn out that the river does not stretch far enough north to be intersected by an east and west line from the Lake of the Woods. I answer, that the arrangement is precisely such as it ought to have been. It would have been premature to provide a substitute till it was ascertained that it was necessary. This could only be done by an actual survey. A survey is therefore provided for and will be made at the joint expense of the two countries.

That survey will not only determine whether a substitute be requisite or not; but it will furnish data for judging what substitute is proper, and most conformable to the true intent of the treaty. Without the data which it will afford, any thing that could have been done, would have been too much a leap in the dark. National acts, especially on the important subject of boundary, ought to be bottomed on a competent knowledge of circumstances. It ought to be clearly understood how much is retained, how much is relinquished. Had our envoy proceeded on a different principle, if what he had agreed to had turned out well, it would have been regarded as the lucky result of an act of supererogation. If it had proved disadvantageous, it would have been stigmatized as an act of improvidence and imprudence.

The strong argument for having settled an alternative is the avoiding of future dispute. But what alternative could have been agreed upon, which might not have bred controversy? The closing line must go directly or indirectly to the Mississippiwhich of the streams reputed or conjectured to be such, above the falls of St. Anthony, is best entitled to be so considered? To what known point was the line to be directed? How was that point to be identified with adequate certainty? The difficulty of answering these questions, will evince that the danger of controversy might have been increased by an impatience to avoid it, and by anticipating, without the necessary lights, an adjustment which they ought to direct.

The facts with regard to the river St. Croix, are these: the